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Still, as a storyteller, I am struck how a person's sense of consciousness can be 
transfonned by nottiing more magical than listenix  ^to words... mere words. 
Charles Nelson Reilty, "Jos^  Chung's 'From Outer Space'" 
TheXFOes 
These either/or ways of seeing exclude life and real revision by pushing us to 
safe positions, to what is known. The are safe positions that exclude each other 
and don't allow for any ambigui^ , uncertainty .^ Only when I suspend myself 
between either and or can I move aw  ^from oonventumal boundaries and 
begin to see shapes and shadows and contours—ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
disomtinuity, moments when the seams of life just don't want to hold; d  ^
when I wake up to find, once again, tiiat I don't have enough bread for the 
children's sandwiches or that there are no shoelaces for their gym shoes. My Hfe 
is full of uncertainty; n^otiating that uncertainty day to day gives me authority. 
Nancy Sommets, "Between the Diaffs* 
. . .  m a d n e s s  f a s c i n a t e s  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  knowledge. It is knowledge, first, because all 
these absurd figures are in reality elements of a difficult, hermetic, esoteric 
learning.... VVltile the man of reason and wisdom perceives only fragmentary 
and an the more unnerving images of it ttie Fool beus it intact as an unbrok  ^
sphere, diat crystal ball which all others is empty is in his eyes filled with the 
density of an invisible knowledge. 
\fichel Fbucault, Afinfixess and Civilization 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
PERFORMANCE COMPLEXITY AND CULTURAL INQUIRY 
A performance completes, or thoroughly carries out, 
social processes. (Stem and Henderson 9) 
If Stem and Henderson are correct, then performance is integral to every 
social act we complete. Performance happens in the classroom and on the stage. 
Performance takes place in the way we conduct business and live with family 
members. Performance is everywhere. According to Brooks McNamara and 
Richard Schechner, performance is "ethnic and intercultural, historical and 
ahistorical, aesthetic and ritual, sociological and political," and represents "a 
mode of behavior, an approach to experience" (5). Performance involves the 
sweep of hximan behavior. 
Embedded within these performances are cultural structures and beliefs. 
These cultural entities in performance make their presence know by creating 
roles for us to enact. These cultural patterns and roles can be labeled codes. We 
understand, respect, and respond to coded behaviors because these behaviors are 
familiar to us; the codes are written in the rules of society. A teacher is regulated 
by the cultural codes related to the idea of "teacher," and students are regulated 
by the codes that apply to "students". In this dissertation I consider how to study 
the idea of cultur<il codes and their effects on our lives. 
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SpedficaEy, I explore how studying cultural performances allows us to 
identify and challenge cultural structures at work within the performance. 
Disassembling performances will provide us with a way to examine these 
cultural structures. Performance scholars Carole Simpson Stem and Bruce 
Henderson expand further on their definition of performance, claiming 
performance as "an enactment of self and society, providing a mirror for culture 
and presenting collective knowledge" (107). These performances can be as 
intricate as a stage play or as casual as an office conversation. Thinking of 
performance as everyday events allows us to take Stem and Henderson's 
"enactment of self and society" very literally. I argue throughout this 
dissertation that a performance provides an opportunity to enact particular 
cultural roles and structures. 
After this introductory chapter, I examine some of the roles performance 
plays in constructing culture. I also consider two performance elements, 
narratives and visuals, that carry cultural patterns that help us make sense of the 
larger cultural stmctures at work. Next, I examine the work of Michel Foucault 
to provide a backgrotmd for our examination of these performances. Foucault 
did much work with language structures and cultural codes. Foucaulfs writings 
help us imderstand how cxilture follows particuleir patterns—or codes—^that 
emerge over and over again. His work was intent on breaking—or at least 
disrupting—the codes at hand in order to remain cognizant of the power 
exercised within and around our enactment of codes. I combine the study of 
performance and Foucault's examination of cultural and power stmctures in my 
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analysis of performance artifacts from Laurie Anderson, a prominent twentieth-
century performance artist Finally, I draw conclusions for English studies to 
consider, in relation to Foucauldian analysis and to performance as a structure to 
identify communication instances. 
My goal for my text is the use of performance as a tool for illustrating 
cultural structures and conducting cultixral inquiry. Performance provides 
occasions to shape cxilture in perpetuating cultural codes or tearing down 
cultxiral structures. What kind of performances do we enact as English scholars? 
What kind of power structures do we support, challenge, or disrupt? I would 
claim we are not fully aware of the cultural structures we support with our 
discipline. My dissertation will help make clear some small elements of the 
performances we enact and the cultural structxires we biiild, as English scholars, 
as rhetoricians, and as professional communicators. 
In the rest of Chapter One, I first provide a brief overview of my 
conceptualization of performance. Then I briefly describe Foucaulf s study of 
language and how cultural inquiry stems from his theories. The chapter 
concludes with an introduction of the artifact I plan to use and an examination 
of the biases relevant to this study, which should expose the larger agenda(s} of 
this work. Let me conclude this particular section with a brief overview of 
postmodern thought. 
My work in this dissertation takes its cue from postmodern sensibilities. 
Definitions of postmodernism are numerous, but they retain a similarity: an 
openness to possibility and/or multiplicity. Madan Sarup characterizes 
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postmodern societies as "media society, the society of the spectacle, consumer 
society, the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, [or] post-industrial 
society" (117). For David Harvey, postmodernism is "an onslaught of diverse 
possibilities" (39) that opens scholars up to "the foregrounding of questions as to 
how radically different realities may coexist, collide, and interpenetrate" (41). 
John Hassard calls the "most stark sense" of postmodernism its "frontal assault 
on methodological unity" (1). Hassard claims, "postmodern epistemology 
suggests that the world is constituted by our shcired language and that we Ccin 
only 'know the world' through the particular forms of discourse our language 
creates" (3). Postmodernism allows us to know the world in various and 
contradictory constructions, including our language. In this work I examine 
postmodern "knowing" through interpretations of performance, using Laurie 
Anderson's "radically different realities" enacted in her works as examples. 
Postmodern thought processes must include recording those thoughts 
with a postmodern writing style. For Hassard, "the task of postmodern writing, 
therefore, is to recognize this elusive nature of language, but never with the aim 
of creating a meta-discourse to explain all language forms" (3). The task of my 
particular set of postmodern writings is to explore the elusive language we use to 
describe the ephemeral form of commimication we call performance. What I 
establish in this dissertation pins down a small section of meaning about the 
concept of performance. The meaning I create then opens itself for more 
interpretation. Postmodern scholarship involves "a vast will to unmaking" 
(Hassan 92), which makes some scholars uneasy. We assume that, if we have 
enough evidence to the contrary, we can "unmake" what has already been made. 
That lack of fixity unnerves writers, because their Hnished text is never finished. 
But the "vast will to unmaking" is, at its lowest level, another attempt at 
understanding revision. The text I create here has been made and immade 
numerous times in its eighteen-month creation process. When I release the text 
as "finished," other scholars will do their own "unmaking" to this text to revise 
the mecixung I put forth. This constant im/re/making of this document does not 
diminish its integrity. Instead, it allows this text to hold several different 
integrities, as defined by myself and my readers. Postmodemism's challenge is to 
grasp and maintain these integrities while, at the same time, allowing 
modification and change. What we see as fixed points/texts in one blink will 
become "new" texts in the next blink, and we must be prepared to adapt. 
Postmodernism is not an easy theoretical position to maintain. It requires 
us to be ideological, critical, and willing to change. Bernard Brock, Robert Scott, 
and James Chesebro note "the postmodern critic maintains that all views are 
ideological, for a description [of anything] can only reflect the perceptual 
perspectives and biases of a particular sjonbol user in a given place at a specific 
time" (435). Stajdng alert to our "perceptual perspectives and biases" can be tiring 
and time-consuming, and involve much thought and struggle. According to 
Tyler: 
Its [the postmodern perspective's] story-path is many-branched and 
lab):rinth, beginnings and ends are forgotten, misplaced, merged, or 
interchanged. Its epiphany is out of sight and beyond light. . . . The 
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light at the end of the tunnel is not Utopia but New Jersey. Its 
discourses are LOCAL, IMMANENT, and INCOMMENSURABLE. 
No single tale tells the whole story of the absent whole and no 
method overcomes the difference of dis-solution. (82) 
Deciding whether or not the light at the end of the ttmnel is some Utopia or New 
Jersey is up for discussion and argument-
Discussing postmodern thought is a useful entry to Foucaulfs theories of 
language and culture. Foucault has been most often identified as a historian and 
a language scholar. His work aims to disrupt, interrupt, or corrupt the power 
structures at hand in order to foregrovind other power structures that may have 
been forgotten, pushed aside, or ignored. Foucaulfs work is open to the 
mialtiplidtous readings postmodernism espouses, which makes his work 
alternately difficult and enlightening. Foucault's work is useful to my study 
because he is interested in the codification of power and how power, persuasion, 
and preference are institutionalized with our language use. Our visual and 
verbal languages (codes in themselves) give us opportunities to create social 
structures with certain codified rules. Foucault examines these social structures 
for the codes embedded within them in order to challenge and disrupt those 
codes. His disruptions open the way for more possibilities of meaning «md more 
distributions of power. Foucault argues for individual, postmodern realities, 
even if he does not use the term "postmodern." Foucault notes, "the word 
'rationalization' is a dangerous one. The main problem when people try to 
rationalize something is not to investigate whether or not they conform to 
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prindpies of rationality, but to discover which kind of rationality they are using" 
(PPC 59, italics added). His search for specific, individual rationalities and his 
demands for multiple interpretations place Foucault in the camp of postmodern 
scholars. 
Foucault's postmodern language theories are central to this dissertation. 
However, the heart of my particular postmodern text lies in the concept of 
performance. If McNamara and Schechner are correct, and performance can 
encompass situations that are "ethnic and intercultural, historical and 
ahistorical, aesthetic and ritual, sociological and political," then performance is a 
postmodern concept in its opermess to possibility. Elin Diamond argues that "to 
study performance is not to focus on completed forms, but to become aware of 
performance as itself a contested space, where meanings and desires are 
generated, occluded, and of course multiply interpreted" (4). The flexibility of 
performance makes it useful for understanding the various ways we interact 
with each other, and its mutability can describe many different social and 
cultural interactions. The combination of Foucault's linguistic openness and 
performance's flexible construction provides us with a useful postmodern base 
for examining communication. Postmodern realities are not about 
indeterminacy; rather, they are about possibility and constructioru This 
dissertation begins the struggle of constructing new ways to examine 
performances we enact in American culture. 
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An overview of performance 
At this point, I wish to provide a brief overview of the concept of 
performance. This overview includes a short examination of two performance 
elements I intend to incorporate into my analysis, namely narratives and 
visuals. I will explore performance in more detail in Chapter Two. 
Creating a performance 
Performance is not an umbrella term for communication. Instead, I 
would argue that performance is one of the complicated patterns htimans can 
choose for communication. We recognize a performance based on particular 
combinations of situations, roles, jmd reactions from our audience(s). Somehow 
these combinations seem to be part of a "show," or a "demonstration." But these 
shows and demonstrations are flexible in their content and staging: a stage 
performance may consider the performance of the ordinary, and our everyday 
performance may be as carefully scripted as a Shakespearean drama. As a 
communication exchange, the elements of a performance are negotiated by those 
involved in the transaction'. A performance can be a teacher teaching her class, 
a police officer writing a traffic ticket for an irate driver, an artist performing a 
song, or a politician giving a speech. Performative interaction is everywhere. 
Rhetoricians must frame a communicative instance as an active presentation of 
meaning and thus mark it as a performance.. A performance is not a 
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performance until someone niimes it as such. The combination of roles seems 
planned and deliberate, designed to attract someone's attention and enter the 
cultural milieu of meaning. 
Diamond provides an explanation to encompass the movement of 
performance's power: 
Whether the performance of one's gender on a city street, an 
orientalist impersonation in a Parisian salon, or a corporation-
subsidized, "mediatized" Broadway show, each performance marks 
out a unique temporal space that nevertheless contains traces of 
other now-absent performances, other now-disappeared scenes. 
Which is to say ... it is impossible to write the pleasurable 
embodiments we call performance without tangling with the 
cultural stories, traditions, and political contestations that comprise 
our sense of history. (1) 
Though a performance is flexible in content and activity, it still uses a specific set 
of boiindaries—one's gender, a Broadway performance, or a boardroom 
meeting—that interacts with cultural influences. Performances complete many 
actions: a performance argues for our beliefs and our version of the world and 
provides us with a negotiated space for communication. The knowledge we 
create from both performing and watching performances is also flexible, and 
predicated on the changing contexts of the performance. The knowledge we gain 
from watching performances helps us understand our relationship to cultural, 
social, and political entities. 
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Two performance features 
We begin to understand the performtinces around us through examining 
the communicative elements within those performances. Narratives and 
visuals are key to our understanding. Narratives and visuals illuminate the 
cultural relationships present in the performance. I choose to study narratives 
and visuals in this project because the artifact I wish to examine is constructed of 
both. Combining narratives and visuals in a performance is not a new 
technique, but it provides a more thought-provoking performance than 
narratives or visuals performed alone. Marie Maclean argues that narrative is 
"the alter ego" of performance (15).^ I insert visuals into that "alter ego" as well. 
narratives in performance Performances can involves stories, or at least 
a storyline. In general, performed narratives are used for two purposes. When 
an individual tells a story, she creates an argument using plot, characters, and 
storylines to help make her argument clear. Narrative is a recognized tradition 
in classical scholarship on tirgument and has been used as a tool in constructing 
arguments since Greeks and Romans argued in the city square. Lci addition, 
narrative appeals to the verisimilitude of life itself—narrative provides evidence 
of human empathy and commonality. She who performs a narrative is arguing, 
in the tradition of ancient rhetors and in the postmodern notion of "life is a 
performance." 
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Narratives offer us a reason for performance. Narratives are the way we 
remain involved with each other—we tell each other stories to help each other 
understand various points of view. Jerome Bnmer explores two different ways 
of knowing; the narrative way and the empirical, scientific way. He notes that 
both have their useful points in argument: 
Each of the ways of knowing, moreover, has operating principles of 
its own and its own criteria of well-formedness.... A good story 
and a well-formed argument are different natural kinds. Both can 
be used as means for convincing another... . The one verifies by 
eventual appeal to procedures for establishing formal and empirical 
proof. The other establishes not truth but verisimilitude. (11) 
I want to push Bruner's point of view much farther. Narrative can offer as 
much "truth" as empirical proof. If our world views are flexible, ever-changing, 
and varied from individual to individual, a story seems to establish as well-
formed an argument as any other discursive construction. We can establish an 
argument with narrative precisely because stories offer us a point of connection 
with each other, and in that connection we can change others' minds. At this 
time in our history, where we rely on multiple interpretatior\s of ideas to guide 
us, verisimilitude is "truth," and a reliable argument. Narratives may never get 
us to "formal and empirical proof," since they are generally individual 
viewpoints told by individuals about specific times, places, and events. In 
general, empirical proof requires observations, numbers, and repeated, validated 
experiments. But the performance of a story is a special kind of verisimilitude. 
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Shakespeare's plays have survived for over four hundred years, in part because 
Shakespeare's characters relate stories that make sense to us. These stories are 
"empirical proof that humans in the sixteenth century worried about love or 
power and corruption. Miirratives hold a special power for humans, because 
they establish "empirical proof" that humans have significant experiences that 
must be discussed. Narratives are the "empirical proof" that life is out there, that 
events do happen, and that we need to share our stories with each other to make 
sense of things. As Anne DiPardo argues, "the narrative urge is ... just as 
important as knowledge gleaned through more systematically rational means. 
The process of understanding experience [through narrative] is informed by 
more rational, factual kinds of knowledge, and in turn informs such knowledge" 
(63). 
visuals in perfortnance Visuals, like narratives, play a role in 
performance. We read visuals as texts, gathering information from them, and 
we understand visuals as representations of specific systems of meaning. Visuals 
give us a chance to enhance, contradict, or disrupt oiir written and oral rhetoric. 
Visuals are not "add-ons" to other forms of corrununication. Visuals are integral 
to a complete picture of the communication instance. Visuals contain implicit 
and explicit messages, and either can be manipulated to convey a message. Paul 
Messaris claims visual understanding "is a prerequisite for the ability to see 
through the manipulative uses and ideological implications of visual images" 
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(165). Both implicit and explicit visual messages provide important information, 
and Messaris' claim is important for visuals in performance. 
Visuals provide another potentially manipulative ideological text within 
a narrative. Some play-goers prefer (and claim to better understand) sets that 
'look like the play/' or sets that seem to represent the writer's given setting for 
the play. However, Shakespeare's plays have been performed with sets that looks 
like fifteenth-century Italy and sets that look like a jungle gym. Each staging of 
the play sends a particular kind of message about Shakespeare's work. The "real-
world" set may indicate a desire to stick closely to Shakespeare's explicit 
messages, including his exploration of life in Renaissance Italy. The jungle-gym 
set may encourage us to explore the implicit messages in Shakespeare, such as 
the power relationships of the characters; the individual on the "top rung" of the 
jungle gym has visual and positional power over those characters on lower 
rxmgs. Visuals can convey messages that are explicitly explored within the 
narratives. Or, the visual messages can provide implicit meanings of the 
narrative. In either case, visuals serve to add another dimension to the 
performance's overall significance. 
Visuals offer various levels of persuasion. A red circle with a diagonal 
line is a powerful visual representation of NO. A STOP sign is equally cleeur in 
commimicating its argument. However, some visuals are less clearly 
persuasive. If a teacher is dressed casually, she may not seem to present the same 
authority to her class as she might if she wore a business suit. Consequently, her 
performance in the classroom might be affected by her lack of authority as 
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defined by her clothes. Visuals add emphasis to other rhetorical forms—our 
clothes contribute to our authority, which influences our other forms of 
persuasion. This visual complication of our communication makes visuals 
another display of our rhetorical abilities, our points of view, and our narratives. 
In some cases, visuals illuminate the narratives contained in a 
performance, in both overt and covert ways. Ln. the introduction to the book 
Discourses: Conversations in Postmodern Art and Culture, editor Marda Tucker 
thanks an artist for adding his artwork to the pages: "Our gratitude also to John 
Baldessari for illustrating the book—or perhaps it would be more accurate to say 
'illiuninating' it—with his own work and thus creating a visual 'text' that 
parallels the discursive one" (2). Baldessari's art does not explain the texts, nor 
does it contradict the texts. Instead, it "illuminates" the book with Baldessari's 
visual versions of the cultural questions under consideration. Baldessari's 
visual interpretation of the text allows readers to consider other points of view 
not contained in the narrative of the volume. The same holds true for visuals 
in performance. Visuals that are executed with thought and care provide more 
and different interpretations of a performance, thus adding more dimensions. 
Foucault. performance, and cultural inquiry 
Michel Foucault's writings on culture and language use are useful for 
uncovering the multidimensionality of performance- Foucault's organizing 
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concept of problematization helps us identify historic, linguistic, and cultural 
constructions that arise within performances. In this section I provide a general 
overview of Foucault's language explorations. I explore Foucaulfs ideas more 
thoroughly in Chapter Three. 
Foucaulfs language theories 
Foucault's writing theorizes the social dimerisions of language. He 
incorporates social structures and their corresponding power structures into his 
discussion of language and its effects on society. Brummett coirunents, "rhetoric, 
which is the struggle over meaning management, is thus also a struggle over 
which patterns to employ in making meiming. This struggle, this urging of 
patterns for ordering upon others, is derived from the social" (75). Foucault 
studies what Bruxrunett posits as rhetoric: the social elements of the meaning-
making struggle. Sodai elements influence the meanings derived from a 
performance, and Foucault is interested in those social influences as they are 
worked out through communication. 
I ground my exploration of Foucault in his works that focus on 
communication, knowledge, and power. Throughout my exploration of 
Foucault, I focus on the relationship between the individual and her connection 
to knowledge and power. Connection and relationship are the keys to 
problematization, the concept I use to organize my analysis of my artifact. 
Foucault's concept of problematization is derived from socially created 
knowledge and power relationships; the idea is most dearly addressed in the 
three volumes of Foucault's History of Sexuality. The History of Sexuality, Part 
One is a "problematization" as explored by Foucault; the book covers the power 
relationships that have constructed Western views on sexuality throughout 
history. Foucault posits "what is at issue [in Western discussions of sex], briefly, 
is the over-all 'discursive fact,' the way in which sex is 'put into discourse'" (11). 
In the same way, what is at issue in this dissertation is how our beliefs and 
arguments eire "put into discourse," and how context affects our discourse. What 
we do and do not "put into discourse" relates to power and how power is 
exercised through social structures. When we pull apart what is "put into 
discourse," we begin to problematize. 
Power is omnipresent in culture. According to Sarup, Foucault contends 
that "individuals are constituted by power relations, power being the ultimate 
principle of social reality" (81). How individuals take, give away, and maintain 
this power relationship with others is integral to how we form relationships 
between ideas. In The History of Sexuality, Part One, Foucault argues that to 
truly understand sex and sexuality in our culture requires "forming a different 
grid of historical decipherment" (90) than the one promoted by "power-
sovereignty," (90) or the governing power structures. For Foucault, power is not 
a possession nor a capacity (Sarup 82). Rather, power shapes our understanding 
of the c\alture aroxmd us. Power is generated by institutions; it extends into the 
past and reaches into the future. The questions in the quotation below provide a 
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glimpse of the depth to wiiich Foucault wants to probe culture for our power 
structures and the contexts from which our social/power structures arise: 
What, in fact, are medicine, grammar, or political economyl Are 
they merely a retrospective regrouping by which the contemporary 
sciences deceive themselves as to their own past? Are they forms 
that have become established once and for all and have gone on 
developing through time? Do they conceal other unities? And 
what sort of links can validly be recognized between all these 
statements that form, in such a familiar and insistent way, such an 
enigmatic mass? (AK 31, italics in original) 
These "enigmatic masses" are what I explore through my artifact. In her 
performances, Anderson pays close attention to the power structures that flow 
in, aroxmd, and through our culture. Foucault and his questions help me 
decipher Anderson's problematizations by providing insight into the 
connections between our discourse, our power structures, and our culture's 
reinforcement/creation/destruction of these power relationships. 
Foucault and cultural inquiry 
Performance provides us with the opportunity to view particular cultural 
constructions within the performance at hand, as I have previously indicated. 
Examining performances helps us grasp what cultural institutions, ideas, and 
codes are ensconced in our cultural knowledge, because these institutions and 
ideas become evident in tiie performance. The roies we play and the things we 
say all relate back to culturally established patterns. Foucault's goal, in all of his 
works, was the disruption of entrenched cultural orders. This disruption that 
permits new performances. According to Gary Gutting, "in examining 
psychiatry, medicine, the social sciences, and other contemporary disciplines, 
[Foucault's] goal was always to suggest liberating alternatives to what seem to be 
inevitable conceptions and practices" (3). Gutting's suggestion of "liberating 
alternatives" is the juncture at which Foucault and performance come together. 
Illuminating the cultural structures that inform performances provides a way to 
understand performances as social and/or cultural events, based in and 
predicated from previously established social entities. Once we are explicit about 
these social structures in our performances, in any given instance, we can make 
more conscious choices. With our choices of what to include and exclude we can 
create new performances that may be more liberating, more useful, or more 
accurate than the previous ones. Once we've created new performances, we run 
the risk of entrenching our newly performed cultural structures, repeating the 
cycle. However, we now have practice in identifying and disrupting our cultural 
structures—we can do it again. Once we are cognizant of the cultural structures 
we use in our performances, we are free to rearrange those cultural structures to 
suit our performative needs. 
In his preface to The Order of Things, Foucault provides an extended 
meditation on the function of social structures. Foucault calls these structures 
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codes, and refers to cultiirai codes in several places in his texts. Foucault claims 
we letim how to interact in society through these structures: 
The fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, 
its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, 
the hierarchy of its practices—establish for every man, from the 
very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and 
within which he will be at home. At the other extremity of 
thought, there are the scientific theories or the philosophical 
interpretations which explain why order exists in general. . . But 
between these two regions, so distant from one another, lies a 
domain which ... is nonetheless fundamental: it is more confused, 
more obscure, and probably less easy to analyse. It is here that a 
culture, imperceptively deviating from the empirical orders 
prescribed for it by its primary codes, instituting an initial separation 
from them, causes them [the original codes] to lose their original 
fransparency, relinquishes its immediate and invisible powers, frees 
itself sufficiently to discover that these orders [the original codes] are 
perhaps not the only possible ones or the best ones .... (xx) 
Our cultural inquiry begins when we look at the "fundamental domain" 
between our cultural codes/structures and scientific truths. This intermediate 
space is significant. In this space, a culture's codes—and scientific truths, for that 
matter—can be interrupted, tested, and reinterpreted, which is important for 
understanding the available possibilites of culturally accepted "orders". Foucault 
argues further, "it is on the basis of this newly perceived order [in this 
intermediate space] that the codes of language, perception, and practice are 
criticized and rendered partially invalid" (xxi). What happens to these codes 
becomes anyone's guess, but "thus, between the already 'encoded' eye and 
reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself" (xxi). 
According to Foucault, this middle ground lets codes and theories combine into 
new ideas in "the pure experience of order and of its modes of being" (xxi). We 
are never free from these social structures/codes, but we are free to create new 
communicative structures—in my explorations, new performances—with the 
codes we have. 
Foucault is important to my text because of his willingness to challenge 
cultural power structures. When we examine new constructions of 
performance, we must retain a flexibility to use cultural entities for our own 
purposes; this flexibility will allow for new performances to be created. We must 
retain otir choice to use a jimgle-gym set for Shakespeare's As You Like It, even 
if the audience prefers a historically appropriate set. Foucault's desire to see our 
commimication as power-laden, historically appropriate, and culturally 
determined is useful for performzmce. We can use Foucault's tactics of "digging 
out" culturally embedded constructions to more fully understand the 
performances we enact. Foucault's concept of problematization, which I explore 
in Chapter Three, enacts this challenge to established cultural entities by 
uncovering the connections between them. 
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At this point, I have provided brief descriptions of performance and 
Foucault's language theories. I combine these elements in further chapters, 
culminating in an analysis of my artifact in Chapter Four. In the rest of this 
chapter, I address my particular reasons for constructing this dissertation in the 
way I have. Declaring my biases helps make clear the "intellectual project" of 
this dissertation and what may happen to it (and me) as I continue my academic 
career. 
Personal biases and motivations 
Obviously, this dissertation does not arise from a vacuum. I have very 
personal reasons for writing it, including these two biases: I am a fan of 
Anderson's, and I believe in interdisciplinary research. I touch on each of these 
biases here so the reader is aware of the perspectives I bring to this project. 
Writing this dissertation is a risk, in several ways. Exploring these biases may 
help explain (to me, as well) why I decided to take these risks. 
Anderson's artistic and scholarly appeal 
I have been a fan of Laurie Anderson's work since I was twenty. The first 
Anderson performance I saw (live or recorded) was Home of the Brave, so it 
seems appropriate to return to it in this text. In 1990, as I watched Home of the 
Brave, I began to take notes, something I do not do for films. Taking notes was a 
sign of my captivation. Anderson's work immediately intrigued me. Its quirky 
points of view, its concern for the use of language, and its humorous takes on 
American cultiore made her work different and captivating- Her ability to "take 
apart" the ordinary to reveal the extraordinary was, for me, an enviable talent. 
Her ability to poke fun at culture was equally enviable. Sometimes Anderson's 
humor emphasized the sharp, serious side of her argument, whatever it might 
be, which made the humor even more effective. Janet Kardon claims Anderson 
is in the tradition of American humorists who are wiiimsical, yet sharp and 
dark: as^ Kardon puts it, Anderson's humor is "oblique [and] brightly sinister" 
(137). The oblique, sinister side of Anderson's work was enchanting. In the 
middle of my first viewing of Home of the Brave, I knew I had to explore 
Anderson's work more thoroughly. 
Anderson's haunting, elegant use of language was an initial point of 
interest for me. Anderson's narratives are always compelling, and they establish 
her keen observational powers. She is a consummate "culture watcher" who 
spins her observatioris into stories, then proceeds to deliver them on stage. The 
electronic wizardry with which she augments her stories make her one of the 
most effective yet eclectic storytellers of the twentieth century. Her ability to spin 
narratives points out her conscious concern with and for how humans use 
language. Her fascination with language is apparent in the themes that appear in 
her work: human relationships, the relationship of authority to "the people," 
and the alterity of the world. Anderson calls language play "always two things 
switching," which recalls the postmodern idea of submerged terms; no matter 
what is at the fore, the opposite is just a turn of the coin away. Anderson's 
concern for language is evident in the way she performs. Most of her "concerts" 
could be called "lectures" or "presentations." Very often she talks as much as she 
sings. Anderson acknowledges the paradox involved with her language study— 
language, her medium of choice for creating her art, is precisely what she tries to 
understand with her work. 
Anderson's visuals are as interesting and complex as her narratives, and 
her visual props reflect her preoccupation with language. Often, Anderson 
projects words behind her as she tells her stories. Even if she is on stage with 
orUy her equipment, her presence is visually intriguing. Her electronic 
equipment creates a kind of fortress around her. Anderson is aware that no 
other performance artist is quite like her, and she uses that fact to her advantage, 
especially in her visual presentation. No current performance artist has the 
same kind of visual presence that Anderson does. At the same time, when 
Anderson chooses to complicate her sets with other visuals, the effect is striking. 
TV sets the size of refrigerators tumble across her back projection screen, and 
photographs of subways at 3 a.m. become the size of billboards. No other current 
performance artist uses such complex, digital, and creative sets—^when she uses 
sets. Anderson is trained as a sculptor, and her formal training seems to 
encourage the deliberate arrangement of her stage equipment, her costiame(s), 
and her back-screen projections. 
Anderson's narratives and visuals are carefully prepared for maximum 
impact. Her visual projections are large, and boldly drawn or printed; her 
narratives are thought-provoking and unusual. Anderson's presentations seem 
carefully "matched". Nothing seems random. Her narratives and visuals are 
integrated carefully, to produce an intense viewing experience. The 
concentrated, focused feel of Anderson's work contributes to her appeal, in my 
mind: I like artists to be passionate about their work. While Anderson doesn't 
exhibit much passion per se—she is often accused of being too self-possessed and 
detached—the power of her work is evident in her carefully orchestrated 
combination of unusual and striking narratives and visuals. 
Chapter Four presents my perspective on Anderson's film Home of the 
Brave. I realize there are many more interpretations besides my own that are 
valid. However, this dissertation is a step in creating a space for all of those 
interpretations. My appreciation for Anderson's work creates a blind side to my 
vision; I tend to think everyone loves her pieces as much as I do. Anderson has 
critics, as all artists do. However, her commercial and critical success as an artist 
leads me to believe she has worth in other fields of communication, including 
my own. I intend this dissertation to encourage more explorations of art and art 
works by scholars in communication studies. Art provides us with an important 
cultural perspective, one whose surface has been barely touched by those outside 
art history and criticism. One chapter on Anderson's work, tucked into a 
dissertation from an English scholar, will pave the way for more explorations of 
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art within the tenets of communication scholarship. My stcirt is small, but it is a 
beginning. 
Interdisciplinary pushes on the boundary 
My desire to explore art as communication leads me to my second bias, 
which is my preference for interdisciplinary work. This dissertation draws from 
several different fields of inquiry, including speech communication, professional 
communication, rhetoric, anthropology, sociology, and art history. My formal 
academic training hits on several areas within communication study, including 
rhetorical theory and history, public address, technical writing, business writing, 
poetry, and literature. As a scholar, I am a walking example of interdisciplinary 
work, and a talking example of someone who challenges the boundaries of 
English studies. I claim the distinctions, despite their problems. Combining 
fields of inquiry can lead to probiematic texts which may have seemingly diluted 
theories, stylistic incompatibilities, or other trouble spots. While working on 
this text, I took sigruficant methodological and stylistic advice from a colleague in 
another discipline. That advice was less than successful in the eyes of my 
primary audience, who are English studies scholars, thus necessitating major 
changes in this manuscript. Disciplinary combinations require much research, 
many careful hours of writing, and many reviews of acceptable/accepted 
combinations of conventions, styles, and ideas. A casual attempt to mesh 
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theories or sentence structxire preferences can result in scholarship that is not 
acceptable to anyone, in any discipline. 
Despite my difficulties with this document, I continue to believe in 
interdisciplinary scholarship, and I will continue to campaign for an expimsion 
of the boimdaries of English studies. I argue that, in general, we instead 
encounter new and different perspectives, rather than slipshod scholarship, 
when disciplines (and theories) are meshed. In his introduction to The 
Rhetorical Turn, Herbert W. Simon argues that, in an expanded arena of 
rhetorical inquiry, "in place of Method, there is talk of methods: variable, 
creative, nonalgorithmic" (2). Bernard Brock, Robert Scott, and James Chesebro 
claim "the critical impulse is universal" (10), not limited to any particular 
scholar, but expanded to include scholarship of any kind. This dissertation has 
no Method similar to the one Simon invokes. Instead, its plurality of "methods 
of understanding" provide insight into performance scholarship, Foucault's 
language philosophies, narrative theory, visual rhetoric, and Anderson's art, 
including the combination of various elements I use here. I prefer to assume 
scholars can augment each other's knowledge rather than fight for 
methodological control. Our fighting isolates us in a ever-shrinking intellectual 
community. Carol Berkenkotter states, "surely [graduate students in 
composition] will need to draw from diverse disciplines and methodologies to 
extend their knowledge (and ours) of how language users acquire their 'ways 
with words' in multicultural and multidisciplinary contexts" (166). Why just 
composition graduate students? Why not all of us? 
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Pxishing on the boundaries of my profession relates dearly to 
interdisciplinary work. Laterdisciplinary research challenges where the boundary 
lines of English studies are drawn. English departments can and should include 
more and different kinds of rhetorical theory and rhetorical history, including 
ones generally taught in speech departments. Departments are beginning that 
shift towards rhetorical inclusivity, but the change is slow, and converts are 
reluctant. Two significant examples of that inclusivity is the ease with which 
peirticular textbooks pass through the boundary between speech and English 
departments- Sonja K. Foss's Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice and 
Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg's Rhetorical Tradition are used in both 
departments to teach rhetorical practice and the history of rhetorical thought. As 
these texts are, I am a sort of "ambassador" between the speech and English 
worlds. I have taught in speech departments and English departments, and have 
had success in both places. I have presented papers at national conferences of 
both disciplines. I am pleased to use all of my training, as a rhetor, writer, public 
speaker, historian, and literary critic. 
Pushing the boundaries of English studies broadens more than just 
English scholars. James Berlin cites an instance where an English department at 
a major university offers its undergraduates "a socially and politically useful" 
curriculum. A department member notes "[students] can do a degree in creative 
writing while taking classes in cultural studies, feminist studies, film studies and 
professional writing. They can take a class in journalism, while doing one in 
Shakespeare, another in advertising, and another dealing with the way in which 
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the portrayal of the erotic in film has been influenced by the discourse on AIDS" 
(in Berlin 150). Students in this program may be more well-rounded, well-
informed consumers of communication than their colleagues at other 
universities. When these students leave school, they will be used to an 
inclusionary viewpoint, at least in communication studies, which will serve 
them well as we enter the global community of the twenty-first centtxry. This 
interdisciplinary, multimodal approach to an English degree is not the norm— 
but it should be. 
These two biases arise from a common desire I have to make my personal 
scholarship exciting, new, and useful to someone other than myself. In that 
quest I often make my scholarship more complicated than necessary. However, 
my short academic career has given me multiple perspectives on 
communication disciplines, and these varied perspectives have proved useful in 
my teaching, research, and professional experiences. I expect my future 
scholarship to continue this pattern of inter/multidiscipUnary work. The 
struggle for accuracy, the audience constraints, and the time consumption all 
become finastrating—and ones that I could eliminate from my work, should I 
decide to stick to one clearly defined subject area for my research. But the 
benefits of interdisciplinary research last much longer than the frustration does. 
An overview of this text 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter One serves as 
the introduction to the work as a whole and the specific elements of analysis 
involved. Chapter Two provides an in-depth examination of performance 
studies, narrative studies, and visual theory. Chapter Three explains the 
significance of language, power, and interaction, in relation to performance and 
cultiu*al codes, through the theories of Michel Foucault. Chapter Four analyzes 
Laurie Anderson's film performance Home of the Brave and the cultural codes it 
disrupts and challenges. Chapter Five provides the implications of my work, 
both with Anderson and with the combination of performance and cultural 
codes, and suggestions for future research. 
I wish to make this project as "thick" as possible. The notion of "thick 
research" follows our field's movement toward "the interpretive turn" described 
by anthropologists.' Geertz characterizes his own work as a combination of 
practices and processes within that turn towards interpretation, and that is how I 
see my own work. Geertz comments that his volume Local Knowledge is a 
collection of essays that represent this combination of approaches to American 
culture: 
The figurative nature of social theory, the moral interplay of 
contrasting mentalities, the practical difficulties in seeing things as 
others see them, the epistemological status of common sense, the 
revelatory power of art, the symbolic construction of authority, the 
clattering variousness of modem intellectual life, and the 
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relationship between what people take as fact and what they regard 
as justice are treated, one after the other, in an attempt somehow to 
understand how it is we understand understandings not our own. 
("Introduction" 5) 
My exploration of performance, Foucault, and Anderson is my current attempt 
to "understand xmderstandings not our own." The imderstandings I pursue in 
this text are those of a woman performance artist and a gay French intellectual, 
twentieth century emissaries of new perspectives on their respective fields of art 
and philosophy/history. This dissertation is a "thick description" which 
combines theories, crosses boundaries, and works with our knowledge-building 
skills. Having this kind of conversation is, as Rorty argues, a way of seeing the 
process of knowing. It is a conversation about understanding(s). Rorty claims: 
If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by 
scientists or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current standards, 
to believe, then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as 
the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood. 
Our focus shifts from the relation between hxmian beings and the 
objects of their inquiry to the relation between alternative standards 
of justification, and from there to the actual changes in those 
standards which make up intellectual history. (389-90, italics in 
original) 
31 
My dissertation is a conversation about our life's performances, and how they 
allow us to better understand the cultural codes we follow. The conversation is 
open to anyone who wants to join me. 
The story that ends this chapter demonstrates the embeddedness of the 
concepts I will examine in the following chapters. In it, I relate a narrative (a 
text) about a performance that includes narrative and visual texts. In that 
performance, Laurie Anderson shapes her discourse to reflect power structures 
she sees within language structures and our responses to them; in fact, the story I 
transcribe here is about power structures in language. My narrative also presents 
the complexity in something that seems simple; the story appears to be about 
nothing more them something I did on a Saturday night- Yet it is best 
understood through the theories I struggle with in this dissertation. Telling the 
story of Anderson's concert seems a fitting way to end this introduction to the 
complexity of performance. 
• • • 
February 1997 
I have been waiting for this night for a long time—almost seven years, to 
be exact. On New Year's Day 1997, when I found out Laurie Anderson would 
perform in St. Paul, Minnesota, I immediately bought a ticket, no questions 
asked, price be damned. [ had been using her work in my academic projects since 
I entered graduate school. Here zuas my chance to see her again, in the middle of 
my biggest project! I haven't seen her perform since 1990, before I began my 
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graduate studies. I was just an artistically interested undergraduate then; now 
I'm a "professional schohir" of her work. 
I entice my friend Joel, another fan, and his wife Mary Beth, to come with 
me to the show. The piecc is billed as "The Speed of Darkness," and is described 
in ads as "a collection of stories and songs about the future of art and 
technology." Anderson is talking about things she's talked about before, but I 
can't wait to see her new ideas for exploring these old themes. I know she began 
this tour—which seems to be intermittent—in July 1996. I feel lucky that she's 
finally close enough that / can see a show. I wish there was a chance for an 
interview, but I will have to content myself with taking copious notes during the 
show (which I hope I'll be able to read later!). 
The evening finally arrives. The auditorium at the College of St. 
Catherine is small and holds maybe seven hundred people, but it is full to 
bursting for this show. Anderson doesn't always play venues this small, and if 
this tour is as intermittent as it seems to be, we are lucky she is here. A small 
college theatre like this is easily skipped when you're a world-famous 
performance artist. When I enter, I see die-hard fans (how do I know them? 
They're talking about other times they've seen her, or their favorite pieces), other 
artists, biker chicks, the coffec-house set, and St. Catherine's students trying for 
extra credit points in a theatre or music class. The audience mix is interesting to 
me, and not quite what I'd expected (thanks to the biker chicks). At this point in 
her career, Anderson has been performing for over twenty years, and she has 
quite a loyal following. Many of her fans didn't discover her until 1983, when 
her magnum opus United States Parts f-V zuas released on a multi-LP set. But 
people seemed to take to the quiria/, unusual stories that made up United States. 
It zuas art, performed with technological wizardry, that people could understand 
(or at least think about) and relate to themselves. When her film. Home of the 
Brave, hit the small, arty theatres in 1986, her fan base grew even more. 
Anderson has done more "public" things, like interviews for National Public 
Radio during the 1992 presidential election, and public service announcements 
on TV in New York Citx/, but her strength Itas always been her live 
performances. She may gamer neiu fans at this performance. The St. Catherine's 
students may decide thei/ like her. 
The audience seems ready to see her, because when she steps on stage the 
cheers are loud and sustained. Joel and I are clapping loudly; this is Joel's first 
time to witness Anderson in performance, and he is excited. Anderson smiles, 
in her ethereal way, then closes her eyes and picks up her violin. I begin 
scribbling, even though she has said and done nothing—not yet, anyway. I want 
to record as much of the atmosphere as possible. I almost tried to sneak in a tape 
recorder to make my own bootleg, but decided against it. I may be desperate for 
dissertation help, but I'm not a law-breaker yet. I look up when the first sound 
issues from the almost-fioating figure on stage. 
Enormous electronic moans fill the air. The music is louder than the 
cheers were, and seems to completely fill the space around us. The sound is not 
like anything we've heard before: it's the sound of an electronic animal, 
wounded and calling for help. It seems amazing Anderson can make so much 
sound with so little equipment. The stage is simply set, compared to her 
previous performances and concert tours. Tonight she uses two synthesizers, a 
few microphones and vocoders, plus some control equipment. She looks small 
in comparison to the sounds she makes. The audience seems instantly taken in 
by her slight form, clad in white, making such an eerie sound. From the first 
pass of her bow across her violin strings, toe are her rapt subjects. 
Her haunting electronic music envelops the concert hall and moves the 
audience into her performance. She begins to talk about technology, then 
personal relationships, and then she tells this story: 
It was up in Canada, and it was August, but very cold. I had been staying on this Cree 
Indian reservation for a few days, just sort of hanging around. One day, some 
anthropologists shorued up at the reservation. They came in a little plane with maple 
leaves painted on the wings. They said they were there to shoot a documentary of the Cree 
Indians. They set up their video equiiment in a tin Quonset hut next to the Hudson Bay 
Company. Then they asked the oldest man on the reservation to come and sing some songs 
for their documentary. On the day of the taping, the old man arrived. He was blind and 
wearing a red plaid shirt. They turned on some lights and he started to sing. But he kept 
starting aver and sweating. Pretty soon it was clear that he didn't really know any of the 
songs. He just kept starting over and sioeating and rocking back and forth. The only words 
h e  r e a l l y  s e e m e d  s u r e  o f  w e r e  " H e y  a h  . .  .  h e y  a h  h e y  .  .  .  h e y  h e y  h e y  a h  h e y  .  .  .  h e y  . . . "  
Hey ah hey hey hey ah hey 
I am singing the songs. 
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Hey ah hey ah hey 
the old songs . . . but I can't remember the words of the songs, 
hey hey hey ah hey 
the old hunting songs. 
I am singing the songs of my fathers and of the animals 
they hunted down. 
Hey hey hey ah hey 
I never knew the words of the old songs. 
Hey hey ah hey hey hey hey ah hey 
I never went hunting. 
Hey hey ah ah hey ah hey 
I never sang the songs 
Hey ah hey 
of my fathers. 
Hey hey ah hey 
I am singing for this movie: 
Hey ah 
I am doing this for money. 
Hey hey ah hey 
I remember Grandfather; 
he lay on his back while he was dying. 
Hey ah hey hey ah hey 
I think I am no one. 
Hey hey ah hey hey. (United States Part Three, n.p.) 
A barely audible murmur runs through the crozud when she begins; some of 
them know this story. It is from Anderson's United States, the eight-hour piece 
that made her name in performance art. But I know I don't mind hearing it live; 
I wasn't at the Brookh/n Acadcmy of Music in 1983, when she first performed it. 
I've heard it on tape, but that's it. foci and I look at each other, with a look that 
says "Oh, we know this!" She finishes her Cree Indian piece, and the audience 
applauds loudly. She could re-do all of her old pieces, with or unthout new 
musical accompaniment, and no one would care. No matter how long ago they 
discovered Anderson, her fans hang on every word out of her mouth and every 
sound from her violin and keyboard. They like the new works. But, for those 
who know them, the old pieces are still powerful, and worth hearing again. 
]Ne continue to listen intently. Anderson doesn't stop: either she is 
talking, telling stories, or she is playing. No one realizes, when she's done, that 
her performance has been 90 minutes long. She loon't come back for an encore, 
no matter how hard we clap. It's not her style. Finally, people stand up and 
begin talking about what they've seen. They say, "was that really 90 minutes? 
Wow. I could have sworn she was on stage for half an hour." Joel and I look at 
each other. He says, "Did you get some information for your dissertation?" I 
look at him and say "What do you think? I ran out of paper." We both grin 
broadly, and leave the theatre. 
• • • 
This story of Ariderson's performance illustrates many cultural structures 
and power relationships at work. Our roles during the performance are 
determined by how we have been taught to act in such a situation. Anderson 
acts as an "artist," partially because she is on stage and partially because of her 
audience's knowledge of her artistic background- Anderson performs 'Xaurie 
Anderson," the public persona she has created, for herself, the one who creates 
technology and writes stories to make "Laurie Anderson's art." She has been 
given the power of visionary and cultural arbiter because she is part of the "art 
world," a place our cultiure imbues with power. We would not expect her to act 
as a firefighter or a research chemist because we do not know her as such; if she 
would, her audience would assume she was using those professions as characters 
for a performance. Anderson also invokes ideology-laden cultural codes with her 
narrative: Native Americans are a lost people, native culture is becoming 
invisible, native people will do anything for money, native cultures should be 
saved on videotape. These ideas conflict in her narrative. Anderson's choice to 
juxtapose them is painful, in some ways, because it creates a reality we may not 
want to face. However, the juxtaposition also allows us to make decisions about 
which ideas to foreground, which ideas to ignore, and which ideas to disrupt or 
disagree with. 
We who witnessed this performance are "audience members" because of 
oiir decision to sit and watch Anderson for ninety minutes. We sit quietly, in 
respectful silence, for the time we are given to witness her work. We clap loudly 
at the end, asking for an encore. We do not dance, sing, or shout, as we might at 
another kind of concert. We have been cidturally taught to behave as 
thoughtful, respectful connoisseurs of intellectual art. As audience members, we 
are free to question the conclusions of the artist, but we are not to show any 
outward signs of disagreement or disrespect, such as booing. However, I heard 
no questioning of Anderson in the conversations around me after the concert-
No one said, "Gee, why did she repeat herself?" Rather, the audience members 
exclaimed "Wow, she did the Cree Indian piece! I'm so glad!" Whether or not 
we agree, we are trained to show respect for artists and their artistic judgment. 
This analysis of the cultural roles at work within Anderson and her 
audience is, of course, my personal, singular summciry. What does the woman 
sitting in the front row think? What is the man sitting in the back of the balcony 
thinking? Are these individuals considering Anderson's performance as an 
intersection of particular cultural roles, or cultural institutions, or power 
relations? I would guess they cire not. However, I assume they are thinking of 
how Anderson's current work fits with the rest of her pieces, or how they have 
heard the Cree story before. Other audience members have not named their 
thoughts as a consideration of cultural forces and performed roles, but they are 
considering some of the same issues I am. What I discuss in the rest of this 
dissertation is not esoteric knowledge. I simply frame our average, ordinary 
considerations of communication as performances, and then I carefully consider 
the power structures at work in forming those performances. We all do that— 
but rarely with the scholarly focus I use here. This brief glimpse of an Anderson 
performance contains all the elements of communication I wish to talk about in 
this manuscript: performance, narratives, visuals, language structiores, power 
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relationships, and Laurie Anderson. Together, these elements make a 
presentation of meaning, a space of argument, a space for questions. And 
have many questions to ask. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THEORETICAL POSITIONS OF PERFORMANCE 
Indeed, postmodern notions of performance embrace what Plato 
condemned in theatrical representation—its non-originality—^and 
gesture toward an epistemology grounded not on the distinction 
between truthful models and fictional representations but on 
different ways of knowing and doing that are constituitively 
heterogeneous, contingent, and risky. (Diamond 1) 
Diamond's quotation indicates how complex performance can be. 
Performance theory has roots in many different academic traditions, including 
the very beginnings of the rhetorical tradition. Portions of performances, 
including narrative theory and visual theory, are also part of my vision of 
performance. Performance's status as a "risky" activity piques the interest of 
cultured scholars. For me, the flexibility of performance provides an avenue for 
the exploration of how humans share narratives and visuals. 
In this chapter I explore performance theory, narrative theory, and visual 
theory, including how these topics fit within our conceptions of rhetoric. I first 
explain performance theory and its importance to this project. Then I discuss 
performance studies in relation to the rhetorical tradition, especially the 
traditions of sophistic rhetoric and epideictic speaking. Next I consider how 
narrative theory and visual theory fit into the rhetorical tradition and how both 
have grown to influence other theories, including performance theory. 
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Narratives and visuals are the most relevant texts in my artifact, which is why I 
choose to focus on them here. At the end of Chapter Two, the connections 
between performance theory, narrative texts, and visual texts are established. 
An overview of performance theory 
Performance theory can, in part, encompass the theory of stage 
performances, such as plays and concerts. While that strand of performance 
theory has relevance here, I concentrate my attention in the postmodern, 
"everyday" arena of performance. What shall emerge from this discussion of 
performance is a more extensive view of cultural performance. According to 
performance scholcU*s Carol Simpson Stem and Bruce Henderson, performance 
incorporates "a whole field of human activity" (3). Stern and Henderson 
explain: 
[Performance] embraces a verbal act in everyday life or a staged play, a rite 
of invective played in urban streets, a performance in the Western 
traditions of high arts, or a work of performance art. It includes cultural 
performances such as personal narratives ... or more communal forms of 
ceremony—the National Democratic Convention... or a bullfight It also 
includes literary performance, the celebration of individual genius, and 
conformity to Western definitions of art. In all cases a performance act, 
interactional in nature and involving sijnibolic forms and live bodies, 
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provides a way to constitute meaning and to affirm individual and 
cultural values. (3, italics in original) 
The sweep of culture Stern and Henderson indicate is highly typical in 
descriptions of performance. No one can seem to agree, exactly, on what 
constitutes a performance. Performances are many things at many different 
times and places. Scholars agree, however, that performance is significant to 
human communication, in part as a means of debating cultural constructions. 
The inclusion of cultural constructs, and of argument, is essential to my 
definition of performance. The text and contexts we choose allow us to include 
various cultural constructions in our performances. What we choose to include 
determines what we debate. 
Performance theories are a crazyquilt of ideas. I discuss some facets of 
performance studies here to ground my discussion of performance, text, and 
context What I offer here augments the definition of performance as an act of 
showing. This overview of performance studies will help us understand how 
text and context come to shape performances. 
The plays of performance 
Performance theory is an interdisciplinary field with many strands of 
influence. The elements I choose for my focus—text, context, the idea of 
showing—fit with Stern and Henderson's textbook defixution, but there is much 
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more to performance than those features.^ I argue, as do other scholars, that 
performances provide a negotiated space for communication. 
According to Fine and Speer, disciplines that contribute to performance 
theory include sociology, anthropology, linguistics, theatre, folklore, and 
commimication studies (3). Strine, Long, and HopKins argue that "research in 
interpretation and performance studies focuses on the constitutive elements of 
texts, performers, and audiences, individuJiUy or in some combination, in order 
to advance understanding of the aesthetic, psychological, historical, sodocultural, 
and political dimensions of performance" (181). Sayre argues that performance 
dislocates the constitutive elements of texts and makes them "free" from fixed 
meaning. Performance allows us "to un-fix the text by speaking it, and in 
speaking it to open the audience to new possibilities, new understandings" (192). 
Strine, Long, and HopKins and Sayre argue the same concept: performance 
allows meaning to move aroimd, in and through cultural ideas, so we may see 
different sides of those ideas. Performance can be a way to redefine culture. As 
performers "un-fix" texts, they are free to "re-fix" new meanings to those same 
texts. 
Strine, Whitaker, and HopKins note that part of the definition of 
performance includes contest and struggle: "Performance, like art and 
democracy ... [is an] essentially contested concept, meaning that its very 
existence is bound up in disagreement about what it is, and that the 
disagreement over its essence is itself part of that essence" (183). Their guidelines 
for performance scholarship follow from the notions of treating performances 
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"as strategic sites of cultural formation and context embedded within, though not 
wholly determined by, a network of social, economic, and political 
contingencies" (192). Though they establish no hard and fast definitions of 
performance, they place performance in the realm of culture and politics. They 
remind us that part of performance is an argument over the nature of the term. 
HopKins provides an explication of performance in her article "The 
Performance Turn—And Toss": 
Performance negotiates not only the performer's relation to the role 
but the nature of the performance site. In a recent essay ... I argued 
that audience, both spectators and researchers, construe variotis 
kinds of sites for performance, such as ... cultural memory,... 
participatory ritual,... [and] as social commentary. These 
categories are negotiations between performer and performed, 
performer and audience, perhaps even between participating 
performers. The categories are construed, not given. Not everyone 
experiencing the performance will construe the site in the same 
way. (233) 
An operable definition of performance is dependent on what we wish to include 
in our performances. We could include HopKins' "cultural memory" and 
Sayre's "free" meanings. We could add in art and politics. We can include 
aesthetics, psychology, history, sociology. I suggest we can add elements to our 
performances ad infinitum. All performances are different and, in HopKins' 
words, "constructed categories." 
Combining ideas provides a negotiated definition of active 
communication- Negotiation is important: a negotiated definition seem to be 
more workable than fixed defiiutions for an entity as slippery as performance. If 
we allow for negotiation, performance may be anything from the President's 
inaugural address to a classroom lecture. Performance can be an artistic 
endeavor, such as a play, a party, a diildren's play group, or a board meeting. 
Fine opens one of her book chapters with the words "Performance is basic to 
humanity ..." (23). She explores the metaphors involved in preaching within 
the traditional black church. Fine's study of preaching utilizes the same 
performance theory we might use to study a board meeting. Both 
communicative instances are active sites of ar^;ument. Both involve cultural 
norms and cultural constraints that affect the commimication enacted there. 
Performance and cultural impact 
Performances are how we make our culture, remember it, transmit it to 
others, and leam what is appropriate. Fine and Speer argue the power of 
performance has to do with both memory and creation: "the power of 
performance to create, store, and transmit identity and culture lies in its reflexive 
nature. Through performance, human beings not orUy present behavior ... but 
they reflexively comment on it and the values and situations it encompasses.... 
Performance, then, as poesis, makes or constitutes cultural identity as well as 
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imitates it" (8-9). Turner maintains this perspective on the cultural power of 
performance: 
For me, the anthropology of performance is an essential part of the 
anthropology of experience. In a sense, every type of a cultural 
performance, including ritual, ceremony, carnival, theatre, and 
poetry, is explanation and explication of life itself.... through the 
performance process itself, what is normally sealed up, inaccessible 
to everyday observation and reasoning, in the depth of sodocultural 
life, is drawn forth— (13 y 
Turner sees a magnitude of life force in performance. Here we find the very 
depths of what it means for us to be alive. Though Turner lists aesthetic or 
theatrical performances as "cultural performances," I expand the definition to 
include events such as everyday social or business interactions. Turner argues, 
"social life, then, even in its apparently quietest moments, is characteristically 
'pregnant' with social dramas" (11). Social dramas are enacted through 
conversations, poetry readings, or staged performances. These social dramas, 
given to us as occasions for performance, represent the places in culture where 
we have the chance to perform our arguments. Others evaluate our 
performances and our arguments; we, in turn, evaluate theirs. Through this 
exchange of points of view, culture is made and remade. 
Performance is a biological, as well as social, event. Anthropologist 
Richard Schechner moves performance one step closer to an elemental life force 
when he suggests that performance affects our autonomic nervous system (344-
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367). When an actor performs a particxilar emotion, his autonomic nervous 
system reacts as if the actor fees that emotion without performative motivation. 
This tendency suggests that we may be "hard-wired" to perform as well as we 
spontaneously feel and act. Schechner argues "human adaptability is nowhere 
better demonstrated thjm in our stunning capacity to lie, simulate, pretend, 
imagine—to make art, especially performative art, that cannot be distinguished 
from the real [emotion] even at the level of ANS response" (363). 
Argument, culture, performance 
I have advanced the argument that performances are flexible, negotiable, 
spaces. The negotiation done within a performance is, in essence, an argument. 
The action of performance provides a way to argue for a certciin set of beliefs. In 
watching and evaluating others' performances, we learn how to form these 
argtiments: we evaluate what seems persuasive in terms of visual and verbal 
communication, and we see how the visual and verbal are combined to make 
the arguments. We know more the next time we argue from our own 
performances. Arguments become our action in the world, a time for us to set 
out oiur beliefs and opinions. Turner notes that "action is 'agonistic,'" (103), in 
the sense that "work and play both have this driving, conflictive character" (103). 
Our performances may or may not seem agonistic to our audience. No matter 
what, we are still arguing, and promoting a set of beliefs we feel to be accurate. 
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necessary, or important. Performance provides the opportunity to share and 
promote our beliefs with others. 
The argument made with/in a performance is a combination of the text 
and context included in the performance plus the text/context an interpreter 
brings to the instance. The creator and the interpreter of the performance may 
attribute different arguments to the event, and they may leave the performance 
with different views of whether the arguments were successful- The 
performance remains a negotiated event. Schieffelin argues: "the work of a 
performance, what it does and how it does it, can never be discovered only by 
examining the text, or the script, or the symbolic meanings embodied in the 
ritual alone because [performance] is a reality apart from its participants ... 
the participants may not all experience the same significance of efficacy from it" 
(293). Even though each participant may achieve different understanding and 
significance from a performance, depending on the interpretation each 
participant takes from the instance. Each individual has the chance to explore 
connections between cultural elements and the force of those elements within 
the text and context of the performance. 
Turner's previous argument regarding performance and the anthropology 
of experience provides the connection needed to make a performance happen. 
The "sealed up" resources "drawn forth" in communication become the 
connections we struggle with during our performance. With our texts and 
contexts, we argue for links between cultural institutions, we debate our political 
beliefs, and we clash in our convictions about social norms. Performance artist 
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Louise Ethel Lillefeldt characterizes the link between performance interpreters 
(performers, audience members) and argument in this way: 
When people want to come and see me, I feel that I actually want to 
give them something back. There is an exchange and when this 
exchange doesn't happen it's not equal. I am being 
confrontational—it's not just a room with no one in it. I am in it 
and I am here and this is work for me, but you are going to do some 
work also, you're going to feel something too. You will know if I'm 
not being real and I will know the same about you. (86) 
The "work" she describes is sharing arguments, even though her audience may 
have less chance to share and argue than she does. Lillefeldt's definition of 
performance is a give and take between interpreters. She does the showing in 
her performance, and Lillefeldt shows her audience her interpretation of life. At 
the same time, her audiexice members do the work of interpreting what she's 
interpreted. This interaction is essential to performance. 
No scholar can completely define performance. As a larger discipline, 
performance studies involves examining angles of various performance theories 
for the validity they hold for the situation at hand. At this moment, 
performance studies provides a starting point for examining the argtunents 
within Laurie Anderson's art. Argument within a performance and the social 
coristruction of performance are not new to the twentieth century. The 
rhetorical tradition has explored these concepts since ancient Greek and Roman 
orators made the worst argument appear the greater. Philosopher and novelist 
Jostein Gaarder believes: "the Sophists raise[d] the question of what was natural 
and what was socially induccd"{63, italics in original). Next I explore the 
rhetorical tradition, focusing specifically on the sophistic and epideictic 
traditions, to explain how performance theory relates to the larger canon of 
rhetoric. 
Early rhetorical traditions—the roots of performance 
Establishing ties between performance and the ancient philosophical 
traditions of sophistic rhetoric, including epideictic rhetoric, is critical to my 
study. The rhetorical tradition is the foundation of all conununication 
disciplines. Rhetoric is the baseline at which commuiiication disciplines may 
claim a similarity. 
I examine both sophistic rhetoric and epideictic rhetoric in this sectioru 
The two do not have to be linked; epideictic rhetoric does not have to be 
considered part of the sophistic tradition. I choose to see epideictic rhetoric as 
sophistic rhetoric because of the contextuality of the traditions. Occasion 
speaking was a contextual event; what you said at an occasion was dependent on 
whether the occasion was a celebration, a funeral, or a war rally. Sophistic 
rhetoric, with its dependence on occasion and the appropriate speech for the 
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occasion, is thus dependent on context- The two forms of speaking are dearly 
related. 
Sophistic ties to performance 
A search in the beginnings of rhetorical theory uncovers performative and 
cultural bonds within the genre of sophistic rhetoric. Sophistic rhetoric is, at its 
base, a philosophical position regarding the status of language and how it 
functions. Leff characterizes sophistic rhetoric through 
its rejection of global generalizations, grand theories, and synthetic 
methodologies. Sophistic gives priority to the unity of concrete 
experience as filtered through our interests rather than to the 
theoretical coherence of the varieties of experience as they are 
ordered according an abstract, rational calculus. Sophistic implies a 
pluralism in which methods of inquiry and argument are adapted 
to the particular subject under investigation. It seeks to solve 
situated problems rather than to formulate abstract theoretical 
principles. (23-24) 
Leff indicates sophistic rhetoric takes individual experience into account and 
uses it to solve situated, specific problems. No universal truths are part of a 
sophistic agenda. Poulakos argues that "the [s]ophists were the first to infuse 
rhetoric with life" (36). According to Covino and Jolliffe, "the [s]ophists were 
famous—or infamous—for reiativistic views of truth and demonstrations of 
oratorical dexterity; such demonstrations were especially popular as both 
entertainments and as indications of the skills required of citizens in newly 
emerging democracies" (84). The [s]ophists exposed the dissoi logoi (opposite 
sides) of an argument; the notion of dissoi logoi was first foimd in Protagoras, an 
early sophist, who noted there were at least two contradictory arguments about 
everything. Even in defining language, argument, and their uses, the Sophists 
used dissoi logoi by contradicting each other with varied definitions of sophistic 
language philosophy.'^ 
Ancient Greek orators might describe sophistic skills differently than 
Covino and Jolliffe. Gorgias called speech a powerful drug: "For just as different 
drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease 
and others to life, so also in the case of speeches, some distress, others delight, 
some cause fear, others make the hearers bold, and some drug and bewitch the 
soul with a kind of evil persuasion" (41). Plato, who did not consider himself a 
sophist, attacked sophistic language use. His well-known treatise against the 
sophists, the Gorgias, did plenty to sully their reputation. Plato's character 
Socrates argues that "there is no need to know the truth of the actual matters, but 
one merely needs to have discovered some device of persuasion which will 
make one appear to those who do not know to know better than those who 
know" (68). Bizzell and Herzberg note that "language in use creates and changes 
the opinions that are our only available knowledge" (39). No matter who works 
to change our minds, be it Plato, Isocrates, or Gorgias, we are left with our 
opinions. We must enact our argxunents—and performances, and 
problematizations—with those opinions/ 
The ties between the sophistic tradition and performance theory are 
evident if we look closely at the sophistic nature of argument and how 
arguments are formed. Both the sophistic tradition and performance ask rhetors 
to consider many sides of the argument. According to Jarratt, "A sophistic 
method [of arranging an argument] works by exposing and exploring a range of 
possibilities for knowledge and action and implicitly theorizing the process of 
their acceptance by the community less on the basis of logical validity and more 
on the force of their 'rhetorical/ i.e., persuasive and aesthetic, appeal" (28). Both 
the sophistic tradition and performance might rearrange the various "facts" of 
the situation to provide potentially new narratives of previously accepted 
events. Jarratt examines Gorgias' attempt to transform history with his 
"Encomium to Helen." According to Jarratt, one of Gorgias' goals is to cast doubt 
on history and disrupt the "traditional" view of what happened to begin the 
Trojan War. Gorgias gives credit to love (Helen's love) and its ties to force; 
history gives consideration only to what force accomplished, namely the fall of 
Troy. Jarratt notes, "consciously refusing to tell history as a continuous complete 
narrative leading to a pre-understood end, the sophist was able to throw into 
new light a range of facts and causes for the purpose of a more general 
consideration" (17). 
When we examine arguments in performance theory for the same kind of 
"range of possibilities" and "rhetorical appeal," we find similar strategies. 
Sophistic language philosophies ask for a consideration of several points of view 
in order to find the most persuasive argument Performance also considers the 
varied points of view which may be extracted from a performance and what 
specific conclusion or argument is suggested within the artifact. Performance 
enacts "the complexities of human culture as seen from multiple perspectives" 
(Valentine and Valentine 185). The idea of multiple perspectives is a sophistic 
language strategy. 
The "sophistic openness" Anderson demonstrates in later chapters 
reflects, for Jarratt, a "rejection of transcendent truths and eternal values, their 
ability to move a popular audience with a range of rhetorical techniques, their 
interest in social exigencies" (2). No language strategy or theoretical position is 
rejected out of hand as a non-argixment. Instead, various positions are sorted 
through to determine which is the best argument. This ancient determination of 
truths is similar to our postmodern impetus to sift ideas from our fragmented 
cultural institutions and match our trutiis to the situation at hand. The 
philosophical position of sophistic rhetoric is old; it is reborn and recharged in 
performance. 
Epideictic ties to performance theory 
Epideictic speaking was one of the first classifications of speaking. 
Aristotle named it as one of the three modes of speaking in his Rhetoric. (48). 
Epideictic speaking is a specific kind of speechmaking usually involving a 
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specific occasion requiring a speech to an audience. Katula and Murphy note, "in 
addition to the courts and the assemblies, a Vciriety of festivals and ceremonial 
events had evolved, each of which called for an orator to address the citizenry. 
One distinct type of performance was the qxideixis, or public display lecture 
Public speaking was even an Olympic event, the winner receiving an olive 
wreath and being paraded through his town like a hero" (17). Epideictic speeches 
require an occasion for a speech, a reason to speak, and an audience to listen to 
the speech. Usually, the speech is to arouse praise or blame: witness Gorgias' 
"Encomium to Helen". Li his speech, Gorgias attempted to turn aside the blame 
previously assigned to Helen and her role in the Trojan War. Rather than blame 
her again for her mistakes, Gorgias tries to engender sympathy for Helen and her 
lovestruck psyche. Gorgias actively works to change his audience's opinion of 
Helen and her (mis)deeds. 
Gorgias' "Encomium" marks an intersection between sophistic rhetoric 
and epideictic speaking. Gorgias is working to make the worst cause (Helen's 
responsibility for the Trojan war) appear better than it previously had been seen. 
Obviously, Helen's love obscured her ability to think through the military 
implications of her relationship. Gorgias' attempt to bring positive attention to 
an "underdog" point of view is distinctly sophistic. The "Encomium" is, at the 
same time, a public display of praise. The word "encomium" literally translates 
as "a speech of glowing praise." Gorgias' method of presentation of his view of 
Helen provides the crossroads between epideictic and sophistic rhetoric. If he 
had chosen to paint a picture of lovelorn Helen and the tragic consequences of 
her love, his representation would not be an encomium. Instead, Gorgias chose 
a speech (a written and presumably oral text) to praise her—or at least attempt to 
change our minds about her. His method of delivery is epideictic; his 
philosophical motives are sophistic. 
Timmerman claims epideictic rhetoric still affects us today: "Presidential 
inaugurations, religious speeches and presentations, and graduation speeches all 
share characteristics of the ancient category of epideictic rhetoric... rhetors 
engage in praise or blame and hold up particular values as laudatory and 
worthy... the speakers address an audience composed of spectators and not 
judges. And, in most cases, such speakers present discourse that is well crafted 
and engaging for the audience" (231). Timmerman notes epideictic speeches 
were performances for the benefit of an audience. Epideictic speaking is another 
bridge between classical rhetoric and performance rhetoric. Performance 
depends on several things common to epideictic rhetoric, including audience, 
occasion, topic, and argiunent. The intersecting needs, wants, and desires of 
these four elements make the performance (the speech) what it is—situational 
and keyed into the audience, occasion, topic, and argument(s) at hand. 
Since sophistic rhetoric is a philosophical approach to speaking, epideictic 
speeches may bring that philosophical point to bear on an audience. In some 
ways, epideictic speech is the first form of performance to create a bridge between 
stage productions and purposeful speaking occasions. These public speaking 
occasions were specific— such as a funeral oration—but were not as formal as a 
play or other specifically aesthetic performance. Sheard examines the recent 
epideictic speeches we see in our culture today, like acts of worship, protest, and 
celebration (765). These contexts provide connection for us as modem audiences. 
Sheard notes "as participants ... we are reminded of the shared values and 
needs, interests and goals, that hold us together as members of groups or 
'communities' (civic, social, religious, professional, and so on), and we see our 
publicly voiced words as timely and purposeful in such contexts" (765-6). 
Sheard goes on to claim that today's epideictic rhetoric opens a path to 
alternative answers to publicly asked questions: "it can be an instrument for 
addressing private and public 'dis-ease,' discomfort with the status quo" (766). 
Sheard connects epideictic and sophistic rhetoric thanks to the emphasis of both 
on moment and occasion. Epideictic rhetoric "allows speaker and audience to 
envision possible, new, or at least different worlds" (770). Both sophistic and 
epideictic rhetoric also emphasize choice, and potential change. Sheard notes 
our epideictic discourse today "operates in contexts dvic, professional or 
occupational, pedagogical, and so on that invite individuals to evaluate the 
commimities or institutions to which they belong, their own roles within them, 
and the roles and responsibilities of their fellow constituents, including their 
leaders" (771). When we listen to speakers today, we are invited to make a 
choice/change based on the information in the speech. Each speaker (e.g.. 
Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich) has a motive and purpose in mind for the 
audience, but audience members are still in control of the choices they make 
about whether or not to "believe" the speech. We are presented with the value 
judgment to make, and vve make it, based on whether or not we agree with the 
speaker. Relativism is nothing new. A postmodern atmosphere allows us to 
make judgments based on our personal value systems. Larger values are held by 
larger numbers of people, and some values may exist on a cultural level, but we 
still think and act according to our individual judgments. 
Sheard argues: 
like its ancient counterpart, contemporary epideictic rhetoric is 
ultimately about conduct and values within communities 
addressed or invoked. It occurs in assemblies large and small, 
formal and informal, public and private. Its efficacy depends today 
as much as it did in antiquity on kairos or "exigency" in the broadest 
sense (not just the "occasion" of discourse, but what makes the 
occasion what it is)—the critical convergence of time, place, and 
circumstance, including audience needs, desires, expectations, 
attitudes, resources, and so on. (771). 
Sheard's argimient is significant. If epideictic speaking is ultimately about 
values, it is ultimately about the choices we make in our lives about what to 
believe. And, as she notes, value choice can occur in many situations, large and 
small, public and private. These choices ask us to evaluate the values espoused 
around us. Our value decisions can then be made in agreement, in opposition, 
or in a combination of dis/agreement with what values are brought forth in 
epideictic occasions. Epideictic discourse is socially tied to argument. Socially 
acceptable arguments make a difference to the success or failure of an epideictic 
speech. 
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Individual and community within epideictic and sophistic rhetoric 
Sheard's description of current epideictic rhetoric brings forth elements of 
individual and community within the epideictic situations. A full treatment of 
the importance of individual/community interaction with performance 
situations isn't possible here; the topic is too extensive. However, I need to touch 
on the individual/community concerns raised by epideictic emd sophistic 
rhetoric, at least briefly, so that ideas of individual and communities as social 
influences are incorporated within these aspects of the rhetorical tradition. 
Community values are important to rhetorical analysis. Whenever we 
examine an artifact, we must consider the community, philosophical tradition, 
or discourse community out of which the artifact emerges. In classical rhetoric, 
speechmaking was used to further the public good. Public speaking was used to 
enlighten the polis on some topic. Miller argues, "the polis is always the arena 
where discourse takes place, the source of issues, argimients, audiences, 
conventions—and the prize that is ultimately at stake" (81). An argument is 
made to an audience (a polis) in order to influence values and beliefs held by that 
audience. The interplay between individual and commimity is not only 
necessary, but essential for shaping social thought. At the same time, individual 
beliefs do not spring up in a vacuum. The community helps individuals 
determine whether they will work for or against generally held community 
beliefs. Performance studies is one tool we can use to understand these 
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interactions between individuals and communities to see how belief systems are 
promoted or deflected. 
Consigny makes a similar argument in his comparison of Gorgias and 
current performance artists. Consigny examines how Gorgias influences the 
polis by asking them to question their currently held beliefs. According to 
Consigny, "Gorgias seeks to expose the deceptive nature of those truths [the 
dominant lo^os of the community], in effect unraveling the fabric of the 
dominant logos in which the 'truths' were woven" (113). Gorgias induces a 
"'crisis of reason' for his audience, exposing the inherent limits and inadequacy 
of their privileged logos, and requiring them to confront the immediate crisis in 
a new way" (113). 
Gorgias' epideictic speeches took up subjects like Helen of Troy's betrayal 
and provided another side to the argument, thus providing the "crisis" for his 
audience. In response, his audience had to decide how they would approach 
Gorgias' position. Coiisigny's exploration of Gorgias as a performance cirtists 
points out the interplay between community and individual. Consigny notes, 
"the performance artist, like Gorgias, places his audience—and himself—^in a 
situation that challenges conventional means of perceiving, thinking, and 
behaving" (114). A rhetor in a performance situation challenges herself and her 
audience. A reality created by the performance influences the audience. The 
audience is affected by the reality as it is carried out by individuals within the 
community.^ A "crisis of meaning" brought about by a performance is, again, 
another example of attempting to understand social connections. The crisis is 
61 
induced by tt\e contradiction between belief systems. The contradiction works to 
examine both belief systems by exposing ways in which they are/not similar. 
Zarefsky notes in an address to a national convention, "the common focus 
on the same story is a bond of community; the contest among alternative 
readings promotes diversity. Although it may seem logically inconsistent, it is 
rhetorically feasible to have it both ways" (7). Zarefsky's idea speaks to the 
possibility of holding the individual and the community together in one's set of 
stories. The common good for the individual and the community can be 
promoted at the same time. Performance is potentially able to accomplish this 
task by giving an individual the chance to provide her beliefs to the community 
(her audience). As sophistic and epideictic rhetoric are shaped by the speaker, the 
audience, and the kairos of the situation, a performance is shaped by similar 
forces. Individual and community can be considered sep<irately, but considered 
together they provide a more complete picture of the performance at hand. 
Performances allow communal stories and individual interpretation to act 
on us at the same time. Our performance results ftrom these influences. The 
interpreter is a member of communit(ies) that believe in particular 
interpretations of texts and contexts- Interpretations will influence the 
imderstanding of the performance at hand. Interpretations may, however, be 
modified by the individual's perspective. He may not believe in the same 
explanation of a text/context as his community does. He may interpret the 
performance based on his beliefs instead of the community's beliefs. 
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The relative confusion of trying to describe a spiral of interpretation 
indicates the embeddedness of the individual within the community. Texts, 
created by individuals or communities, and contexts, created by the same, are 
individually and communally interpreted- But neither set—text/context or 
individual/community—is complete without both halves of the whole. 
Relating to argument/relating to performance 
Noting performance's history within the rhetorical tradition is useful for 
one particular reason: establishing performance theory has a relation to theories 
of argument. Individual and communal rhetoric influence both ancient and 
contemporary performance. In my next section I take up another tie to the 
rhetorical tradition: narrative rhetoric. In general, narrative, epideictic, and 
sophistic rhetoric all share the characteristic of providing argimients, which are 
tailored for the occasion and for the audience at hand. Narratives comprise the 
texts of the arguments. 
Narrative theory and its ties to performance 
Narratives provide another link between individuals and communities. 
According to Jerome Bruner, narrative is the only way we have to describe our 
lived experience ("Life as Narrative" 12). Bruner argues that humans hold "a 
predisposition to organize experience into a narrative form, into plot structures 
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and the rest" (Acts 45). Storytelling and the use of narrative is a tradition among 
all cultures. Oral stories existed long before the beginning of recorded history. 
Narrative theory deserves attention in the context of performance for several 
reasons, including how narrative links performance and the classical rhetorical 
tradition; how narratives connect people to each other; and how narratives 
describe sites of cxiltural struggle. 
Narrative rhetoric and the rhetorical tradition 
Within the classical period of rhetoric, the Roman rhetors Cicero and 
Quintilian use narrative as part of their rhetorical schematics- In Book II of 
Cicero's De Oratore, Cicero offers a narrative example to illustrate eloquence and 
demonstrate how a speaker may reach his audience through narrative: 
... if brevity means employing only the absolutely essential 
minimum of words, this is required occasioneilly, but often it is 
actually very detrimental in stating the facts of the case, not ordy 
because it causes obscurity but also because it does away with a 
quality that is the greatest merit in narrative, that of entertaining 
and convincing. (n.Ixxx.326) 
Narrative, as Cicero indicates, can offer audiences particular details of shared 
humem experience and draw individuals closer together. The narratio, at the 
beginning of a lawyer's case, can make or break the argiament; "for it touches the 
main issue of the whole suit whether the case has been set out with 
droimspection or the opposite, because the narrative is the foimtain head from 
which the whole remainder of the speech flows" (n.Ixxxi.330). If the audience 
cannot identify with the narratio, the lawyer cannot reach the audience and the 
case is lost In the same way, Quintilian encouraged rhetoric students to pursue 
and articulate the common occasions of human experience, because common 
sites "are of the very nature of speeches on trials, and, if you add the name of an 
accused party, are real accusations" (TV.22). Quintilian indicates that the 
particularizing details of a given case make the case more understandable, since 
the audience can come together and identify with a shared experience or cultural 
phenomenon.*' 
Cicero and Quintilian are asking students to prepare for the courtroom or 
legal arena, but their arguments for the power of narrative apply as well. 
Performances cirgue, and they usually argue in narrative ways. As Gcero and 
Quintilian advocate, narrative is a crucial tool to help the audience understand 
the arguer's point of view. According to Frantz, narratives provide three 
different argumentative roles for communication: 1) a way of knowing about 
the context of any rhetorical situation, 2) a way of connecting socially with our 
audience, and 3) a way of structuring an argument (2, emphasis in original). A 
narrative way of knowmg helps both the rhetor and her audience understand 
the context of the situation and the context of the argument. A narrative way of 
connecting rhetor to audience is partially encompassed by a way of knowing and 
partially enveloped by the kairos of the situation. A narrative structure for 
argument presumes narratives are different forms of argument. Narratives 
provide plots connected with other storylines augmented by important details to 
make their arguments instead of direct claims, proofs, and evidence. Narratives 
provide the multiple perspective advocated by the sophists. 
Thinking of narrative structures as arguments leads us into examining 
current narrative scholarship. Many more theorists, especially psychologists, 
anthropologists and sociologists, now recognize the story—^its betsic structure and 
basic power—as one of the building blocks of how we construct our lives. 
Carlton suggests that including personal events in our scholarship points out 
"[personal events and stories] have everything to do with our intellectual 
histories, if by intellectual we mean our attempts to discern significance in the 
social text" (339, emphasis in original). Using Carlton's definition of intellectual 
opens up an entirely new way to think of narratives and stories of personal 
events. 
Contemporary narrative theory 
Current narrative theory provides updated viewpoints of andent 
rhetorical visions of narrative. Narrative theory plays a role in disciplines as 
wide-ranging as anthropology and organizational communication.^" Mumby 
provides this definition of narrative: "narrative is both a communication 
phenomenon that is worthy of intellectual scrutiny and (epistemologically 
speaking) it represents a particular orientation toward the study of social 
phenomena" (3). Mumby's two-part definition of narrative is important. The 
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definition encompasses how narratives are formed and how narratives affect our 
view of the world. Mumby argues: 
narrative is examined not as a fixed and stable communication 
phenomenon but rather as part of the complex and shifting terrain 
of meaning that makes up the sodal world [a] willingness to 
recognize the open-ended nature of knowledge claims; to recognize 
the difficulty (impossibility?) of making any vmiversal claims about 
the human condition; and to acknowledge the extent to which, as 
theorists and researchers, we are never neutral, dispassionate 
observers of behavior but are always heavily implicated in the 
construction of the narratives ... that provide insight to the social 
reality that we inhabit- (3-4) 
A fundamental belief in the "open-ended natiure of knowledge claims," means 
narrative exploration provide a way to explore knowledge claims within a 
naturally fluid form. 
Contemporary narrative theory appears many different places in the 
academy. Narrative allows many individuals to connect in many different 
contexts. Narrative plays a role in pedagogy, though the place of narrative can be 
controversial. Kail claims that "textbooks provide us with many ... culturally 
essential narratives of knowledge" (179), while DiPardo argues, "among 
composition teachers 'narrative' and personal experience essays are generally 
regarded as the same, largely suspect phenomenon" (61). Edward Bruner argues 
that, for ethnographers, "the narrative structures we construct are not secondary 
narratives about data but primary narratives that establish what is to coixnt as 
data. New narratives yield new vocabulary, syntax, and meaning in our 
ethnographic accounts, they define what constitute the data of those accounts" 
(142-43). Narratives in anthropology have long been considered rich sources of 
information about culture. Narrative has recentiy been used in analyzing 
interactions in the business and technical worlds. Blyler reminds us, "theorizing 
about narrative has been linked to another vital issue: a reexamination of 
research methodologies" (1). Narratives represent another method of studying 
human interaction, a method that may not be as "exact" as some scholars desire. 
But narratives bring other kinds of data to the fore that quantitative information 
simply carmot deliver. Narratives tell us how someone feels about the three 
children they've lost to disease, not just the fact that high infant mortality is a 
problem for them. Feelings and facts do different things. Narratives work well 
for studying the ins and outs of human emotion and its related behavior. 
One component of narrative research is the "doubling" of narratives. 
Scholars who write about narratives write their own narrative about the stories 
and cultures they study. In narrative research, this double-story must remain in 
the fore. In analyzing stories others tell, we tell a story about what we think about 
those other stories. We must consider what our narratives of rese<trch say about 
the narratives we use as data. In narrative scholarship, we also encounter (thanks 
to this double-story) an intensified interrogation of the legitimacy of data. We 
must accurately record the stories we hear from others. We must accurately 
represent these stories in the narratives we tell of our research. Scholars must 
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keep in mind these "double narratives" and remain aware of the pluses and 
pitfalls engendered in narrative research. Scholars probe different angles of 
narrative studies within academe: narratives are cultural, narratives are 
essential, narratives make data, narratives are suspect. Academe has room for all 
of these perspectives on narrative theory. 
Fisher's definition of humans as homo narrans completes the circle of 
meaning around narrative use in social settings. Fisher uses a "narrative 
human" metaphor to explciin our "essential nature"; the metaphor works better 
than any other metaphor communication scholars have already tried (62). Fisher 
argues we should take narration as the most basic human way to explain 
ourselves: "when narration is taken as the master metaphor, it subsumes the 
others. The other metaphors become conceptions that inform various ways of 
recounting or accounting for human choice and action" (62, italics in original). 
Recounting is how we learn to understand our experiences and others' 
experiences. Fisher continues his description of how we use narrative in our 
lives: 
Regardless of the form they are given, recounting and 
accounting for constitute stories we tell ourselves and each other 
to establish a meaningful life-world. The character of narrator(s), 
the conflicts, the resolutions, and the styles will vary, but each 
mode of recounting and accounting for is but a way of relating a 
"truth" about the human condition. 
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The Homo narrans metaphor is thus an incorporation and 
extension of Burke's definition of 'man' as the "symbol-using 
(symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animals.' The idea of 
human being as storytellers posits the generic form of all symbol 
composition- It holds that symbols are created and 
communicated ultimately as stories meant to give order to 
human experience and to induce others to dwell in them in 
order to establish ways of living in common, in intellectual and 
spiritual commuruties in which there is confirmation for the 
story that constitutes one's life. (62-63) 
Fisher approaches narrative as the way humaris choose to communicate their 
experience to others; we choose this mode of communication because it confirms 
we are human. We have varied reasons for contributing narratives to the larger 
social conversation: a narrative may illuminate a point, provide an example, 
amplify a point of larger discussion, or provide a spirit of esprit de corps and 
contribute to a feeling of goodwill. Rosaldo notes humans use narrative for this 
reason of goodwill, but with a specific purpose in mind: according to Rosaldo, 
stories often shape, rather than simply reflect, human conduct (129, my italics). 
Narratives carry directions for living. 
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Contextual issues of narrative research 
Chapter Two is designed to provide connections between performance, 
narrative and visuals. I argue narratives are one way to identify the texts of a 
particular performance. Peterson and Langellier discuss the involvement of text 
and context in narrative research methods in their recent article "The Politics of 
Personal Narrative Methodology." Peterson and Langellier agree that, if 
narratives are to be taken seriously as research artifacts, we must acknowledge 
the contested, political nature of the texts and contexts involved in the 
narratives. Personal experience is not an unproblematic source, origin or 
explanation of knowledge. Rather, our personal experience and identity are full 
of power relationships shaping our resultant narratives. The complex set of 
"cultural effects and relations of power" (137) are central to narrative theory. For 
Peterson and Langellier, three assumptions have to be challenged in order to 
more clearly expose power and context in narratives: 1) personal narrative is a 
text; 2) we are fully able to transcribe and analyze personal narratives; and 3) 
personal narratives do not constitute a performance (137). 
The researchers argue, instead, narratives are sets of relationships and 
strategies rather than texts: "personal narrative is not 'given' as a text; rather, 
personal narrative is a strategic practice of textualizing and contextualizing 
performance" (141). Narratives are strategic practices, and thus transcription is 
equally strategic. The transcriptionist chooses the "important" pieces of 
narratives and may leave the rest, thus forcing a form on a narrative which may 
not be accurate. At the same time, the transcriptionist carmot capture all the 
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nuances of the narrative performance. As Peterson and Langellier argue, "if we 
had better technology ... we would finally know just what was happening in a 
personal narrative" (142). Better technology could capture more accurately the 
gnmts, hand gestures, and physical settings that are part of personal narratives. 
Peterson and Langellier's last challenge is to see personal narratives as 
performances rather than stand-alone texts to be interpreted as we interpret 
literature. They argue "narrative production interrogates the production of 
identity and the experience; it negotiates and construes relations of power that 
implicate the research context as well as the story-text" (146). Narrative 
performance represents the "multiple contingencies of cultural conflict," (146) 
including whose narrative this is, what the relationship is between the narrator 
and the information related, whose pleasure or pain resides in the narrative, and 
whose identity is embodied within the story. Peterson and Langellier contend 
we cannot "stop constructing" our multiple subjective cormections. We are 
always within ourselves and our relatioiiship to others. We are always 
performing ourselves in our narratives. 
Peterson and Langellier are right to call for a more thorough discussion of 
the text and context of narratives in performance. Narratives as shifting, 
contextual entities means narratives are part of a larger performance. Peterson 
and Langellier see narratives as an interrogation of our texts and contexts rather 
than a static entity that can be transcribed and stored. My project accomplishes a 
similar task. I apply narrative as a central textual feature in performance, and 
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thus expose narrative's ability to question and complicate our performances of 
identity. 
Since stories communicate truths between humans and we can use stories 
to conduct and promote specific kinds of action— including argiunents— 
narratives should be considered carefully in our attempts to make sense of how 
culture is created and transformed through performance. DiPardo argues, "Few 
would dispute that the best thiriking and writing is at once personal and public, 
both irxfused with private meaning and focused upon the world beyond the self" 
(60). Narrative theory provide ample evidence to suggest narrative as a ftiiitful 
form of communication worthy of scholarly attention. 
Narratives are part of the communicative building blocks of culture. In 
his book Acts of Meaning, Bruner posits that a narrative "can... teach, conserve 
memory, or alter the past" (52). I choose to incorporate narrative into 
performance for the functions Bruner notes— its power of teaching, its 
preservation of memory, and a means to alter the past—but I include narrative's 
power to shape the future. We influence the future with the narratives we tell 
today. Part of our narrative impact includes the "verisimilitude" of stories that 
Bruner argues for in Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (11). Narratives may 
provide the nearest notion of "truth" portrayed in human interaction. 
Narratives can be powerful forces. Performance scholars Stem and Henderson 
sum up the power of narratives in this way: 
Constituted in a communal process, [narratives] tell about personal, 
lived experience in a way that assists in the cor\struction of identity. 
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reinforces or challenges private and public belief systems and 
values, and either resists or reinforces the dominant cultural 
practices of the community event occurs. The personal narrative 
very often gives the teller as well as the hearer a sense of value, 
cohesion, and empowerment. (35) 
According to Maclean, "the energy involved in performance, the energies 
unleashed hy performance can perhaps best be appreciated at the most 
fundamental level in oral narrative" (2, italics in original). Maclean goes on to 
say that "the transgressive power of the performance cracks the rigid framework 
of ideologies and preconceptions to allow a release of energy which can then be 
channeled .. in renewed creativity..." (2-3). 
Visuals also play an important role in performances. In the last section of 
this chapter, I examine visual theory in light of its rhetorical connections, its 
social connections, including art, and its links to performance. 
Visuals in a rhetorical framework 
Visuals give us a chance to enhance other forms of rhetoric with another 
kind of text. Visuals emphasize our points, make clear our meanings, and, in 
some cases, offer contradictory viewpoints to the ones emerging from our stories. 
Visuals—whether they are pictures, clothes we wear, or room arrangements— 
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are another version of our arguments, our rhetorical abilities, and our 
textual/contextual knowledge that influences our communication. 
In this section I address four primary functions of visuals. A visual can be 
primarily informative, aesthetic, persuasive, or ideological. I emphasize 
"primarily" because all four functions exist in almost any visual. But a visual 
almost always has a primary function corresponding to one of these four 
categories. The words on this page are representations of a code we know to read 
as "English," which makes them first a visual expression before they form a 
lingmstic expression. Before we read the words, we must "read" the letters as 
visual symbols which make up larger visual symbols. In the same way, Gretchen 
Barbatsis describes televised campaign ads as "pictorial texts" because they are 
"characterized by both their content and compositional [syntactic] qualities" (70). 
Visuals can be read in the same way we read other symbolic, syntactic systems. 
Informative visuals 
At first glance, a street sign and a painting have few visual qualities in 
common. A street sign is easily recognizable as an informative visual. Even 
without words, an eight-sided red sign tells us something in our culture—when 
we see it, we stop. Even though a painting seenis less informative, it does serve 
to document the history of its period, either through what's painted on the 
canvas or through its style. In general, all visual texts have an iiiformational 
component. 
Edward Tufte is recognized worldwide as an expert on informational 
visuals- His standards for informational visuals are high. Tufte's criteria for a 
successful informative visual include data accuracy, statistical honesty, 
proportional pictures, and enough context to understand the visual." His main 
expertise lies in analyzing visual displays of quantitative information. 
According to Tufte, "of all methods for analyzing and communicating statistical 
information, well-designed data graphics are usually the simplest and at the 
same time the most powerful" (9). Data graphics may be the most significant 
examples of informational visucils. A chart or a bar graph can be worth 
thousands of words. Tufte argues "Excellence in statistical graphics consists of 
complex ideas communicated with clarity, precision, and efficiency" (13). Clarity, 
precision, and efficiency can be useful in creating any kind of visual text. If we 
follow Tufte's principles in designing visuals, we can be assiued our idea will 
emerge from our head and be displayed in a way that represents what we want to 
say. What an interpreter takes from our visual is anyone's guess. However, if 
we pay close attention to Tufte's requirements, we will construct our visuals to 
reflect our viewpoints. 
At first blush, informational visuals seem to be everj^here. Each visual 
we see conveys some sort of information. However, Tufte's quest for precision 
in data displays indicates a particular standard for accurate informational visuals. 
Those visual signs and symbols we rely on consistently for information have 
particular requiremeiits. Iiiformational signs on interstates and highways are 
green or brown. STOP signs are red octagons. Though we can adapt if we change 
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the visual standard (we could learn to stop at a green square STOP sign), we rely 
most dearly on the visual symbol to convey the information. Even if a red 
octagonal sign didn't have the word STOP on it, we would likely stop our car in 
front of it- All visuals contain information, but for some, information is the 
primary feature of the visual. 
Aesthetic visuals 
Primarily aesthetic visuals include paintings, sculptures, drawings— 
almost any kind of art is considered aesthetic. Sets for theatre productions, 
furniture, and architecture are other examples of visual structures that might be 
considered aesthetically important before their informational, persuasive, or 
ideological components are exposed. Whatever the form, the relationship of art 
and culture is important to explore here. 
art as visual communication Art operates as a system of visual 
commvmication. The statement sounds obvious. The perceived beauty of art is 
part of its communicative value, but the meaning of a piece is more than 
aesthetic qualities such as color, shape, and texture. Art is a complex blend of 
appecu^ance and content. The content of Laurie Anderson's art is part of what I 
analyze in Chapter Four. However, the visual appearance of art is of primary 
importance for many art scholars and appreciators. For some patrons, 
appearance provides enough meaning. The aesthetic stance requires patrons to 
examine a piece ftrom an appropriately reverent distance, commenting only on 
its beauty. Many art critics believe disregarding this distant "aesthetic attitude" is 
a dangerous prospect. Stoinitz argues the definition of the "aesthetic attitude" is 
the "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object 
of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone" (10). Stolnitz's viewpoint lets us 
"contemplate objects" and look at them as individual, stand-alone pieces of 
beauty.^^ Who decides the standards of beauty is partially represented by who 
can maintain the distant, aesthetic attitude. Inglis posits art as an indicator of 
power relationships in cultures—those who say what art is "good" or "beautiful" 
are those who hold the power of a society (183). Aesthetics again becomes central 
to arf s worth. According to Inglis, visual communication in the guise of art is 
another way of maintaining the status quo. 
We Ceui conceptualize aesthetics as a cultural construct if we consider its 
context. We look at art because it is beautiful, ugly, or unusual. But often we 
mxist go deeper than how art looks to discover its social importance. Content 
needs to be discussed as part of the visual communication art provides. 
Alperson notes, "art is a social phenomenon ... artists are members of society" 
(231). Because they are part of society, artists are affected by societal forces. The 
art they make reflects their opinions of institutions, trends, and values. 
Alperson argues, "the pictorial arts both present and characterize social 
conditions and beliefs" (231). The characterization of social attitudes is how art 
commvmicates. Following the traditional dictates of the aesthetic attitude does 
little to help understand visuals in culture. A disinterested viewpoint will not 
lead us to understanding the social implications of art. Instead, we must think of 
art and its beauty as connected to the larger social systems around it. 
Aesthetics is the point at which context enters visueil communication. 
According to Charles Kostelnick, "aesthetics speaks to cultural issues because it 
contextualizes design, situating it in a given moment" (188). The "given 
moment" of the piece is critical. If we consider a piece as a stand-alone example 
of an artist's talent, we miss the social conditions surrounding the work. Was 
the artist poor or wealthy? Was the piece commissioned by a patron? Was the 
artist popular? All of these cultural conditions (power relations, political 
connections, social aspirations) influence what an artist says with his pieces. The 
expression of these conditions in the piece and in our discussions of it help us 
understand the cultural forces influencing the work. We deconstruct a visual, 
including art, by understanding the cultured relationships within the visual. 
Hatcher considers the contexts and functions of art as central to art's 
societal importance. Hatcher argues that art "helps hold society together because 
it reflects and reinforces the relationships deemed proper in that society; art 
symbols are collective representations which by their form and constant presence 
are shaped by and help shape the social order" (113). We make art to make visual 
communication of our ideas. Artists propose new works, combine old ideas to 
make new ones, and react against previous art in order to express the cultural, 
political, and social corutectioios creating society's institutions. Creating 
connections, which then may lead to social institutions, helps individuals 
generate power for themselves or their causes. 
Hatcher asserts that art can help recapture power for individuals. In her 
view, art "helps hold society together because of its psychological functions— 
essentially it acts as a safety valve, channeling discontent, disruption, and excess 
energy" (113). Art is how people visually express themselves, especially when 
they do not agree with a publicly held opinion. Instead of hosting a public 
debate, trying to earn a spot on Jay Leno, or writing a book, an artist might make 
a sculpture reflecting his oppositional point of view. When disagreement is 
required, art is another way of allowing for dissent. 
Art is, essentially, an organizing process. Art helps us discover how things 
are related to each other, both visually and socially. Hatcher notes, "visual 
communication differs from verbal communication, not in being more a matter 
of feeling, or of the unconscious, but in being more a matter of how things are 
related to each other ..." (138). For example, art points out the relationship 
between the artist and her viewpoint on various social situations. The Des 
Moines Art Center in Des Moines, Iowa, has three rhinestone-encrusted vacuum 
cleaners encased in Ludte boxes. The vacuums are in an art space—a museum— 
where beauty is expected, and they are dressed in "jewels," which adds to their 
aesthetic value. However, the vacuums say something to us about our cxilture 
which is deeper than the aesthetic pleasures of rhinestone-studded vacuums. 
The artist could be indicating cleanliness is a very overrated value, something 
we think is "precious" enough to belong to a museum. The artist may be trying 
to argue that anything holds aesthetic value (a Dada point of view), including a 
vacuum cleaner, espccialhf a vacuum with rhinestones. We have no way to 
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determine the artist's intentions; we have no way of knowing how or why the 
Art Center decided to purchase these particular pieces. What we do know is that 
these dressed-up vacuums provide us with more than their aesthetic value. 
They provide us with a visual representation of someone's opinion about 
vacuuming—it is up to us to determine that opinion, but the visual 
representations of the vacuums ask us to consider what vacuuming might mean 
to us and to others. 
Aesthetic elements are central to visuals. We look at objects because they 
catch our eye, in some way, and they catch our eye with their appearance. If the 
piece is well designed, its visual effect is usually persuasive. 
Persuasive and ideological visuals 
It is hard to separate persuasion from ideology. In general, the persuasive 
nature of a visual communication stems from an ideology which asked for the 
creation of the visual. I consider both persuasion and ideology under one 
heading because of their close ties. Of course, persuasion and ideology are two 
features of visuals which dexiy easy separation from other categories used here. 
Persuasion and ideology exist within information, and aesthetic choices can be 
determined by persuasive or ideological prefereiices. If we disentangle 
persuasion from ideology through using persuasion as a particular feature of 
argument, we can make a small separation between the two. 
The persuasive/argumentative features of visuals emerge in different 
places. According to Kostelnick, "postmodernists like Charles Jencks (1984) have 
viewed architectural designs as a vehicle for communication, Geofirey Broadbent 
(1980) has explored the semiotics of buildings, and Richard Buchanan (1985) has 
examined product design as a form of rhetoric" (189). Visual: syTubol systems are 
rhetorical and part of the tradition of argument. Not everyone agrees that 
visuals actually "argue": some rhetoricians claim that only oral and written 
symbol systems can argue. Fleming claims, "argument is reasoning towards a 
debatable conclusion" (19), and since a visual carmot be broken into claim and 
support, it carmot qualify as a true argument. According to Fleming, "a picture 
can be considered an 'argument' only by stretching the meaning of that word 
beyond recognition" (19). However, experts like Kostelnick and Foss would 
claim that many different kinds of ^ visual systems can "argue," and in the same 
way traditional arguments are formed. Visual symbol systems employ argument 
and ideology with regularity. Foss calls for a more thorough study of visual 
argument because, "by situating visual imagery at the periphery of 
communication theories, we have overlooked much information about 
communicative processes, practices, and principles" (85). Visuals respond to the 
cultural context surroLmdiiig them and their creator as much as any other 
meaning-making symbol system. 
Visuals are, of course, ideological. Robin Kinross claims that no visual, no 
matter how neutral it seems, can ever be free of persuasive/rhetorical influences. 
Kinross invokes Gui Bonsiepe, an influential visual designer from the sixties, to 
enhance the argument that visuals cannot be free of rhetoric:": 
information without rhetoric is a pipe-dream which ends up in the 
break-down of communication and total silence. "Pxire" 
iiiformation exists for the designer only in arid abstraction. As soon 
as he begins to give it concrete shape, to bring it within the range of 
experience, the process of rhetorical infiltration begins. (Bonsiepe 
30) 
Bonsiepe takes traditional rhetorical figures, such as metonymy and metaphor, 
and gives them visual counterparts through his analysis of advertising. Kinross 
picks up Bonsiepe's cue and examines rhetorical figures in other visuals, 
including a railroad timetable. Kinross concludes, "nothing is free of rhetoric, 
that visual manifestations emerge from particular historical circumstances, that 
ideological vacuums do not exist" (29). BCinross' claim alerts us that anything 
from a frain schedule to a dress is value-laden, persuasive, and potent. 
We see with(in) our ideology. Our belief systems help dictate the visual 
cues we interpret in our environment. Mieke Bal mentions visual ideology as a 
part of seeing. We assume that the things we see are "true" or "real." According 
to Bal, "what you see must be real, true, present, or otherwise reliable. After all, 
it is visible, you see it there, before you. Although every visitor [to a museum] 
knows at an intuitive level that an exposition is a representation, the presence of 
the object provides an mideniable urge to recognize its 'truth'" (5). Discussing 
visual "truth" takes visuals even farther than persuasion. Visuals contain our 
belief systems as well as our arguments. Our ideology enters into the visuals we 
create because our epistemology cannot be divorced from visual commimication 
any more than it can be from other written or oral communication-
Barton and Barton have done significant work with combinations of 
ideology and visual communication. In their article "Ideology and the Map," 
they attempt to uncover how "visual signification serves to sustain relations of 
domination" (50), ones that might not be readily apparent. Barton and Barton 
argue that maps are one of the most "quintessentially ideological" visual systems 
(51). A map's ideology cannot be detached from the map. Consequently, the map 
becomes a representation of the ideologies promoted by the mapmaker. If the 
mapmaker is American, America may well be the center of his map. The 
Bartons' goal is to "'deconstruct' the innocence of such maps" (52) in order to 
imcover those ideological structures embedded within the visual. 
Ideology is the driving force behind the exertion of power. Barton and 
Barton have studied ideology in other visuals besides maps. They claim that 
"visual as site of power inscription" ("Modes" 138, italics in original) is a 
significant notion for document designers. Invoking Foucault and following the 
idea of Bentham's Panopticon, a sophisticated penitentiary that allowed guards to 
view all inmates at once. Barton and Barton elaborate on S5moptic and analytic 
vision (139-141). Looking with a synoptic view allows us to understand a great 
deal of information at once. Synoptic modes of power in visuals include maps, 
once again. Barton and Barton argue, "in a map, after all, the whole world can be 
brought within the purview of a single viewer" (143). Maps allow us to see 
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many relationships at once: place, area, population density. Synoptic visuals 
allow us to look at information and take it in. Employing an anal5rtic mode of 
power in our visuals means we are able to view particulars. Tables, charts, and 
graphs are analytic visuals, and we must see them carefully in order to make 
sense of them (144-45). These modes of power in visuals can operate together— 
in the form of a bus map, for instance, that demonstrates routes and pick-up 
times in the same space—to generate even more ideological power for visuals. 
Barton and Barton's most important argument is the notion that visuals can 
represent ideologies. Power, taken as resistance ("Modes" 157), allows us to fight 
against existing power structures. As a result, we can instill our ideology into 
any visual we create. We can also assess visuals according to the power they 
demonstrate. 
Relating to visuals/relating to performance 
To some degree, all visuals are informational, aesthetic, persuasive, and 
ideological. Some visuals have more of one characteristic than another. Chir job 
is to decide how much of each feature is present in a visual and how we will 
react to the visual's message. 
Art, document design, advertising, architecture, and nonverbal 
communication are all part of visual communication. All of these visual texts 
can be combined with other texts to either enhance or detract from the message 
intended by the visual. The combination can be more powerful than a singiolar 
text. Rutter's study concerns gazes between individuals in conversation, and the 
final point he makes in his book is important to how we understand the role of 
visuals in general: "Language and nonverbal communication do more than 
work in parallel—they are integrated together—and we must not forget" (214). 
We cannot remove the impact of a visual from our "complete" communication 
(words, documents, nonverbals, body language, whatever may be involved). We 
do not know how others will interpret our visual, or our message in general. 
We cannot control their reception or interpretation. All we are able to do is 
create our communication texts, whatever they may be, and place them in public 
view for others to consider. 
An examination of visual theory demonstrates visuals may be read as 
informational, aesthetic, persuasive, or ideological texts. Our visual texts then 
become a part of our performances as bar graphs, costumes, advertisements, or 
maitifestos. Belief systems and visual representations dictate how we 
incorporate visuals in our interaction and how we use them as persuasive 
elements in the performance of our stories. Individuals and communities are 
affected by our visual arguments. Gablik invokes the notion of community to 
describe how art can have a positive visual impact: 
In the past, we have made much of the idea of art as a mirror 
(reflecting the times); we have had art as a hammer (social protest); 
and we have had art as furniture (something to hang on the walls); 
and we have had art as a search for the self. There is another kind 
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of art, which speaks to the power of connectedness and establishes 
bonds, art that calls us into relationship. (114) 
Art and other means of visual communication can draw us together to help us 
explore our social condition. The visual text of our performances provide a 
significant piece of our performances. 
A chapter summary 
In this chapter I forge bonds between performance studies, the rhetorical 
tradition, and narrative theory, both past and present. I have included visual 
theory as a part of performance studies to point out the importance of visual 
rhetoric and how it contributes to cultural analysis. I believe the ties between 
performance and argument are evidenced through exploring specific kinds of 
texts used in performance, namely narratives and visuals. Performances are 
powerful, intentional communication forms. Performance theory draws its 
argimientative strength from previous rhetorical traditions such as sophistic 
rhetoric and epideictic rhetoric. Performances gains importance through its 
social aspects, detailed by sociologists, anthropologists, and performance 
theorists. We perform arguments with other members of culture, under the 
cultural influences brought to bear on us through the contexts of the narratives 
and visuals. 
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The performances we encounter may be fleeting, extended, scripted, or 
completely extemporaneous. They may be specifically aesthetic, spartan, 
technologically up-to-date, or without formal trappings of elegance." No matter 
how they are done, our performances express our point of view (our argument) 
on the topic at hand as we see it through our acculturated eyes. Performance is 
made through a combination of text and context, in this case narrative and 
visual texts and their surrounding contexts. Others will interpret our 
performances, and we do the same. We perform in response to the social 
situations we encounter. Performances help us negotiate the culture around us. 
Chapter Three addresses the cultural negotiation our performances create 
by more carefully examining the idea of context. Contextualizing the narrative 
and visual texts within a performance can be construed as the problematization 
of cultural connections. Problematization is a term for interpretation envisioned 
by Michel Foucault in his later works. Chapter Three explores Foucaulfs 
theories of language, culture, and power to help make sense of this 
contextualizing process. Chapter Three considers how language shapes cultuire 
and power, and how power structures created by language can be exposed. 
The aim of a performance is to ask, ultimately, what an artifact argues for 
in terms of cultural representation. Chapter Three explores how performative 
argimients are shaped through our language rules and power structures, and 
how cultural contexts created tiirough problematization are part of the 
performance. Diamond reminds us, "performance, as one crucial practice in the 
making of culture, is inseparable from politics and history" (10). I have covered 
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some of the texts of performance theory's politics and history in this chapter. In 
Chapter Three, I investigate the contextual sides of politics and history. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE CONTEXTS 
OF PROBLEMATIZATION 
Viewing performcince within a complex matrix of power, serving 
diverse craltural desires, encourages a permeable understanding of 
history and change. (Diamond 2) 
Encouraging a "permeable understanding of history and change" is the 
jimcture at which Foucault enters this study. Foucault's idea of problematization 
provides a way to contextualize performance. For that reason, I choose to devote 
Chapter Three to the examination of problematization and how it can help us 
imderstand the contexts of texts and performances. 
Foucault's work was not done in the discipline of communication studies, 
but he provokes much thought among those who study language use. Cooper 
argues Foucault's primary object of study was "discursive practice," and the 
centrality of discourse in his work accounts for his popularity among 
rhetoricians (272-3). Cooper notes, "his analyses of systems of thought, power, 
and ethics provide commentary about both repressive powers and forces for 
liberation within contemporary society" (273). Foss, Foss, and Trapp argue, 
"despite the wide variety of subject areas with which his work dealt, some 
essentially rhetorical concepts served as the foundation for much of his work . . . 
[including] the relationship between rhetoric and knowledge . . . the notion of 
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power . .. [and] an analysis of ethics and the mearis by which individuals 
constitute themselves as subjects . .(216). 
In this chapter I relate Foucault to the field of rhetoric while exploring 
basic concepts important to his characterizations of power and language. 
Exploring Foucaulfs writings on language is a way of approaching text. 
Foucaulfs defiiutions of discourse and language seem to offer "meta-text" about 
what text can do. I then offer Foucaulfs writings on problematization, as a way 
to shape and focus the context of a particular text. An understanding of 
problematization provides a basis in Chapter Four for an analysis of Anderson's 
performances. 
Relating Foucault to rhetoric 
The connections between Foucault and rhetoric are not immediately 
visible. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a French philosopher, historian, and 
language scholar. His formal education was in philosophy, psychology, and 
psychiatry. Some of his major works include A History cf Madness, a study of 
how society contributes to the construction of "insanity"; Discipline and Punish, 
a history of prisons and confinement; and The History of Sexuality, a history of 
the relationship between sex and culture. He has been called by many scholars a 
"post-structural" language philosopher. In post-structural thought, the 
interaction between reader and text is productive and active, not static and fixed. 
Reading is no longer an exercise in "passive consumption" (Sarup 4). Instead, 
the reader and text create meaning together-
Though the titles of Foucault's major works do not suggest rhetorical 
studies, Foucault's subject matter involved such rhetorical concepts as discursive 
practices (how oiar speaking patterns are influenced), the articulation 
(connection) between language and its subject matter, and the relationships 
between knowledge construction and cultural institutions (216). Foss, Foss, and 
Trapp argue Foucault's contributions to rhetoric might appear limited if we 
examine the disciplines in which his works are based (209). However, the "meta-
discourse" of his works relates him to rhetoric. Sarup characterizes Foucault as 
"one of the leading post-structuralists" of this century. Alongside other 
significant theorists such as Lacan and Derrida, Foucault "question[s] the 
possibility of the objectivity of any language of description or analysis" (Sarup 4). 
Not only is Foucault's work included in current rhetorical thought, it 
echoes classical concepts. Foucault has been "adopted" by rhetoricians due to his 
study of the effects of language and power. His work has been incorporated into 
both contemporary and classical rhetorical studies. Foucault has been invoked as 
a modem practitioner of classical rhetorical concepts. Covino and Jolliffe note 
how Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault have all worked with predominantly 
sophistic ideals in their language studies, namely the inability of language to 
transmit reality and "truth" as rhetorical construction (67-8). 
Bizzell and Herzberg argue that Foucault "treats author, meaning, and 
knowledge itself as a function of discourse, not as its source" (1126). Foucault 
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challenges the idea that knowledge provokes discourse. Instead, discourse 
generates its own reality, and knowledge emerges from within the discourse. 
Bizzell and Herzberg assert Foucault's idea of discourse "describes the 
relationship between language and knowledge; the functions of disciplines, 
institutions, and other discourse communities; the ways that particular 
statements come to have truth value, the effects of discursive practices on social 
action; and the uses of discourse to exercise power" (1127). They note Foucault 
does not use the term rhctoric in his works; he prefers to use discourse as his 
umbrella term for communication. However, they argue "there is no question 
that his theory addressed a number of ideas that are central to modem rhetoric," 
including the notions that "rhetoric is epistemic, discourse (rhetoric) is a form of 
social action, and that power is disseminated in society through our laws, 
regulations, and texts" (1128). 
Foucault and coramunication scholars 
Foucault's work has been useful to two sets of commimication scholars. 
First, many rhetoricians have employed Foucault in their studies.^® He has been 
included in standard texts for graduate and undergraduate rhetorical history and 
criticism classes (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990; Brock, Scott, and Chesebro, third 
edition 1990; Covino and Jolliffe 1995; Foss, Foss, and Trapp, second edition 1991). 
Foucault is mentioned in Lyotard's groundbreaking volume The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knoiolcdge (xix) as a skeptic of master-narratives, and is 
named at the end of Thomas Kent's Paralogic Rhetoric: A Theory of 
Communicative Interaction as an "externalist philosopher" (170), which 
includes him in the vanguard of rhetorical thought on human interaction. 
Scholars who study reading and writing cite Foucault as one of the preeminent 
scholars on power, political resistance, and knowledge in discourse 
communities (Berlin 1987; Donahue and Quandahl 1989; Giroux 1983; Miller 
1991; Scholes 1985). The opening essay of Sullivan and Qualley's Pedagogy in the 
Age of Politics (Greene) begins with a quotation from Foucault's Discourse on 
Language (1). Foucault appears in the intersection between hermeneutics, 
politics, and philosophy as the scholar who "reduce s philosophical theology to 
power politics" (Rosen 189). He emerges as "the person who has taught us to 
analyze history through institutionally situated discursive practices" (Culler 63). 
Second, Foucault's work is significant in performance studies. Forty 
percent of the collected essays in the volume Critical Theory and Performance, 
edited by Reinelt and Roach, reference Foucault's theories. Most often, authors 
use Foucaiilt as a source for their discussion of power in society and how power 
transfers to performance. The performances discussed in the volume range from 
plays to performance art to jazz. In his essay on theory after the Cold War, Jim 
Merod compares Foucault to jazz musicians: "as a theorist and as a jazz critic, I 
cannot hear the words of Michel Foucault or Paul de Man without hearing also 
Louis Armstrong and Charlie Parker" (193). Merod continues, "I caimot hear 
Pops and Bird . . . without recognizing the liberating hope and self-eviscerating 
vigilcmce at work .. . (193). The comparison of jazz's frenetic style and content 
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with Foucault's earnest intensity seems appropriate. We may have trouble 
discerning the path of a Foucault essay, just as it can be hard to follow a jazz solo. 
But both serve to help us see the intricacies of the music or theory at hand. 
Foucault's discourse on power, language, and knowledge adds to the 
"epistemological critique" (Reinelt and Roach 5) that has recently emerged in 
performance studies. 
Self and agency in Foucault 
Agency is an important tenet in rhetoric. Who has the power to speak in 
what circumstances determines much about the creation of argvmients. Some 
arguments are excluded if their proponents do not have the agency to articulate 
them. For example, an assault victim may have less power to tell his story than 
his assailant might, depending on the audience. Agents retain the power to 
speak or write as they need and choose. Agency indicates the ability, including 
the social power, we have to express ourselves. 
Foucault's writings related to agency seem contrary to his postmodern 
stance on interpretation because the agent seems to disappear from the equation 
of meaning. In his article "What is an Author?" Foucault determines that "the 
name of the author remains at the contours of the texts" (123), placing authors 
(named individuals) in the roles of delineating one text from another by virtue 
of identification. But an author's name does not encapsulate the author; her 
name is "situated in the breach, among the discontinuities, which gives rise to 
new groups of discourse" (123). Consequently, instead of identifying an 
individual, the name of an author "characterizeCsJ the existence, circulation, and 
operation of certain discourses mthin a society" (124). Authors become signiHers 
of particular conversations. When we say "a Platonic ideal/' we do not 
necessarily refer to something Plato wrote, but rather something encompassed by 
ideas and discourses that could be attributed to Plato. 
An erasure of the author concerns scholars who consider agency a primary 
source of power, and with obvious reason. If a text's creator, signified by a 
person's name, is only a description of the 'legal and institutional systems that 
circumscribe, determine and articulate the realm of discourses" (130), then 
people seem to drop out of the meaning-making process. However, considering 
the author as a descriptor of discourse is not the same as discarding the 
individueil interpreter of texts. Foucault argues that the "author-function" (130) 
does not refer "to actual individuals irisofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a 
variety of egos and to a series of subjective positions that individuals of any class 
may come to occupy" (131). Instead of destroying individual sets of meaning, 
Foucault indicates individual sets of meanings come together to make a 
collective author-function. Foucault's "author-function" is not the destructive 
force many scholars perceive. It does not discount individual agency. For more 
evidence of Foucault's support of agency, we must turn to his disciission of 
power and the individual. 
In an interview with French journalist Gerard Raulet, Foucault makes a 
statement about the relationship between power, truth, and the individual. The 
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relationship between power and the individual is one measurement of agency. 
Foucault argues: 
If I tell the truth about myself, as I am now doing, it is in part that I 
am constituted as a subject across a number of power relations 
which are exerted over me and which I exert over others. I say this 
in order to situate what for me is the question of power.... I am not 
developing a theory of power. I am working on the history, at a 
given moment, of the way reflexivity of self upon self is established, 
and the discourse of truth that is linked to it (PPC 39) 
Foucault's construction of a "subject across a number of power relations" does 
not discount the individual. Rather, it acknowledges individuals are constituted 
and influenced by the power relationships they exerdse and those exercised upon 
them. The individual is shaped by cultural forces, yet she is not lost. Rather, she 
remairis as an interpreter, or author, whose interpretations are guided by those 
power relations. 
In an interview with Stephen Riggins, Foucaxilt discusses his childhood 
and the influence war had on his life. The power relationships between war and 
cultiiral identity shape Foucault's interpretation of his childhood. In this 
extended quotation, Foucault explores, from his adult perspective, how the 
power generated by a complex cultural institution such as war shaped his agency 
to speak of his childhood. 
The menace of war was our background, our framework of 
existence. Then the war arrived. Much more than the activities of 
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family life, it was these events concerning the world which are the 
substance of our memory. I say "our" because I am nearly sure that 
most boys and girls in France at this moment had the same 
experience. Our private life was really threatened. Maybe that is the 
reason why I am fascinated by history and the relationship between 
personal experience and those events of which we are a part. I 
think that is the nucleus of my theoretical desires.... We did not 
know when I was ten or eleven years old, whether we would 
become German or remain French. We did not know whether we 
would die or not in the bombing and so on. When I was sixteen or 
seventeen I knew only one thing: school life was an environment 
protected from exterior menaces, from politics. And I have always 
been fascinated by living protected in a scholarly environment, in 
an intellectual milieu. Knowledge is for me that which must 
function as a protection of individual existence and as a 
comprehension of the exterior world. I think thaf s it. Knowledge 
as a means of surviving by understanding. (PPC 7) 
Foucault took his agency from the situation by choosing to remain in the 
scholarly realm, where he felt safe and protected. The passage represents 
Foucault's "discourse of truth" relating to the "reflexivity of self" he possesses 
about his childhood. War has shaped Foucault, and he in turn has shaped the 
discourse around zuar by deconstructing his own personal involvement with the 
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concept Foucault was able to remain an agent in a time of great powerlessness 
by choosing the environment in which he felt most comfortable. 
As Foucault notes above, "knowledge" works as "a mecins of surviving by 
understanding." We create our personal truths through knowledge, and 
speaking these truths helps us retain our agency. Sarup captures Foucaulf s 
argimient regarding the relationship between power, agency, and knowledge in 
this passage: 
For Foucault, then, conceiving of power as repression, constraint or 
prohibition is inadequate: power "produces reality"; it "produces 
domaiiis of objects and rituals of truth." Foucault remarks that we 
often hear the cliche "power makes mad," but we should consider 
the fact that the exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge 
new objects of knowledge. Conversely, knowledge induces effects of 
power. It is not possible for power to be exercised without 
knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power. 
(82) 
When we articulate our knowledge, regardless of power relationships, we retain 
our agency as text-creating, text-interpreting beings. 
Foucault is tied to rhetoric thanks to his concern for discourse, power 
structures, and the multifaceted self created with language. For Foucault, 
discourse creates culture and power relationships within culture. I examine 
Foucault's synthesis of culture and language by examining, first, his 
understanding of discourse and language structures. Then I will take up 
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Foucault's discussion of the power in/of language. I cover Foucault's notion of 
problematization as a third feature of Foucault's language theories. 
Foucauit and language structures 
Discourse is one of Foucault's central tenets of his language theories." 
Discourse constitutes the main linguistic interaction between individuals, 
though the individual does not constitute these discourse practices. Instead, the 
individual is a product of the discourses. As Foss, Foss, and Trapp note, Foucauit 
argues, "The human being is the creation of our current way of talking about 
human beings" (222). Only in our created discourse are we created- In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucauit refers to discourse: 
instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the 
word "discourse/' I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: 
treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, 
sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and 
sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number 
of statements ... (80) 
Foucault's conception of discourse is certainly not static, which makes a complete 
definition of discourse hard to attain. Discourse may be small or large, more or 
less powerful, depending on the number and kind of people who participate. In 
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any case, a discourse (discourses, discourse statement, discursive practices) is the 
foxindation of our social reality. 
A statement, which is the building block of discourse, is equally 
complicated. A statement is defined as: 
not therefore a structure (that is a group of relations between 
variable elements, thus authorizing a possibly infinite number of 
concrete models); it is a function of existence that properly belongs 
to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide through 
analysis or intuition, whether or not they 'make ser\se/ ... [a 
statement is] a function that cuts across a domain of structures and 
possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in 
time and space. (AK 86-87) 
Statements are not sentences, nor are they always governed by the rules of logic 
(Foss et. al. 217). Foss, Foss, and Trapp define a statement as "a set of signs or 
symbols to which a statiis of knowledge can be ascribed" (217). The "status of 
knowledge" is then established by understanding the "cultural code, 
characteristic system, structure, network, or ground of thought that governs the 
language, perception, values, and practices of an age" (216). Because of their 
creation within a culture, statements are understood to be true in particular 
cultures and false in others. Statements are governed by our belief systems, so 
grammatical rules apply less accurately than do epistemological rxdes (Foss et. al. 
217). Statements gathered together, fueled by an ideology, make up our 
discourse(s). These discourses, in turn, help us create realities. 
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Discourse in and of itself is not the most pressing issue here. Discourse 
shapes the culture around it. How we use active discourse to create cultural 
realities—^knowledge—^is Foucault's main interest Foss, Foss and Trapp argue 
that "for Foucault, knowledge and discursive practices are inseparable" (217). 
How knowledge emerges from cultural practice is Foucaulf s central concern. 
In Foucault's analysis, discourse creates "forms of continuity" that, in turn, 
shape genres of thought, cultural institutions, and disciplines of knowledge. 
Medicine is tin example of a discipline of knowledge. The field has knowledge 
relating spedficcdly to it, including particular vocabularies and ideas. As these 
gerures, institutions, or disciplines become established within our culture, their 
discourse becomes privileged. Foucault argues institutions "speak" this way 
about their ability to retain power from their institutional discourse: "we're here 
[the institutions] to show you discourse is within the established order of things, 
t h a t  w e ' v e  w a i t e d  a  l o n g  t i m e  f o r  i t s  a r r i v a l ,  t h a t  a  p l a c e  h a s  b e e n  s e t  a s i d e  f o r  i t . .  
. and if it should happen to have a certain power, then it is we, and we alone 
who give it that power" {AK 216). 
Foucault's goal is to break apart institutions, genres, or knowledge bases, 
instead of letting the monolithic discourses representing them stand 
unchallenged: "Once these immediate forms of continuity are suspended, an 
entire field is set free" {AK 26). Our tendency to grcmt great power to institutions 
in ovir culture, such as mcdicinc, creates these monolithic discourse continuities 
that must be disrupted. With constant exposure, we speak—^without thought— 
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the discourse assigned to the cultural Institution. Foucault asks us to challenge 
traditions: 
We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings 
that we normally accept before any examination, those links whose 
validity is recognized from the outset; we must oust those forms 
and obscure forces by which we usually link the discotirse of one 
man with that of another; they must be driven out from the 
darkness in which they reign. (AK 22) 
By questioning "groupings" of thought, we may illustrate how o\ir discourse 
creates the power structures that force together the ideas in an entity such as 
medicine. 
Foucault questions the arbitrary cormections we make between discourses 
which privilege the discourses. He argues the cormections are arbitrary: "The 
question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: 
according to what rules could other similar statements be made? . . . how is it 
that one particular statement appeared rather than another?" {AK 27). 
Somehow, our culture manages to privilege one discourse over another 
(evolution over creation, for instance), and that discourse ends up shaping a 
cultural institutions (we teach evolution in our school systems). Language 
scholars must disrupt and disassemble discursive cultural structures. Foucault 
notes that, "of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more 
than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them 
irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech. It is this 'more' that we must 
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reveal and describe" (AK 49, italics in origincil). When we look for the "more/' 
what we find are the power relationships shaping discourse formations. 
Each classification of language structure builds upon the previous 
configuration. Statements form discourses, which form larger institutions. 
Foucault refers to the largest language structures as codes, which spring up 
around institutions. For example, Foucault argues, "up to the end of the 
eighteenth century, three major explicit codes—apart from the customary 
regularities and constraints of opinion—governed sexual practices: canonical 
law, the Christian pastoral, and dvil law" (HS 37). Sexuality was regulated by 
these particular codes, which were regulated by larger cultural institutions, 
namely the chiurch and the polis. 
These cultural discourse structures, or codes, also have "coded contents 
and qualified speakers" (HS 29). Qualified "code speakers" can affect or change 
cultural language structures. In relation to Foucault's example, only priests, 
pastors, and judges could speak the appropriate codes regarding sexual behavior. 
When qualified speakers choose not to change the code, the code remains. 
Intellectuals, of course, are part of the qualified speakers of the code of 
"knowledge." In a conversation with theorist Gilles Deleuze, Foucault noted, 
"intellectuals are themselves agents of [the societal system] of power—the idea of 
their responsibility for 'consciousness' and discourse forms part of the system" 
(10). Qualified speakers obviously hold the power of discourse in their hands. 
Foucault claims, "the intellectual's role is no longer to place himself 'somewhat 
ahead and to the side' in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; 
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rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its 
object and instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge,' 'truth,' consciousness,' and 
'discourse'" (10). 
Instead of a privileged status of purveyors of "knowledge," intellectuals 
mtist acknowledge the power relationships inherent in ideas like "truth" and 
"discourse." Merod argues Foucault tried to set up his relationship with 
knowledge outside this privileged discourse of academics. Merod claims, 
'Toucault tried for the majority of his writing career to avoid declaring 'interesf 
except in the most objective way possible. One could think of this habit as 
'scholastically political.' Such interest, of course, was always constructed by 
Foucault to undermine fraudulent authority ..." (189). As a scholar, Foucault 
tried to match his personal practice to his writing by acknowledging the 
"authority" he held in relation to a particular set of knowledge claims. By 
constructing this distant, objective power relationship to knowledge, he 
imdermines other "fraudulent" authorities who participate in academia. 
However, Foucault carmot escape his status as a "code speaker." His appearance 
in forty percent of a collection's essays (referenced earlier in the chapter) marks 
him as a significant claimant in the stakes of knowledge. His attempt to keep 
himself "scholastically political" and relatively disinterested caimot completely 
erase his academic affiliation or his status as a privileged speaker. 
Separating discourse relationships from the power relationships they 
create is difficult. It may not, in the long run, be necessary to do so. However, for 
the purpose of this chapter, I provide a separate discussion on Foucault's 
105 
conceptions of power, since Foucault's power theories are important to 
understanding his viewpoints on language. 
Foucault and power 
Foucault's relationship to the concept of power is complex. The concept of 
power is central to all of his writing. According to Sarup, "whereas we might 
normally regard knowledge as providing us with power to do things that 
without it we could not do, Foucault argues that knowledge is a power of others, 
the power to define others. In [Foucault's] view knowledge ceases to be a 
liberation and becomes a mode of surveillance, regulation, and discipline" (73). 
Power is the controlling factor in our lives: we are shaped by the "powers that 
be," and the social powers we caimot control. 
Foucault's studies of sexuality provide particular social arenas for studying 
"power challenges." Foucault argues, "sexuality, in so far as it is, in every society, 
and ours in particular, [is] heavily regulated" (HS 102). Foucault studies sexuality 
in part to explore specific questions: "what is power? And, to be more specific: 
how is it exercised, what exactly happens when someone exercises power over 
another?" (HS 102). Transgression may become part of that exercise of power. 
Sarup notes, "Traditionally, power has often been thought of in negative terms 
and been seen as an essentially judicial mechanism:... to have power is to say 
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no. And the dmllenging of power thus conceived can appear only as 
transgression" (81, italics added). 
The transgressive power we exercise when we work against established 
power formations applies to our selves as well. As he argues for the existence 
of a prohibitive, regulatory set of power structures, Foucault also claims we use 
power to define our selves (and others) and our actions. This definitional power 
provides us with a way to work around constructed social norms and influences. 
For Foucault, power works in both directions. Power is both repressive and 
generative at the same time. The "transgression" of working against established 
power structures is not a transgression, but a transduction: 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did 
anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to 
obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is 
simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says 
no, but that it traverses and produces things ... forms knowledge, 
produces discourse. (PK119) 
Power can be generative and destructive. But no matter whether power is a 
negative or positive influence, Focault claims, "power is the problem that has to 
be resolved" (PPC 104). Foucault's focus on power is evident in the subjects he 
studied—sexuality, prisons, criminals. Foucault conjectures that institutions 
such as prisons are actually socially constructed ideas governed by discourse 
formations revealed by examining the power relationships within the language 
that formed them. A prison is actually someone's conception of "prison." 
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His dual view of power makes it difficult for Foucault to provide a 
sweeping statement about what power is or does. Instead, Foucault argues he is 
not after an overarching concept of power. Rather, he is interested in finding the 
power relations inherent in language, which are "smaller" than the power 
structures we find in cultural regulations. In his interview with Raulet, he 
claims, "when I speak of power regulations, of the forms of rationality which can 
rule and regulate them, I am not referring to Power—^with a capital P— 
dominating and imposing its rationality upon the totality of the social body. In 
fact, there are power relations. They are multiple, they have different forms, 
they can be in play in family relations, or within an institution, or an 
administration" (38 PPC, italics added). Foucault wants to uncover the small 
powers which we might not think about, ones shaping how we celebrate our god, 
whether we celebrate with a "priest" or "preacher," and whether we can reach 
our god by ourselves or need intercession. Small power relatioris shape our 
ideologies and discourse formations and build the larger power relationships and 
social structures we call church. 
In a conversation with Gilles Deleuze, late in Foucault's life, Foucault 
stated: 
. . .  t o  t h i s  d a y  w e  h a v e  y e t  t o  f u l l y  c o m p r e h e n d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
power. . . . Theories of government and the traditional analyses of 
their mechanisms certainly don't exhaust the field where power is 
exercised and where it functions. The question of power remains a 
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total enigma. Who exercises power? And in what sphere? 
("Intellectuals and Power" 13-14) 
Foucault never solved the enigma of power. However, he used power as a 
starting point for many different inquiries of language and culture. For Foucault, 
power is both generative and destructive. Power can change systems for better or 
worse. As agents, we choose how to use power, even when we appear 
"powerless," as prisoners appear. Even prisoners, according to Foucault, 
"[possess] an individual theory of prisons, the penal system, and justice. It is this 
form of discourse which ultimately matters, a discourse against power, the 
counter discourse of prisoners ..." ("Intellectuals" 11). Power is a tool. We have 
power over power. 
Foucault introduces various notions of text, context, and interpretation 
with his ideas about discourse, power, and agency. Problematization is an 
amalgam of Foucaultian theory. Problematization is useful for finding more and 
different interpretations of particular texts and contexts. Like any other 
Foucaultian concept, problematization is a complex idea. I explore 
problematization as a general theory of history/interpretation and explain where 
I see its complexities. 
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Foucault and problematization 
Problematization is a way to understand the context and influence of a 
particular concept, phrase, idea, or institution. Foucault defined 
problematization in one of his last interviews. He argues: 
The notion common to all the work that I have done since [A 
History of Madness] is that of problematization . . . problematization 
doesn't mean representation of a pre-existing object, nor the 
creation by discourse of an object that doesn't exist- It is the totality 
of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something 
into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for 
thought.... (PPC 257) 
Problematization allows us to think tiirough articulated cultural connections 
within a topic/term/idea and trace the patterns of that topic's influence on other 
cultural institutions. The "true and false" of these "discursive or non-discursive 
practices" depends on how we construe something as "an object for thought." 
Problematization is thoroughly postmodern in its ability to explore many facets 
of a topic. Which "truth" or "falsity" we choose to pursue will guide the 
discoveries we make by problematizing a topic. 
Problematization illuminates dis/continuities embedded in ciilturally 
created terms or institutions. According to May: 
In Foucault's texts, continuities and discontinuities are woven 
together to form a history which, though recognizable as our 
history, makes us appear strange to ourselves. This is not because 
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Foucault arbitrarily lumps together historical items that are in 
reality separate, but bccausc he uses unities that are generally 
forgotten in order to raise questions about unities that are taken for 
granted as natural. (103, italics added) 
Problemati2ation is a tool of discovery. It helps us understand where things 
came from, where they seem to be going, and what connections have been made 
along the way. The process of problematizing a particular cultural institution or 
construction helps us understand commuiucation as an arbitrary, hiiman-made 
entity. Ideas we took for granted will not appear so "natural" when carefully 
scrutinized. Problematization is a challenge to assumptions, and a challenge to 
the composition of cultural institutions. Problematization provides a starting 
point for language inquiry, identifying the constituent parts of a partiaalar 
subject^®. The negotiation involved in problematizing a concept does not 
necessarily "solve problems" as one would dis/prove a h)^othesis (a 
problematic). Problematization elucidates connections within communication 
(which may be un/cor\scious or un/intended) and often complicates what 
appears to be uncomplicated. Problematization enables us to untangle some of 
the complexities in commimication. 
Problematization is done by individuals; consequently, it affects their 
conceptions of particular terms. Foucault brings the individual to the center of 
his work in problematization (Privitera 122), thus providing another avenue for 
agency within his language theories. Previously, Foucault's work had been 
focused on ideas and their being, or power relations and their effects on ideas. 
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Problematization is an outgrowth of two of Foucault's signature approaches to 
history: archaeology and genealogy- Foucault's archaeologies—his examinations 
of discourse structures—make it possible to understand the ways the discourse of 
a particular topic arises. His genealogies, the studies of how theories are 
practiced, help us see how theories of knowledge, power, and domination are 
performed in culture. When we scrutinize terms, we find a complex and tangled 
mass of cultural norms composed of even more cultural concepts. 
Problematizing is, to a large extent, trying to "untangle" the relationships forged 
between cultural norms, including their lingixistic expressions. In enacting a 
theoretical approach such as problematization, Foucault brings the subject (the 
individual) to the fore and studies how she acts and is acted upon as the result of 
the knowledge/power relationships. The individual is involved in truth 
negotiation as she contextualizes herself in the world. Is she a "teacher" or a 
"student"? "Employee" or "peer"? Problematizing these terms means two 
things: 1) exploring the effects of power structures and discourse strategies on the 
terms, and 2) examining the effects in light of the individual's behavior. Both 
tasks involve individual perceptions and conclusions and the acting out of those 
perceptions. Two individuals' problematizations of a term such eis "teacher" 
may not match. The differences in interpretation may result thanks to the 
difference in the individuals' history. In any case, no matter who problematizes 
what concept, it is still one interpreter making the decisions about cultural 
connections. 
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Problematization and history 
Part of the difficulty involved in problematization is the sweep of history 
it may include. Castel challenges Foucault's notion of problematization in his 
essay "'Problematization' as a Mode of Reading History." Castel notes 
problematization can be a useful, if difficult, methodology for understanding 
cultural concepts (237) because of the double sense of history one must hold in 
order for problematization to be successful- Castel argues that deciphering a 
"history of the present" is helpful, because "[it] enables history to take a double 
look back. It sheds light on how contemporary practices function, showing that 
they continue to be structured by the effects of their heritage. But it also sheds 
light on the entire development of [a particular topic] by showing that the history 
of this development began before [the topic's] official birth" (244). 
Despite the "entire development" of a historical topic, Castel sees a 
problem with leaving out an "official history," or the culturally sanctioned 
history of the topic at hand. If problematizing theorists disregard a privileged 
history, they may miss an important feature shaping the current incarnation of 
the subject. Castel concedes there is no "official history" in postmodernism, but 
we need to pay homage, at least in some sense, to the historians' tasks (242). 
Otherwise we may take "what is qualified to serve," and leave the rest as 
unimportant (242-43). Sarup argues problematization per se works to break free 
from an officially sanctioned history. Foucault's ideas are an attempt to separate 
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inevitability from history: "Foucault breaks off the past from the present and, by 
demonstrating the forthrightiiess of the past, relativizes and undercuts the 
legitimacy of the present" (63). History becomes an even playing field, with all 
stories given consideration. Foucault's idea of problematization combines 
analysis of the past and the present of cultural institutions to understand what 
meanings, performances, and other cultural institutions have been attached to 
the term under discussion. 
Problematization suggests interaction with, and mutual dependence on, 
other cultural forces, including history. Postmodernists theorize history is a web 
of ideas and interactions. More than one history—of a time period, of a subject, 
of an idea—can exist simultaneously. What becomes "history" is usually the 
story of the victor, or the story that becomes dominant when "history" is retold. 
Problematization allows us to probe dominant stories to illuminate stories that 
were not allowed dominance, for one reason or another. Elucidating the non-
dominant ideologies within a term or cultural institution allows us to make 
choices about which ideology should remain dominant. Here is the cormection 
between problematization and argument (rhetoric): to problematize is to decide 
which 
Problematization has several actual problems. First, the sweep of history a 
problematization may encompass can loom large. Second, following the 
"wrong" thread of a problematization might not lead you to the information you 
desire. But that second concern raises an adjunct question: is there a wrong 
branch of a web to follow? No matter how we trace our problematizations, we 
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are still working toward opening the social, historical contexts contained within 
a particular term or institution. Castel articulates the challenges within 
problematization: 
every problematization carries with it a risk .... It attempts a 
rereading of historical material from the standpoint of categories— 
in this case, social categories such as instability, vulnerability, 
protection, exclusion, insertion, and so forth—that are not utilized 
by historians to organize their own corpus. In other words, a 
problematization constructs another account from historical data. 
But still it must be compatible with the accounts of historians. Thus 
a problematization must satisfy two demands whose coexistence can 
itself be a problem. (251) 
Castel reminds us of the prominence of the "official history" in constructing a 
problematization. Disagreeing with the official stories can pose a problem. 
However, Foucault's challenge to us is to sort through the fixed, authoritative 
narratives to understand which ones have been sidelined in favor of the "official 
history." 
Problematization and Anderson 
Problematization seems rather large for a study as small as this one. We 
have no real way of approaching the entire history of performance art, the 
history of the art world, or the tustory of women artists. Instead, we have to 
choose our terms to problematize and expand from there. I can access much of 
the history of Anderson and her performances. I shall keep problematization 
within the context of a particular performance in Chapter Four. I extrapolate the 
concept of "particular problematization" to other areas of English studies, such as 
professional communication, in Chapter Five. Limiting my context to the art 
world of a woman Jirtist in the last third of the twentieth century provides a 
frame of reference with enough information to problematize a "thicker 
description" of Anderson's works. Instead of problematizing Anderson's works 
in relation to the entire history of art and/or civilization, I problematize them 
"against themselves," relating the terms I use to how they were (or were not) 
previously used in Anderson's pieces. Obviously, some amount of art history is 
important to this discussion, because Anderson herself is a "product" of art 
history and the art she studies. If this dissertation focused exclusively on a 
problematization of Anderson, the necessity of historical exploration is much 
greater. As it stands now, Anderson is a component of a larger issue; her art is 
interpreted in light of problematization and performance. The ability to choose 
what or where or when you want to problematize is one of the benefits of 
problematization, no matter the size of the study. The inquiry you create Ccm 
begin, or end, anywhere within the topic. 
Problematization provides an excellent opportimity to contextualize the 
texts within a performance. Foucault argues that when we problematize, we 
exercise and explore "the strategies, the networks, the mechanisms, all those 
techniques by which a decision is accepted and by which that decision could not 
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but be taken in the way it was ..." (PPC 104). A performance is a result of a 
decision made to enter a concept into "the play of true and false." 
Problematizing performances illuminates the relationships between texts, 
including the influence texts have over one another. Bringing the concept of 
problematization to performance and communication studies suggests a new 
way to approach several areas of inquiry, including argument formation. As I've 
mentioned, part of a problematization is choosing whether or not to explore the 
dominant or non-dominant ideology present within a term. The choice we 
make helps us understand how arguments are formed within and around that 
term. 
Problemati2ation and further application 
BizzeU and Herzberg note Foucault "enriches and complicates the notion 
of context with a network of archives, disciplines, institutions, and social 
practices that control the production of discourse" (1128). "Complication" is a 
key concept in Foucault's scholarship. His approach to language, power, and 
cultural constructions is complex and complicated. Even when we think we 
grasp Foucault's philosophies, another sexitence or term emerges to further 
complicate what we have just begun to understand. Problematization is an 
example of one of Foucault's most complicated conceptions. Had he lived 
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longer, he may have developed problematization to the extent he developed 
other concepts, such as his premises of archaeology and genealogy. 
In creating this chapter I have touched upon only a small portion of 
Foucault's scholarship. To extensively cover Foucault and his language/power 
theories requires a study much longer than this chapter. My exploration of 
Foucault foctises on the importance of the combination of three of Foucault's 
essential elements of culture: language, power, and cultural structxires. 
Problematization is one form of understanding emerging from the combination 
of these three cultural elements. Problematization demonstrates how language 
and power contextualize the social and cultural structures/ideas/thought 
processes acting upon the individual. To problematize a concept—such as 
sexuality or identity— is to represent the cidtural forces (including ethnidty, 
context, time frame, age, sex, race, and any other cultural construction) which 
determine how we tJiink about that concept. The spiral of cultural institutions 
and cultural connections continues, builds, and recedes. We uncover more and 
more links to explore, and the web of problematization expands. 
I use Foucault's notion of problematization to explore artifacts from the 
career of performance artist Laurie Anderson. Chapter Four provides a forum to 
discuss one of Anderson's most complex and intriguing works, one full of 
cultural institutions and rich problematizations—her concert movie. Home of 
the Brave. 
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Ironically, problematization may not bring us closer to understanding. 
Foucault ponders whether or not the strength of problematization makes a 
difference in understanding cultxore: 
There is irony in those efforts one makes to alter one's way of 
looking at things, to change the boundaries of what one knows and 
to venture out a ways from there. Did mine actually result in a 
different way of thinking? Perhaps at most they made it possible to 
go back through what I was already thinking, to think it differently, 
and to see what I had done from a new vantage point and in a 
clearer light.... I seem to have gained a better perspective on the 
way I worked—gropingly, and by means of different or successive 
fragments—on this project.... It was a matter of analyzing, not 
behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their "ideologies," but the 
problematiziitions through which being offers itself to be, 
necessarily, thought—and the practices on the basis of which these 
problematizations are formed. {UP 11, italics in original) 
Instead of analyzing behaviors or ideologies within ideas, we must, instead 
analyze how behavior, ideology, and ideas work together to shape our world. 
How is culture a version of "being offer[ing] itself to be"? Anderson's version of 
culture may demonstrate a very different form of "being." Problematization 
provides a tool to contextualize her performances. 
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Intermission: a bridge to analysis 
In the first three chapters of this work I outline several significant 
theoretical bodies of work, including performance theory, narrative theory, 
visual theory, and Michel Foucault's ideas about language, power, and culture. 
Taken separately, each intellectual grouping is significant as a set of critical 
tenets, especially when connected to the rhetorical tradition from which these 
critical tenets emanate. However, when these ideas are brought together, they 
become more powerful: they form a way to examine cultural artifacts, placing 
emphasis on performance and power and including elements of production. In 
the next chapter I begin to explore what this synthesized point of view means for 
my examination of the artistic works of Laurie Anderson-
Each element of this dissertation adds a particular focus to my analysis of 
Anderson. Performance studies provides the language to examine 
communicative instances as performances, poir\ts in time when an individual 
makes a conscious decision to make a show. A performance provides a 
particular, considered viewpoint on a topic constructed around the concept of 
demonstrating/enacting that point of view. Performance is significant to our 
meaning-making: "performance . . . makes or constitutes cultural identity as well 
as imitates it" ( Turner 9). Performances can include textual elements such as 
narratives and visuals, which are the particular elements included in 
Anderson's works. Narratives fm-nish personal, identifiable viewpoints within 
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the performance. As Fisher claims, "regardless of the form they are given, 
recounting and accounting for constitute stories we tell ourselves and each other 
to establish a meaningful life-world" (62). A performed narrative provides an 
intimate view on a particular angle of the performer's life. Visuals can enhance 
particular points in a narrative or provide alternate/multiple meanings to 
complicate the text at hand. As Barton and Barton claim, visuals are a significant 
"site of power inscription" ("Modes" 138). Narratives and visuals work within a 
performance to add more persuasive elements to the argument which generates 
the performance. 
Foucault's language theories add another significant dimension to the 
epistemological discussions of the first three chapters. Foucault's language 
analysis gives us a starting point for examining persuasion and power structures 
within the language of our performances. Our language structures, recognized, 
remembered, and repeated to create cultural codes, help establish the governing 
constructions of oxlture itself. Foucault's identification of these cultural codes 
helps us discern some of the power structures in culture that we un/consciously 
obey as "rules" or "authority." For example, Foucault recognizes medicine as an 
authoritative cultural structure; we do not think to challenge it because the 
cultural ideas embedded within medicine (medical help can be trusted, doctors 
are not wrong) are fixed in our collective consciousness- Foucault's tactic of 
problematization provides us with some suggestions for examining "the play of 
true and false" that surrounds an idea such as medicine. To problematize is to 
consider the cultural connections between and within objects, entities, or 
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institutions. Problematization deconstructs to illustrate power structures and 
gives us insight into the cultural production of the object/institution at hand. 
Problematization allows us to consider where our notions about medicine come 
from, including how to disrupt or change those notions. 
Considering tl\e elements of performance within the context of power 
structures, cultured codes, and problematization gives us several angles from 
which to approach Chapter Four's analysis. My artifact consists of several 
performances by Laurie Anderson collected on her concert film Home of the 
Brave. Narratives and visuals have been selected as performance elements to 
analyze because of their prevalence in Anderson's work. Her narratives and 
visuals will be the primary texts considered within her performances. However, 
the richness of the artifact demands more than narrative and visual analysis. 
Anderson's performances must also be considered in terms of performance 
theory and Foucault's "play of true and false" that cortstitutes his idea of 
problematization. I call my analysis a "problematization" based on its similarity 
to Foucault's concept; my inquiry attempts to illustrate cultural connections 
within the artifact in the spirit of problematization. Because of the infinite 
number of cultural connections involved, a complete problematization of any 
thing or idea is not possible. The myriad cormections elicited within a 
problematization allow the process to continue to infinity. In Chapter Four I 
begin a problematization that works to remain narrow by limiting itself to 
explorations of the artifact in light of the performance, narrative, visual, eind 
language theories that arise from Chapters One, Two, and Three. 
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My thesis for Chapter Four revolves around the title of Anderson's 
movie: Home of the Brave. Anderson's film explores the cultural 
representation of this phrase, a continuation of her investigations of the larger 
cultural concept of "America." Several titles of her major concert tours and 
performances relate to America as a whole, most notably United States Parts I-IV 
(originally titled and performed as Americans on the Move), completed before 
Home of the Brave, and Emptij Placcs, a photodrama/performance of the "dark 
side" of American cities, done after the film. Anderson finds artistic and cultural 
significance in examining what are presumed to be "homogenous" values of 
Americans, including valor, bravery, patriotism, respect, and love. Home of the 
Brave is an extended meditation on "universal" American values. 
My specific thesis statement that guides Chapter Four is this: in Home of 
the Brave, Anderson argues for alternate versions of "bravery" as found in 
America. The "bravery" demonstrated by the characters in Anderson's film is 
not patriotic valor in wartime, nor is it unflinching determination in the face of 
adversity. Rather, Anderson's film provides us with interpretations of behaviors 
and attitudes that reflect "coping" kind of braveries Americans use to get 
through national and personal rough spots. The phrase "home of the brave" 
reflects the infusion of non-traditional versions of courage into traditional 
bravery. Anderson makes these arguments for non-traditional bravery with the 
narratives and visuals she projects as part of her film. 
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To facilitate my analysis, I have created a list of particular topics that spring 
from my thesis and deserve attention in Chapter Four. I limit my 
problematization of Anderson's notion of "bravery" to the starting points below: 
• How does Anderson show us and/or tell us about bravery? How 
do her performances reflect the quality of showing? What are the 
conditions of production that allow her to show us what she 
does? 
As I consider Anderson's showing techniques, I will explore the 
argument she makes in her performance. As I argue in Chapters 
One and Two, the quality of shozuing is part of what makes a 
performance a performance. Aiiderson's particular version of 
showing is unique to her, produced by the artistic and larger 
cultural conditions that surround her career. In Chapter Four I 
will illustrate Anderson's particular qualities of showing that 
arise from the specific circumstances that "produce" her and her 
art. I will also consider how her qualities of showing contribute 
to her argument-making abilities. I will include a brief 
discussion of Anderson's use of technology. Technology 
provides Anderson with particular ways to show, and she reaches 
particular audiences with technology that she might not reach 
otherwise. 
• What do Anderson's narratives and visuals contribute to her 
discussion of American "bravery"? How do these two 
performance elements argue for or against the notion of "home 
of the brave"? 
Andersoxi's narratives and visuals are the vehicles which carry 
her arguments. They must either support her idea of non-
traditional bravery or refute the cultural notion of conventional 
bravery. Her narratives and visuals can work together or 
"against" each other. Narratives can complicate visuals, and 
visuals can tangle the meanings of narratives. In Chapter Four I 
will explore Anderson's particular narratives and visuals that 
make arguments for or against "bravery." 
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• How is Anderson a "code speaker"? How does she incorporate 
her Ciiltural power as "artist" within her performances? How 
does her position as "code speaker" affect her ability to make 
"culture" with her performances? 
Anderson's position as "artist" gives her access to different kinds 
and amounts of cultural power. Because she is labeled as an 
"artist" she is given the chance to influence culture through her 
art. Even as she tries to subvert cultural standards, such as the 
traditional definition of bravery, she still participates in the 
"code" of art because of her assigned status; that "code speaking" 
damages her chances of truly disrupting the cultural codes at 
work. In Chapter Four I will explore Anderson's position as 
"code speaker" and how that label affects the conditions of 
production and consumption that envelop Anderson's artistic 
work. 
These three questions are considered in various ways throughout my analysis of 
Anderson's work. The "probiematization" produced by these points of inquiry 
promises to be rich, while leaving room for more insights at a later date. 
As I mention in Chapter One, the central question raised in this 
dissertation is this: how does a close reading of a performance, with an emphasis 
on power and ciilturai structures, provide us with new angles for imderstanding 
that performance? Part of those "new angles" includes the study of performance 
elements, such as narratives and visuals, and the examination of how a 
performance makes specific arguunents in its showing. Chapter Four explores 
my ariswers to this question through a close reading of Anderson's 
performances, including power, cultLiral structures, and the arguments made by 
narratives and visuals. Anderson's cultural arguments are enhanced by her 
combinations of narratives and visuals, and her understanding of our culture's 
125 
power structures is presented in the narrative/ visual mixtures which make up 
her performance. Chapter Four moves theory into practice and begins the praxis 
of discerning the complicated elements of a performance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
PROBLEMATIZING CULTURE WITH LAURIE ANDERSON 
The study of rhetoric ... totters unsteadily t>etween intellectual 
inquiry and the mundane transactions of common life. (Leff 20) 
Critique of performance (and the performance of critique) can 
remind us of the unstable improvisations within o\ir deep cultural 
performances; it can expose the fissures, ruptures, and revisions 
that have settled into continuous reenactment. (Diamond 2) 
In this chapter I demonstrate the veracity of Leff's claim. Examining the 
rhetoric of Laurie Anderson provides a glimpse of the mundane turned upside 
down to become intellectual inquiry. Anderson's rhetoric explores the "fissures, 
ruptures, and revisions" present in American ciilture. Anderson's performances 
engage in the "continuous reenactment" of culture Diamond suggests. 
The "definitions" established in Chapters Two and Three are significant 
for Anderson's work. A performance is a fluid cor\struction, named as such by 
an interpreter and composed of a showing produced for an audience. Narrative 
and visual texts provide performance features on which to focus our interpretive 
energy. Problematization is an examination of the performance that considers 
the social, cultural, and historical significance of performance elements. These 
elements are illustrated in my analysis of Laurie Anderson's performance(s). 
Her topics of analysis are wide-ranging and variable, but they always relate back 
to American ailture as it affects "individuals in the middle of the bell curve," 
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whom Anderson calls "nobody" and/or "everyone" (Hansen 36). This chapter is 
my analysis and interpretation—my problematization—of Anderson's 
interpretations of American culture. My problematization will, of course, be 
different than other analyses of Anderson's work. I may see different 
connections than other viewers may see. Differences in analysis speak to the 
postmodern plurality of problematization. We problematize connections 
relevant to our lives. Illuminating all possible connections within a 
problematization is impossible, thanks to the vast number of interpretations 
available to us and the individual perspectives we bring to those interpretations. 
Postmodern thought processes do not permit a finite problematization. The 
process of problematization is best referred to as "the process of problematizing," 
which indicates the ongoing task of exploration inherent in interpretation. 
In this chapter I argue Anderson's work is a compelling example of how 
performance problematizes cultiu'e. Anderson's movie Home of the Brave is a 
problematization of a recurrent question in her work: what is bravery? The 
stories and visuals contained in the movie address the creative and destructive 
forces in our culture and what it means to be brave in the face of many kinds of 
threats, including nuclear amiihilation. My problematizations in this chapter 
examine the cultural moment of Rome of the Brave in terms of Anderson's 
career, the artistic climate from which Home of the Brave was bom, the 
historical forces in the United States when Home of the Brave was created, and 
how Anderson problematizes these factors in her performances within the film. 
My problematizations examine the cultural moment of Anderson-as-artist, the 
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cultural moment of the film, and the cultural moment of bravery in the mid-
eighties sodal and political milieu of America. Foucault's theoretical vision is 
present throughout this cultiu^al examination. Foucault's work allows us to look 
at the power relationships between entities in Anderson's film and the culture 
surrounding her film. Probiematizafion is, at its most basic level, a conscious, 
careful elucidation of connections between ideas and objects. Foucault's 
influences are felt throughout this chapter in the connections I make between 
Anderson, her art, and the culture surrounding her art. 
Home of the Brave and its creator 
Laurie Anderson's background is relatively conventional- She is a 
traditionally pedigreed artist with a BA {magna cum laude) in art history from 
Barnard College, where she was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and an MFA in 
sculpture from Columbia University. She has been awarded honorary doctorates 
from the Art Institute of Chicago, the San Francisco Art Institute, and the 
Philadelphia College of Art (Howell 141). Anderson grew up in the Midwest, the 
daughter of a well-to-do paint manufacturer in Chicago (Smagula 243). Her BA 
in art history initially specified her as an Egyptologist. She also has extensive 
classical music training, most extensively in violin: according to art historian 
Howard Smagula, "until the age of fifteen she was a serious student of the violin 
and achieved a great measure of technical virtiiosity on the ir\str\iment" (243). 
Anderson is well known in the art world. Her art has been shown around the 
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world, in theatres, muiseums, and galleries. She held her first performance in 
1972, when she arranged cars on the town green of Rochester, Vermont, to play 
her piece Automotive, a song for various pitches of car horns (Howell 148). She 
has created nine books, between fifteen and twenty sound recordings, four 
musical scores, for performers ranging from duos to symphonies, two 
soundtracks, one interactive CD-ROM, and numerous museum installatioris and 
full-scale concert performances. Much of her work is enhanced by electronic 
technology Anderson has built or created. 
Anderson compiled extensive documentation of her works in her 
retrospective book Stories From the Nerve Bible. The volume chronicles her 
career from 1972 to 1992, just after she finished her Nerve Bible tour. The book 
provides event narrations, stage notes, backstage and onstage photos, video stills, 
musical scores, and "asides" written by Anderson about her pieces. The book is 
thorough, including a note, photo, or lyric from almost all her pieces, including 
her car horn piece in Vermont, her "video clone," and her Nerve Bible show, 
done in Spain, Germany, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv in 1992. Anderson notes in 
the introduction that this book is her "Talking Book," a project she abandoned in 
the Seventies: "a wildly free-form anthology of stories on tape which included 
fragments of songs, letters, theories about motion, history, and vision. As the 
narrator spoke and sang, her voice constantly changed into other peoples' voices. 
... I could never really figure out exactly who was talking or how to organize this 
cacophonies talking orchestra. When I fuiished Stories from the Nerve Bible, I 
realized this was the Talking Book" (NB 6). 
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Anderson claims she learned to love performance when she was teaching 
art history at various colleges in New York City after she finished her MFA. 
According to Anderson, 
. .. since I wasn't exactly a professional art historian, I wasn't 
keeping up .. so gradually I began to forget the facts So I'd just 
make things up, stories about this or that... and the students 
would write it down and I would test them on it 
Things went on this way for a while until eventually I began 
to feel sort of guilty and I quit. (Not before I was fired, but it was 
very, very, close.) Anyway, this is the reason I began to do 
performances. I discovered that I loved just standing there in the 
dark, showing pictures and talking. (NB 94) 
Anderson's love of performance has been her main artistic activity since the 
beginning of her career (which coincided nicely with the heyday of Happenings 
and other performance-oriented conceptual pieces). In late 1972 and early 1973 
she slept in public places to find out if "the place Ccm color or control my dreams" 
(NB 9), including a night court courtroom, a beach at Coney Island, and a 
bathroom in the Columbia University library. These performances have 
evolved into the magic technological wizardry of her latest performance, "The 
Speed of Darkness," on toxir in 1996 and 1997. In "The Speed of Darkness," a 
barefoot Anderson appears on stage with two keyboards, various digital 
equalizers, harmonizers, and synthesizers, a few microphones, and a signature 
violin. Her most recent performance is very different than her 1972 
"Institutional Dream Series," or Home of the Brave. In her variety, Anderson 
reminds us that performance is everywhere: from tooting cars in a small town 
to small concert halls to Coney Island beaches. 
Anderson's work is well respected. In the January-February 1995 issue of 
the Utne Reader, Laurie Anderson was named as one of the "100 \^sionaries 
Who Could Change your Life." According to Jon Spade, author of the article, 
"these visionaries are hard-eyed as well as hopeful. They show a remarkable 
willingness to go beyond the boundaries of their personal agendas or specialties . 
. . these thinkers live and even relish paradox and tend to be able to hold 
opposed truths in their minds without sweating. For them, the big, unitary 
answer that levels, grades, and paves reality like a superhighway is not only not 
the solution, it is at the very heart of the problem" (57). Anderson reflects that 
visionary attitude through her explorations of American culture. She does not 
attempt to find any "big unitary answer;" rather, she examines the small parts of 
culture for the meanings that pave the superhighway of reality. Anderson' 
follows Foucault's idea of micovering the "play of true and false" that surrounds 
an irxstitution or idea; in that exploration, there is no room for big, unitary 
answers. Howell argues that Anderson's continuous success comes from a 
constant reinvention of herself: "like any true performance artist, Anderson will 
derive her cues for the future from an immediate context. By focusing on the 
process of discovery, Laurie Anderson maintaiiis a palpable cormection between 
life and work that keeps her performances truly alive" (30). Howell's statement 
echoes the label of "visionary," though he argues her vision comes from being 
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able to utilize life right noxu. Howell also notes that, for Anderson, "success is a 
shared plunge into the miknown" (30). Noting that there are others who share 
her vision reflects her existence within a larger tradition of American scholars, 
artists, and cultural critics. 
Anderson as rhetorician Anderson must be considered a rhetor as well 
as an artist if we are to study the persuasive elements in her work. According to 
Foss, rhetoric can be defined as "the actions human perform when they use 
symbols for the pizrpose of communicating with one another" (4). Anderson is 
not a "conventional" rhetorician—her works are not texts, written in books and 
discussed in classrooms—but she examines and critiques the symbols aroimd her 
which communicate culture. The task of cultural critique is part of what 
rhetoricians do, so Anderson's work falls in line with Foss's definition-
Anderson provides this comment on her communication study: 
As an artist I have made many things; performances, prints and 
drawings, films, records, comics, sculpture, videos, computer 
animations, and books. But it's spoken language that has always 
interested me the most. I believe it's possible that language is a 
virus, as William S. Burroughs claims. But to believe that language 
is a disease, first you have to believe that it is alive. So, is language 
alive? {NcnK' Bible 6) 
Anderson's version of "living language" provides narratives and visuals that 
shift, change and evolve. A shifting point of view does not contribute to an 
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easily discerned argument. Kellner argues that the language of Anderson's 
performances (her narratives and visuals) are nothing but sentence fragments of 
a dialect no one can understand- Kellner notes her 1986 documentary concert 
film Home of the Brave "provides fragments of meaning which do not add up 
to any dear system of meanings.... Her performance is for the sake of 
performance, in the moment, and does not produce any particular statements, 
positions, messages or ideologies . .(288). Anderson does not directly refer to 
her personal ideologies in her stories and songs. However, her ideologies are 
present in her exploration of subjects such as war, death, communication, 
politics, money, and love, which I demonstrate in my examination of her texts 
and contexts. Her arguments are subtle and thoughtful- By studying her works 
closely, we can discern the outlines of her ideologies in the texts she uses- Overt 
acknowledgment is not necessary- Anderson's subtle arguments allow us to 
draw our own conclusions about the points of view she presents. 
In Stories From the Nerve Bible, Anderson argues "basically my work is 
storytelling, the world's most ancient art form" (150). Jerome Bruner's argument 
of narrative as verisimilitude figures into Anderson's idea that storytelling is the 
world's most ancient art form: if art is for helping us understand cultural 
realities, then storytelling is one of the strongest forms of art for helping us 
imderstand cultural truths. Anderson performs her stories with the intensity of 
a well-practiced orator, on a parallel with William Jennings Bryan or Malcolm X. 
Her concern for language, alive or dead, chained or not, points to her status as a 
rhetorician. Anderson does not work in n traditional rhetorician's arena. She is 
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not in the classroom, in the boardroom, or any profession that rhetoric and/or 
professional communication usually studies. But art is as much a cultural 
system of meaning as language is.' ' Anderson and her counterparts in the art 
world are ready to be brought into the "rhetorical spotlight" as communicators 
who discuss and analyze important ideas. A work of art has as much rhetorical 
impact as any text generated by a "certified rhetorician." Foss argues, in another 
article, that "the study of visual imagery as communication is surprisingly absent 
from the communication field; our focus has been primarily on the nature and 
functions of discursive symbols. .. [but] most of us believe symbolicity is broader 
than discourse and involves systems such as mathematics, music, and 
architectvire" (85). This chapter's exploration of an rhetorical artifact created by 
an artist will begin to bring alternate discursive symbol systems into view of 
communication scholars. 
Anderson's artistic lineage 
Kardon claims Anderson to be part of the avant-garde tradition in art. 
According to Kardon, 
Anderson's art occupies several familiar territories that were carved 
out by certain New York avant-gardes.... Her art works brilliantly 
within the conventions of juxtaposition and non-sequitur that 
replaced the exhausted surrealism of the late fifties and early sixties 
(a surrealism that MTV has revived). These conventions rim 
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through large swathes of New York culture: Robert Rauschenberg 
in visual art, William S. Burroughs in literature, Merce 
Cunningham in dance, Richard Foreman, perhaps John Cage in 
mixsic. These figures have, I think, established the ground out of 
which Anderson, a member of a new generation, works with ease 
and aplomb, carefully organizing and orchestrating the random in a 
way that denies method even as it invokes it. (137) 
According to Hughes, the avant-garde artist "is a precursor; the truly significant 
work of art is the one that prepares the future" (366). Avant-garde artists look to 
the future to explain the impulses of the now. The avant-garde exists because 
artists are now free to make a living without patrons or sponsors; we have 
moved away from the "taste of courts, religious or secular, [which] determined 
patronage" (Hughes 366). Society's various tastes can support—emotionally and 
ideologically rather than monetarily—artists who work against the centuries of 
artistic tradition. The avant-garde, in its attempt to make new, confirontational 
works, pushes the boundaries of art farther than artists who stay in line with 
previous traditions (Hughes 368). Performance art fits into this confrontational, 
unconventional stance for artists and their work. 
Anderson does not fit neatly into any particular American artistic 
tradition. Her style does not reflect any one artistic heritage but has roots within 
identifiable postmodern traditions in the art world. Even Dada, a movement 
from the early twentieth centtiry, is postmodern in its attempt to bring the 
ordinary into the view of artists eind patrons. Levin credits Marcel Duchamp, a 
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major Dada artist, as the "alchemist" of what became postmodern art: Duchamp 
"transmut[ed] art 6:0m one plane to another, rare^dng it, shifting it from the 
visual to the mental, coaxing it along the perilous process from matter to energy" 
(16). This transmutation of ideas can be considered part of the postmodern shift 
towards multiple meanings and juxtaposed ideas. Battcock argues that "modem 
art is based on a single assumption. That the artwork is only what it is. It is not a 
picture or a metaphor for sometiiing else. It is, say, a photograph ... or a 
painting, first and only" (in Nickas xxi). Postmodern art turns these notions 
upside down with jokes, fragmented meanings, and pieces that stand for more 
(or less) than what they appear to be. The most specific traditions important to 
Anderson's work are Conceptual art and its outgrowth, performance art.^° For 
Conceptual artists, "art becomes a phenomenon of the purest sort; ever)rwhere 
and nowhere, it simply is" (Wheeler 247). For performance artists, 
"performance, like Conceptual art, would enable the artist to shun mere pictorial 
values in favor of true visual communication: art as a vehicle for ideas and 
action" (Nickas xi). Anderson's work is about being, how we are, as a society, and 
what beings in action think and do. 
Home of the Brave within Anderson's body of work 
Home of the Brave is one of Anderson's most complicated projects. I 
discuss the history of the film because of its complexity and its uniqueness in 
Anderson's body of work. Rarely does Anderson do this much collaboration 
with others to create or produce her work. The film was one of Anderson's most 
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extensive collaborations. Anderson tends to be a true "solo" artist. For 1996-7's 
"Speed of Darkness" tour, Anderson was the only person on stage for her ninety-
noinute performances as technician and performer. Anderson actively cultivates 
this sparse aesthetic. Home of the Brave was a challenge for Anderson because 
the film used elements she could not control—namely other people. Seven 
musicians plus eleven other cast members made up the "actors" of the movie. 
Anderson spent much of her film time performing her pieces- But she also had 
to spend time on directing tasks. She says, "I'm not sure I would advise anyone 
else to star in their own movie. The special blend of schizophrenia and 
narcissism that you need to split roles can result in a power struggle. Eventually, 
of course, the director wins" (NB 210). 
Home of the Brave is loosely called a "concert film" by Anderson (NB 210) 
because of its unique combination of stories, songs, cultural analysis, and visual 
performances. The film is based on performances of the 1984 Mister Heartbreak 
tour, which featured pieces from United States Parts I-IV (NB 210) and pieces 
made specifically for the Mister Heartbreak tour. The film was shot at the Park 
Theater in Union City, New Jersey, over a period of ten days in 1985. The 
audience was bused in from Manhattan for half a day, to provide reactions for 
performances. The other half of the day was used for shooting scenes that 
needed no audience (NB 210). Home of the Brave was released through 
Cincecom International Films in 1986 and shown in small theatres catering to art 
films. 
138 
Anderson's creative control over Home of the Brave was strong, but she 
states the contributions of the other cast members made the film as spectacular as 
it was: 
Even though I designed the performances to be split-second 
collaborations between sound, image, and action, it's the presence 
and inventiveness of performers that bring the work to life. As 
film director I did nothing except remind the performers that the 
cameras weren't really there. Although most of the performers had 
been on the sixty-city concert tour, I never thought of them as my 
band but as guest artists. (NB 213) 
Many of her guest artists are well-known performers in their own right. 
Gmtarist Adrian Belew, percussionist David VanTieghem, and back-up vocalists 
Janice Pendarvis and Dolette McDonald have all worked with more mainstream 
musicians such as Sting and David Byrne. Home of the Brave is richer and more 
complex than Anderson's solo performances, in large part thanks to the talents 
of her guest artists. Even though the collaborative components of the film 
challenged Anderson's usual working style, the collaboration produced a very 
successful film, one that Ariderson's fans and critics regard as one of her 
strongest pieces. 
Despite Anderson's concerted efforts, her gamble to entertain mainstream 
film audiences didn't pay off exactly as she had intended. According to 
Anderson, 
Home of the Brave opened in New York at the 57th Street 
Playhouse. The reviews were lukewarm and it played for about a 
week. It had a similar short life in most other cities. I was 
devastated. I had spent two years on the movie, poured all my 
energy into it, and it had basically bombed. Eventually it did show 
up in various film festivals, and was even selected for "Directors' 
Fortnight" at Camies where it received favorable reviews; but my 
baptism into big-time movies had been a shock. {NB 217) 
Anderson's first foray into "pop culture" didn't earn her instant success or name 
recognition. However, when the film was released on videocassette, Laurie 
Anderson fans immediately piurchased it for their collections. Thanks to the fan 
appreciation of the video, the movie received a wider showing on tape than it 
did in theatres. 
Home of the Brave is significant to Anderson's career for several reasons. 
First, it is Anderson's most involved piece, even more so than United States, 
Parts I-IV. The scale of United States is larger, because it was performed over 
several evenings, and the work contains more individual pieces because of its 
length. However, the number of individuals involved in Home of the Brave is 
more than double those involved with United States I-IV, and the effort to 
produce the film was more intense. The film required more monetary backing, 
persormel, and preparation than any other performance Anderson has 
completed to date. Second, it is Anderson's first concerted attempt at preserving 
a performance. Home of the Brave is Anderson's first audio/visual recording of 
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her performemce(s) produced for a large audience. Other pieces had been 
preserved on film, but none had been released into movie theatres or on 
videotape. A film, on the other hand, can be seen many times, and owned, if it 
mtikes it to videotape. 
Third, Home of the Brave contains some of Anderson's most powerful 
combinations of narratives and visuals. This third reason is the most significant 
influence in my choice of artifacts. Anderson has a long career full of 
performances. I could have chosen any number of artifacts for this analysis. I 
have chosen to examine components of Home of the Brave, because of the 
narratives and visuals performed within the film. The narratives and visuals 
make the film complex and intriguing. Some of the pieces in the film are 
signature works, such as "Sharkey's Night." Other pieces, such as "Zero and 
One," are not well known, but offer intriguing combinations of narratives and 
visuals that make her performance ripe for analysis. Home of the Brave is one 
of Anderson's most significant achievements. Though complexity and 
insightful commentary are typical Anderson hallmarks. Home of the Brave is an 
extended example of both. 
problematizing the artistic moment of Home of the Brave Anderson's 
film emerged at a particular significant time for performimce art. In the art 
world of the eighties, Anderson had already made a significant impact with her 
live performances, most notably her magnum opus. United States, Parts I-IV, 
performed in 1983 at the Brooklyn Academy of Music. In the early eighties. 
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performance art was reinventing itself. The seventies had seen an incredible 
boom of performance pieces, in part because performance artists had the 
opportunity to "assess their sodetal function and develop the potential of 
performance art to approximate reality more closely than traditional disciplines" 
(Enstice 144). The "organic wedding of [performance] art to a social continuum" 
provide the chance for artists such as Chris Burden to perform pieces that were 
alternately serious and whimsical. Burden's piece Prelue to 220, or 110 placed 
Burden in immanent danger of electrocution from 110-volt lines immersed in 
buckets of water at his side. Burden was secured to a concrete floor with copper 
bands; if the bands and the lines connected through a careless move by a 
spectator, Burdem was a dead artist (Enstice 145). The factors of chance and 
happenstance were great. If a viewer spilled the buckets. Burden could die. On 
the other hand, if spectators were careful. Burden was only secured to the floor— 
nothing very exciting. The potential for real-life drama, however, enhance the 
piece's meartmg. Burden's work points out our inability to predict, despite our 
precautions, the one small accident that could signal our doom. The social 
impact of this living, breathing art was significant. Art wasn't just picnics in the 
park or beautiful dancers. Art could be life and death and the incredibly delicate 
balance between them. 
In the eighties, performance art evolved into a medivun less concerned 
with scaring individuals than with puzzling out social truths. This "second 
generation" of performance artists, including Laurie Anderson, added more 
formal performance elements to the social dramas, including a move into more 
i 
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traditional theatre venues and forms, such as variety theatre and stand-up 
comedy (Goldberg "Performance" 73). Another significant factor was the 
"addition" of entertainment to the performance artist's show ("Performance" 74). 
No longer was the artist merely point out socially significant events; an artist 
could entertain as well as erUighten. This new performance work began to test 
the line between art and entertairunent. The art world began to change, in part 
thanks to the performance artists. The art world was begirming to reach into pop 
influences while still trying to retain a cutting-edge sensibility. Anderson was 
part of what some critics called "avant-pop," a blend of "drama, music, sculpture, 
and anything else its exponents chose" ("The Rise of Avant-Pop"). Avant-pop 
took its artistic sensibilities from earlier twentieth century art movements, most 
notably Dada, from the teens and twenties, and Happeiiings, from the sixties. 
Avant-pop artists were taking some of the humor from Dada and the social 
seriousness of Happenings and merging them into a socially conscious brand of 
humor for the art world. 
Avant-pop had many proponents besides performance artists: graffiti 
artists such as Keith Haring aiid Jean-Michel Basquiat took art to the subways, 
thus making the commodity of art part of the average urban landscape. Artist 
Jenny Holzer began posting her aphoristic comments on American culture on 
New York lamp posts in the late seventies (Auping 21). Holzer's work in the 
street was regarded as left-wing public service announcements as often as it was 
considered art. According to critic Michael Auping, the late seventies and the 
decade of the eighties witnessed an explosion of art in public places. Auping 
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argues, "leery of the confining and elitist connotations of private galleries and 
museums, many artists sought out more public situations, where their art could 
interact as directly as possible with a larger audience" (19). Many artist-nm 
collectives specializing in avant-pop art began in the ejirly eighties, most notably 
in New York City, including ABC No Rio, Artists' Space, Fashion Moda, Fun 
Gallery and the Mudd Qub (Stiles 293). Haring and Basquiat eventually moved 
their work from the streets to SoHo galleries, where they met and collaborated 
with internationally known pop-artist-force Andy Warhol (Stiles 293). 
Anderson's work did not fit the anti-establishment move to the street. 
Anderson took the public-art feeling back into galleries and concert halls. Her 
work was produced for the audience in the artistic venue, not startled 
individuals encountering a poster on a telephone pole. However, her subject 
matter brought the people on the street into the concert halls. Anderson's work 
meshed with the work of artists like Holzer and Haring; slices of life were her 
performances, not just part of them. Like Haring's graffiti art and Holzer's word 
art, Anderson's art reflected the consciousness of the average person, pondering 
the problems of their life. The humor of Dada, the intensity of Happenings, and 
the street smarts of art since the sixties were merged on the stages of Anderson's 
performances. 
problematizing technologi/ in art Technology is a large part of 
Anderson's work. Anderson creates and administers most of the technology she 
uses on stage. Anderson has been involved in technological art for most of her 
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career. Anderson uses technology as both an amplifier and a stand-alone 
element in her work. Technology, such as multiple-voice microphones (when 
you speak into it, your voice becomes many voices), allows Anderson to 
augment her presence with "others," even if she creates the others. For 
Anderson, technology is a way to fill the stage while retaining her singularity. 
Her technology becomes, in some cases, her art. When Anderson uses her 
"audio masks," such as the microphone that turns her voice into Sharkey's 
voice, the technology becomes a significant part of the piece. Anderson's CD-
ROM, Puppet Motel, is an electronic home for Anderson characters, replete with 
her signature symbols and stories. Anderson has called technology the "campfire 
around which we tell our stories" (McCorduck 136). Technology keeps us warm, 
safe, and together. 
However, using technology in a piece is not the only potentially sticky 
issue for technology in the art world. What about using technology to 
re/produce one's work? Critic RoseLee Goldberg notes that performance artists 
were some of the first to translate their art into technologically available media, 
simply because their performances could be recorded, whether on videotape, 
television broadcasts, or audio tape and vinyl. This decision to step forward into 
media technology placed performance artists in an interesting dilemma: should 
they participate in this technology culture despite its anti-aesthetic attitude, or 
should they go for the money? Was using technology to distribute one's art a 
version of "selling out"? How would the art world see this appropriation of 
technology? Goldberg comments: 
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To graduate from the art world into real life—^into television or 
into video discs, into feeding the industries that in turn feed the art 
and allow artists to live on revenue from their own work—has 
been the goal of many young artists now performing in the early 
1980s-... Needless to say, the two factions, popular and high art, 
had been eyeing one another across a fragile divide for some time, 
with a fairly simple rationale to justify the merger: something so 
omnipresent as the media must be utilized and adapted, infiltrated 
and altered, for to avoid it was tantamount to living in the past. . . . 
(75) 
Technology cillows for more thorough distribution and consumption of one's 
work: a monologue on an audio CD can be heard by many people besides the 
audience in the concert hall. Technology provides art with a "common culture" 
base; art can be mass-distributed. The question then becomes whether the mass 
distribution has tainted the art. If art is only art in the gallery, what is the art we 
put out on CDs, videocassettes, and mass produced postcards? 
The impact of this use of technology is played out in Anderson's work. 
Anderson's use of highly technical equipment to produce the sounds and images 
incorporates technology within her art in the art space of concert halls and 
galleries (her early work, shown in galleries in New York City, incorporated 
simple technology such as tape recorders). Anderson also uses technology to 
reach out to consumers, thus bringing her art into the realm of commodity. 
Anderson doesn't seem to be bothered by these uses of technology, but she is 
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concerned with the extremities teciinology can generate. When she was in Israel 
in 1994, her Israeli promoter showed her some recently aeated bombs, which led 
her to a realization about technology: 
The first one goes off, and it's fabulous, an orange thing with a 
beautiful purple tail; the next one makes a huge pop, noting 
visually. I'm really starting to enjoy this, until I think, wait a 
second, I'm from the country that is the largest arms supplier in the 
whole world, talking bombs with the world's second biggest 
customer, and I'm having a great time! This is really disturbing. 
That's what high-tech means, really: images of power to me have 
many connotations. (137) 
Anderson's revelation presents us with another conundrum of technology; 
those with the most wield the most power. Technology, power, and authority 
are tied closely together. Artists can seize some of this power for art by producing 
it with technologically advanced means, such as CD-ROMs. 
An extended discussion of art, technology, and Anderson is not possible in 
this chapter because of the extensiveness of the topic. What I suggest here is only 
a beginning inquiry. Technology is significant for the production and reception 
of art, and Anderson makes use of the latest technology available to her to reach 
a larger audience. She uses technology to make her art visually and audially 
exciting. However, she also understands the impact technology has on the 
power structures of the world, as evidenced by her experience in Israel. Anderson 
has tamed technology and made it work for her. At the same time, Anderson 
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remains aware of the power and impact technology has on the power structures 
of the world. 
Problematizino bravery in Home of the Brave 
I have chosen three different pieces from Home of the Brave to examine 
for Anderson's interpretation of bravery. I will first provide the text and context 
of the piece, then I will make my arguments regarding the problematization 
contained within it. Once I've explored these performances, I will bring together 
the themes they present regarding our culture's versions of bravery. The film's 
content is not about bravery, but the influence of the concept appears from the 
instant we learn the title of the film. Using a line ftrom the "Star Spangled 
Banner" as a film title is provocative; it elicits themes of nationalism, patriotism, 
and homage to our country. Anderson proceeds to ask serious questions about 
such issues during the course of the film. 
Foucault's description of problematization is important for sorting 
through Anderson's words and images: "[problematization] is the totality of 
discursive or non-discxursive practices that introduces something into the play of 
true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought..{PPC 257). In this 
analysis, I want to examine the narratives and visuals put forth in Anderson's 
performance as "discursive practices" that present something—in this case, 
bravery—into the "piny of true and false" that occupies our cultural discourse. 
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In Home of the Bnwe and throughout her body of work, Anderson uses 
particular phrases and pictures over and over again. I want to approach 
Anderson's use of repeated phrases and repeated symbols as a beginning glimpse 
of Anderson's conception of bravery. These repeating visual and verbal themes 
"set us up" to interpret individual pieces, such as the ones in Home of the Brave, 
by establishing an "Anderson ideology" as a kind of outline around the rest of 
her work. They repeating visuals and verbals link the specific topic at hand and 
Anderson's epistemology. The repetition provides part of the energy Anderson 
infuses into her pieces. In Home of the Brave, Anderson's repeated phrases and 
symbols point to a lack of awareness and an apathy toward the forces at work in 
our culture. 
Phrases to make us think 
Anderson chooses several different phrases to repeat throughout her 
concert film. The sentences seem to represent a particular mindset Anderson 
has about American culture: as a nation, we are not paying attention. We seem 
to be neglecting something, or ignoring something. These phrases all relate to 
bravery, in some way. 
this is the picture 
listen to my heart beat 
home of the brave 
deep in the heart of darkest America 
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you connect the dots 
you pick up the pieces 
you've already paid for this 
These phrases are repeated many times in Home of the Brave. They also appear 
on the movie soundtrack and the album Mister Heartbreak, which covered songs 
from Home of the Brave not released on the soundtrack. Sometimes these lines 
are spoken by Anderson (one by one, or strung together), and sometimes they 
appear as visuals on the large projection screen behind the stage. 
With these phrases, Anderson seems to be asking us to concentrate on 
something, but she never tells us exactly what it is. She uses the "unattached 
referents" of this and i/ou to make her phrases open to everyone: "this is the 
picture", "youVe already paid for this", "you connect the dots", "you pick up the 
pieces." We are in the "home of the brave," "deep in the heart of darkest 
America", and we don't' know who i/ou are or what/where this is. We are also 
not sure exactly what the "bravery" is in our brave home. 
Anderson fills in the answer to "what this is" with several different 
options described in different pieces: this is Paradise ("Language is a Virus"), this 
is a dream, ("Talk Normal"), this is love and we're slightly crazy ("Langue D' 
Amor"), this is a new day of adventure ("Sharkey's Day"), or this is trouble 
("Sharkey's Night"). Here in the "home of the brave," each of us is on a mission 
to find out exactly what this is. What each of us needs may be different; for 
some, the adventure to the "heart of darkest America" may entail falling in love, 
or living our dream life in Paradise. For others, the "heart of darkest America" 
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may be a Conrad-esque journey into the dark, unforseeable forces of human 
nature. Anderson never answers the questions of who you is or what this is. 
We are left to decide for ourselves. We become the you, and we fill in the this 
with our own answer. 
Anderson's stock phrases ask us to take responsibility for our actions and 
our beliefs- Anderson's open-ended definitions of you and this allow for more 
than one perspective on a topic, so we are all free to create personal definitions. 
With our choices, we open the topic f'this is Paradise") for examination and 
destabilize the idea of a singular true or false interpretation, as Foucault indicates 
we should. This particular "play of true and false" surrounding you and this also 
suggests a general warning: be carcful of luhat you loish for, because you might 
get it (or that). We may need to look for the larger meanings in culture or "pick 
up the pieces" created by what we've demanded. We may "pay for this", 
whatever we choose, with anger, sorrow, or resentment. The ultimate warning 
to us may lie at "deep in the heart of darkest America." At that place, we may be 
asked to be honest about who we are or what we want (our you and our this). 
The dark realizations found in "the heart of darkest America" may not be what 
we expected to gain from our "home of the brave." We are also still left to 
wonder this: what is this "home of the brave"? Who is "the brave"? Is this 
where we live? 
With the admonitions embedded within these phrases, Anderson suggests 
another point of view on the you and this: if we aren't careful, those who appear 
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to be on our side may actually hurt us. This political implications of this 
warning emerges more clearly in "Sharkey's Night," which I cover when I 
discuss the piece, but it deserves merit in light of Anderson's repeated phrases. 
Her reminder that "this is the picture" may provide two warnings: "this will be 
what happens to us if we're not careful", and "this is where we are now." These 
warnings are related, and the implications are significant. Those we suppose are 
honest (those whom we trust to run our country) may not be. We may be lied to, 
surprised, or completely taken over by those who have previously seemed 
beneficent. 
Symbols to make us think 
Anderson inserts several different forms of repeated visuals in her work, 
including t)^ography (such as words projected on a big screen), socially 
understood sign systems (such as language, time, maps, charts, grids), line 
drawings, and specific images, including airplanes, water, hands, eyes, windows, 
and phones. Anderson also uses the interplay between light and darkness as a 
visual coimterpoint to her narrations (Kardon 127-135). In Home of the Brave 
these visuals support Anderson's perspectives on the complicated relationships 
between humans, language, and cultixre. All of these repeated visuals are 
present in the film 
The interplay of light and dark is one of the most significant visual choices 
Anderson makes. When Anderson is on stage by herself, or with only a few 
musicians, the spotlight features her. When the entire ensemble performs a 
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song, the light may still be brighter on Anderson. The consistent illumination of 
Anderson throughout the show marks her as the one with the answers, or at 
least as a tour gioide towards those answers. If she is always "in the spotlight/' 
she is always "in focus". This light/dark interplay helps to make Anderson a 
version of Foucault's "code speakers", a topic I will return to at the end of the 
chapter. 
Part of the strength of the repeated symbols happens in combination with 
verbals or other visuals. During the performance of "Excellent Birds," the 
performers sing "This is the picture" while the phrase "this is the picture" is 
projected in capital letters, starting small in the middle of the screen and 
growing, expanding quickly and rushing toward the audience. Telephones are a 
significant symbol throughout Home of the Brave. The phones point out 
communicative insistency: when the phone rings, we answer it. At one point in 
the film, a white telephone drops from the ceiling of the theatre, and we hear a 
short monologue by Burroughs. In "Sharkey's Day," Anderson carries a phone 
and gestures with it when she says 'Taging Mr. Sharkey ... white courtesy 
telephone, please." After the performance of "Talk Normal," Anderson calls her 
keyboard player Joy Askew and talks with her, rambling about how the concert is 
going. Askew is no more than 20 yards from Anderson while this phone 
conversation takes place. 
Anderson's repeated visuals point to a meta-theme of movement. In the 
song "Kokoku," the back screen projects a drawing of a mountain peak. Several 
line drawings repeatedly tumble through the sky, over the drawing of the 
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mountain. These drawings include a TV (a box of moving images), an umbrella 
(used for flight by Mary Poppins), and lightning bolts (a motion that can strike 
you dead). At the same time, a ghosdy line drawing of a plane flies from right to 
left across the projection screen, over and over, for the duration of the song. The 
plane flies in a straight line, crossing the same territory over and over again as 
the TVs, umbrellas, and lightning bolts repeatedly fall down the sky. We are left 
with an image of movement going nowhere. In contrast to the projected visuals, 
the performers on stage, including Anderson, seem very purposeful in their 
movement. This motion is often a choreographed dance that all performers do. 
For one song, Anderson provides a conductor's direction with the movements 
she makes. As she notes, "The time signature for "Smoke Rings" was difficult so 
I invented a dance to show musicians where the downbeat was" (NB 216). The 
motions of the live performers are deliberate and purposeful, while the motions 
of the images on the projection screen seem deliberate but ineffective. 
Anderson's repetitive visuals remind us of the difficulties involved in 
trying to communicate. They do not indicate an epistemological statement, as 
her repeated verbals do. Instead they point out other aspects of Anderson's 
'language as virus" theme. The words "This is the picture" rush off the screen 
almost too fast to read them. The scribbled "notes to herself" that appear on the 
projection screen during "Talk Normal"—grocery lists, daily lists, research 
questions—are almost too scribbled to be read, but tantalizing enough to think 
about. The telephone sequences are ail very short, like answering machine 
messages, and provide only "sound bites" of information. All the repeated 
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visuals reinforce her uncertainty about the reliability of language. This 
uncertainty generates questions that are never articulated but are suggested: who 
can speak? What do our symbol systems really mean? How purposeful are our 
movements—are we just running in place? A figure running in place is used 
behind Anderson in the monologue of "White Lilly." Anderson's repeated 
visuals add to these and more questions surrounding the complexity of 
communication. 
Anderson's repeated phrases and visuals seem more important each time 
they appear within the pieces that comprise Home of the Brave. I bring them up 
before the extended analyses of the pieces to suggest some meta-messages that 
Anderson uses to frame the film. The repeated phrases ask us to think about 
responsibility. We must determine who we are and what we want. The phrases 
also ask us to examine our actions in response to others' priorities, e.g. "you pick 
up the pieces." The visuals serve as a meta-message of the conflicts within 
language use: messages move too fast or are too illegible to be read; the lighted 
speaker is the "voice of authority." We stand warned, or at least reminded, both 
visually and verbally, of the power struggles that occur in our culture and are 
played out in our language use. 
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Stories and pictures of bravery 
All of Anderson's work is, to some extent, about language and the effect of 
language. Kardon argues: 
. . .  i n  A n d e r s o n ' s  w o r l d  w e  c o m e ,  a s  i n  c l a s s i c  P o p  A r t ,  t o  t h e  t e r r o r ,  
banality, and awe of the capitalist Word. Anderson has 
monumentalized the Word by extending and shifting the time in 
which the Word appears, carefully bringing it into a structure that. . 
. exists episode by episode to exhibit chaos and discontinuity. (138) 
I argue that Anderson's problematization of bravery is exactly Kardon's claim of 
"exhibiting chaos and discontinuity." The film plays out many angles of 
Anderson's eind American culture's notions of bravery: who is brave, who lives 
in the home of the brave, why bravery is significant. 
The issue of play and its resultant humor is important to the film. 
Anderson plays with ideas, images, and cultural stereotypes in her work. It is 
hard to tell if she is dead serious or playing deadpan jokes. According to Levin, 
Anderson has made "the cutting edge of Conceptual art [into] entertainment" 
(187). Cummings calls Anderson a "tour guide, shaman, troubadour, babe-in-
the-woods, prankster, and mater of ceremonies" (251). This ability to play with 
form and meaning results in Smagula's comment: 
Anderson represents a decidedly different. Postmodern sensibility 
in her work. She is an indication of a new drift in art—away from a 
hermetic Formalism and towards a body of work that mediates 
between easily understood, popular forms and meaningful 
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statements that question the very nature of contemporary life-
Anderson feels she can be amusing, entertaining, and theatrically 
viable with no compromise in terms of the work's content, 
meaning, and effectiveness. (242) 
Somewhere in Anderson's playful, unpredictable approach to her work is her 
commitment to exploring ranges of meanings. These ranges are Anderson's 
versions of problematizations. 
I examine three different performances from Home of the Brave using 
their texts and contexts to discuss Anderson's problematization of bravery. These 
pieces are significant in expressing Anderson's ambivalence about bravery, and 
each piece incorporate the repeated narratives and visuals Anderson uses. For 
each separate performance, I provide discussion of the narratives (included in 
story form iristead of stanza form) and visuals, then comment on the piece's 
context and its elucidation of Anderson's ongoing contextualization of bravery. 
"Zero and One" 
Description of the performance Anderson opens the movie with the 
phrases HOME OF THE BRAVE and A FILM BY LAURIE ANDERSON written 
large on the projection screen. She enters with an angular, jerky dance. The cast 
solemnly walks towards their spots. The short dance is spotlighted and makes 
her entrance a dramatic one. Anderson has on a white suit and a blank-face 
mask. The cast has masks on as well. The mask has drawn-on eyes, nose and 
mouth; it lacks any expression except a staring concentration. As the musicians 
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move to their places, Anderson plays the violin, which makes electronic 
swooping noises. A mountain with cascades of images poured over it fills the 
projection screen. An airplane flies backward, a TV falls from the sky, clouds 
race by, and lightning bolts strike the mountain. At the end of her violin solo, 
the stage goes black. The cast leaves. When the spotlight returns, Anderson is 
there with her blank-face mask (her "Sharkey" mask). She delivers this 
narrative in her "Voice of Authority," which she uses in other pieces. Her Voice 
is an altered microphone that, when she speaks, lowers her voice about two 
octaves. Anderson begins the show: 
Good evening. Now, I'm no mathematician but I'd like to talk 
about just a couple of numbers that have really been bothering me 
lately, and they are zero and one. Now first, let's take a look at zero. 
Now nobody wants to be a zero. To be a zero means to be a nothing, 
a nobody, a has-been, a clod. 
On the other hand, just about everybody wants to be number one. 
To be number one means to be a winner, top of the heap, the acme. 
And there seems to be a strange kind of national obsession with this 
particiilar number. 
Now, in my opinion, the problem with these numbers is that they 
are just too close—leaves very little room for everybody else. Just 
not enough range. So first, I thiiik we should get rid of the value 
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judgments attached to these two numbers and to be a zero is no 
better, no worse, than to be number one. Because what we are 
actually looking at here are the building blocks of the Modem 
Computer Age. 
Anything that can be expressed in words or nimibers can be written 
in this simple, foolproof code. It's all here in a nutshell, the 
alphanumeric system, the A to Z, the zero to infinity of digital 
intelligence. (NB 135) 
While Anderson tells this story, a zero and a one are projected behind her on the 
screen. The numbers waver on the screen, as if they might disappear at any 
moment. When Anderson is done with the story, she then goes on to describe 
several different zero-one combinations projected behind her. The first binary-
string image is the first two letters of the first word of the Gettysburg Address. 
The next projection is the first two numbers, written in binary code, of her home 
phone number; quips Anderson, "the remaining digits are available on 
autographed limited-edition floppy disks on sale at the souvenir stand in the 
lobby." Each image of the zero-one strings gets smaller and smaller, because each 
set of numbers gets larger and larger. Her last image of zero-one strings is huge. 
She notes that it is the first two notes of the song "Sharkey's Day," a song "I 
composed myself, using this very system. And it can be counted like this—and 
zero—and one—and zero—and one." The zero and one continue to flash when 
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she stops counting. An eerie warning siren, one which would accompany a 
nuclear holocaust, accompanies the flashes- The stage goes black. 
Narrative texts and analyses This first performance allows Anderson to 
introduce a repeated narrative phrase: home of the brave. Right away the 
audience is reminded of the name of the film and of the terrain to be explored. 
Even though we are not sure where the "home of the brave is," though we know 
the phrase from the U.S. national anthem, we can tentatively assizme it is the 
United States. The audience is thus set up for more information about 
Anderson's United States, which she delivers throughout the rest of the film. 
We are also set for more explorations of the idea of bravery. Are the "zeros" the 
brave ones, because they're not "ones"? Anderson never claims an answer, but 
she does indicate that both zeros and ones are special in their own right, precisely 
because of the power relationship between the numbers in her examples of 
binary code. 
Anderson's narrative establishes her as the star (the authority) of the film. 
The audience greets her opening "Good evening" with shouts, cheers, and 
applause. No one seems hesitant to grant Anderson the authority to tell her 
stories, and she does not disappoint her audience. Her text conveys little 
hesitation about her position, but it also points out unique ideas regarding zero 
and one. The extreme closeness of zero and one is not apparent in our society, 
but Anderson makes sure we understand the dichotomy our social meanings of 
"zero" and "one" present when compared with their numeric status. The 
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numbers take on additional meaning when Anderson points out their 
importance as the "building blocks of the Modem Computer Age." Anderson's 
first narrative accomplishes two things: it establishes her as the "code speaker" 
of the film, and it also introduces the audience to her ability to draw unnoticed 
and underappreciated relationships out of what seems to be a simple situation. 
Zero and one do not appear to be complicated numbers (or ideas)—^at first glance. 
Anderson points out their complexity with practiced ease. 
With this comparison of zero and one, Anderson introduces the audience 
to binary code, the most basic computer language available (it was even more so 
in 1985). This basic structural language serves as an example of simplicity within 
complexity; zero and one are simple within themselves, but the combinations of 
patterns they can make is infinite, and the combinations can represent almost 
anything. Anderson makes this binary code socially important by reminding us 
of our cultural stereotypes surrounding zero and one. The social gulf between 
the numbers is enormous, even though, as she points out, there's not much 
numerical room between them. With the introduction of the social implications 
of zero and one, they become metaphors for more than just the building blocks 
of "the Modern Computer Age." Zero and one become the building blocks of 
society. We are either one or the other—there seems to be no space between 
them. We may be both a zero and a one, though it seems difficult to "be" the 
ntambers at the same time. Zero and one are the most basic computer language 
available. Zero and one are also the basic "language" of classification for 
individuals within our society. But this basic language is socially complicated. 
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Anderson's Voice of Authority introduces us to a new vocal range. In her 
work Anderson uses voices to "escape her perspective/' and this particular voice 
offers her the chance to explore a male point of view: 
. . .  i t ' s  a l s o  t h e  v o i c e  o f  a  s h o e  s a l e s m a n  o r  o f  a  g u y  w h o ' s  t r y i n g  t o  
sell you an insurance policy you don't want or need. He's a bit 
insecure but cheerful, not very bright, but quite pompous anyway. 
It's only recently that I realized that this guy is based on my first 
ideas of who men were. (NB 150) 
Anderson's Voice of Authority allows her to explore the "carefree species" that 
men appear to be, a Foucaultian power structure society has created for them. 
Their authority gives them the ability to express ideas without worrying about 
consequences. Men are "code speakers" whether or not they know or 
understand the code. Anderson's "male" voice thus gives her more credibility 
and authority. What she says in this voice must be "true". 
Visual texts and analyses Several repeated visuals make their first 
appearance in this piece. The Sharkey mask is brought back several times in the 
film, though Anderson is not always the person wearing it. These masks 
provide the performers with an extra character to play; they can be their 
musician-selves or their blank-faced selves, and sometimes they are both at the 
same time. The mask indicates their ability to visually shift their personality: 
sometimes they are themselves, sometimes they are Sharkey. In this opening 
spot, they are only blank-faced selves who frame Anderson's whirling, dancing 
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blank-faced self. Anderson's physical motion is also part of this piece. Her 
angular dance begins the pattern for the "Sharkey dance/' which she and the 
crew members do in both "Sharkey's Day" and "Sharkey's Night." The dance is 
slightly manic, relatively unpredictable, and suggests mechanical influences. 
Anderson's arms and hands wave in patterns a robot might exhibit. 
This idea of social complication within apparent simplicity is emphasized 
by Anderson's mask. The mask is an almost-faceless face, but its rhetoric is 
strong. With its drawn-on features, its expressions are limited to the one it 
wears, but the face seems determmed. The mask functions most clearly as an 
iriformative and persuasive visual. This mask visually emphasizes the 
singularity within the multitudes: Anderson, at this point, is a singular mask. 
Her singularity is a piece of information we need to remember. Later on, she is 
one among many. But even as a group, their faces indicate they are the same 
"person," no matter how many of them there are. The mask persuades us to 
think of it (and those who wear it) as a character who seems separate from 
Anderson and her musicians. That characterization is extended first to 
Anderson, then to everyone who wears the mask. In their blank faces, they 
exhibit a kind of "groupthink" that becomes pervasive. We believe what the 
Sharkeys are saying and doing, especially when they are led by the Head 
Sharkey—Anderson herself. 
Bravery in the context of cultural roles Anderson's Voice of Authority, 
her mask, the projections of zeros and ones, and her narrative add up to a 
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meditation, on the lack of/distance between polarities. Bravery in this "home of 
the brave" might only be its opposite, which many people regard as stupidity. 
Often we say "well, I was brave, or maybe I was just stupid," indicating that what 
appears to be brave, considered action might only be unconsidered 
impulsiveness. In the same way, a "zero" and a "one" could be different sides of 
the same idea, with the "one" side of the dichotomy as the privileged one. Even 
though zero and one are numerically close, their social meanings are miles apart. 
Even though zero and one make up the most basic machine language we know, 
the combinations of numbers are infinite. What appears simple is trxily 
complex. Or is it? Bravery seems to be a complex idea in the "home of the 
brave," but it's really only the courage to act, to declare oneself to be a "one" 
instead of a "zero." 
Anderson problematizes zero and one by cormecting them to two 
seemingly different systems—society and computer languages. Anderson 
demonstrates that the comparison isn't far-fetched. Both systems have 
prescriptive rules and established polarities that must be followed. Zeros aren't 
allowed to be ones, and vice versa. In computer code, you can move between the 
numbers, and switch them back and forth, but the code will not allow one to be 
the other. The order is set, as Anderson demonstrates. Specific patterns of zeros 
and ones will make specific things, such as her phone number. The system may 
not be distTorbed. 
In American culture, however, "zero" and "one" seem a bit more fluid, 
though people tend to be labeled one or the other. Anderson's Sharkey character 
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seems to be a zero; his face indicates he is expression-deficient, possibly bland and 
boring. However, Sharkey is a one, because he knows the secrets. He has the 
knowledge. He is "brave." He understands more than other people do, because 
he can see the comparisons between the strict binary of computer code and the 
strict hierarchy society levels on us. Even though we may think we can move 
between zero and one, Anderson suggests the rigidity of the social order with her 
comparison of American society and computer code. 
This piece is most easily contextualized within the confines of the film. 
Sharkey's character appears and disappears during the two hour concert. His 
presence is slightly ominous, because we don't know who this blank-faced 
person is. As the film progresses, Sharkey becomes the embodiment of 
Anderson's "everyman". Sharkey speaks of oxltural connections we make but 
do not articulate, for fear of sounding slightly insane. As we see more of his 
worldview, we discover that Sharkey is deep in the throes of Foucault's 
"liberation" of what may be madness. Foucault describes this liberation as 
a proliferation of meaning, from a self-multiplication of 
significance, weaving relationships so numerous, so intertwined, so 
rich, that they can no longer be deciphered except in the esoterism 
of knowledge.. .. Thus the image [or the word] is burdened with 
supplementary meanings, and forced to express them. And dreams, 
madness, the unreasonable can also slip into this excess of meaning. 
(MC 18-19) 
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Sharkey speaks aloud this "excess of meaning." In Anderson's/Sharkey's 
narrative, she brings up many different connections. Sharkey mentions the close 
proximity of zero and one, wiiuch is "not enough range," and how the social gap 
between the labels of "zero" and "one" constitutes a much larger span. This 
social edifice of numerical labels then shifts to become "the building blocks of the 
Modem Computer Age," complete with giant projections of the "digital building 
blocks" of Sharkey's home phone number projected on the screen. Sharkey 
explains, "Anything that can be expressed in words or numbers can be written in 
this simple, foolproof code. It's all here in a nutshell, the alphanumeric system, 
the A to Z, the zero to infinity of digital intelligence" (NB 135). Sharkey has just 
given us license to explore our entire world in terms of zero/one combinations. 
We can choose our own path, or we can follow him. We have until "infinity" to 
discover all the combinations. In the same way, we have just been given license 
to explore Anderson's notion of "home of the brave." Are we "home" in this 
place? We are still left wondering who the "brave" are, and whether or not we 
are one of them. With her comments on the social structure of zero and one, 
Anderson points out the slipperiness of categories. We might be considered 
"brave" in one instance, but we are jvist a hair's breadth away firom "cowardly," 
just as we can move between "zero" and "one." 
"Sharkey's Day'VSharkey's Night" 
Description of the performance The pieces "Sharkey's Day" and 
"Sharkey's Night" are separated in the film but represent two halves of a whole. 
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Anderson continues her Sharkey character's musings on life with these 
performances. As the pieces reveal, Sharkey seems to be sliding faster and faster 
into Foucault's "excess of meaning". 
"Sharkey's Day" chronicles a morning in the life of Sharkey. The entire 
cast returns in Sharkey masks, as they are in the introduction of the film. 
Anderson does not wear a mask, so she is set apart from "the crowd". The 
performance, which is relatively long, is framed by a narrative of Sharkey's 
complicated thought processes. This narrative is delivered by Anderson, in her 
own voice: 
Sun's coming up. Like a big bald head. Poking up over the grocery 
store. It's Sharkey's day. It's Sharkey's day today. Sharkey wakes up 
and Sharkey says: There was this man, and there was this road, and 
if only I could remember these dreams, I know they're trying to tell 
me ... something. Strange dreams. Oh yeah. And Sharkey says: I 
turn around, it's fear. I turn around again, it's love. Oh yeah. 
Strange dreams. And the little girls sing: oooeee Sharkey. And the 
marxager says: Mr. Sharkey? He's not at his desk right now. Can I 
take a message? And the little girls sing: oooeee Sharkey. He's 
Mister Heartbreak. 
And Sharkey says: All of nature talks to me. If I could just figure 
out what it was trying to tell me. Listen! Trees are swinging in the 
breeze. They're talking to me. Insects are rubbing their legs 
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together. They're all talking. They're talking to me. And short 
animals—they're bucking up on their hind legs. Talking. Talking 
to me. Heyl Look out! Bugs are crawling up my legs! You know? 
I'd rather see this on TV. Tones it down. And Sharkey says: I turn 
around, it's fear. I turn around again, it's love. Nobody knows me. 
Nobody knows my name. 
And Sharkey says: All night long I think of those little planes up 
there. Hying aroimd. You can't even see them. They're specks! 
And they're full of tiny people. Going places.... That Sharkey! 
He's a slow dance on the edge of the lake. He's a whole landscape 
gone to seed. He's gone wild! He's screeching tires on an oil slick at 
midnight on the road to Boston a long time ago. And Sharkey says: 
Lights! Camera! Action! TIMBER! At the beginning of the movie, 
they know they have to find each other. But they ride off in 
opposite directions. 
You know? They're growing mecharucal trees. They grow to their 
full height. And then they chop themselves down. Sharkey says: 
All of life comes from some strange lagoon. It rises up, it bucks up 
to its full height from a boggy swamp on a foggy night. It creeps into 
your house. It's life! It's life! ... Deep in the heart of darkest 
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America. Home of the brave. Ha! Ha! Ha! You've already paid for 
this. Listen to my heart beat. 
On top of old Smokey, all covered with snow. That's where I'm 
gorma ... that's where I'm gorma ... go. (dust jacket, Mr. Heartbreak 
album) 
The stage is a frenzy of action in this performance. Everyone is dancing, 
including Anderson. The dance is mechaiiical and choppy, and is repeated in 
"Sharkey's Night." The projection screen at the back of the stage is alive with 
pixel-evident pictures of suns, faces, houses, and mountains. The mood seems 
to be joyous. Anderson tells Sharkey's story in a tone of wonder, as if Sharkey is 
discovering the world for the first time. Sharkey's imagination is evident. At 
the end of the performance, the Sharkey atmosphere seems to wind down with 
Anderson's promise of "that's where I'm gonna go." The performers, and 
Anderson, have tired themselves out with the energy of Sharkey's thought 
processes. "Sharkey's Day" appears in the begimiing half of the show. 
By contrast, "Sharkey's Night" holds a dark, sinister tone. It is the last 
piece performed in the film. The stage is much darker, and the images projected 
on the screen are ominous—for example, a line drawing of the "Sharkey" mask, 
with its eyes shut tight and its mouth frozen open in a scream. The ensemble 
wears Sharkey masks again and they play, sing, and dance with a frenzied 
intensity. Anderson wears no Sharkey mask. She tells the story of Sharkey's 
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night, in her (Sharkey's?) Voice of Authority. This night is much different than 
Sharkey's day: 
Sun's going down like a big bald head. Disappearing behind the 
boulevard. It's Sharkey's night. It's Sharkey's night tonight. And the 
manager says: Sharkey? He's not at his desk right now. Could I take a 
message? Hey Kemosabe! Long time no see. Hey sport—^you cormect the 
dots. You pick up the pieces. 
WeE, I drove down to big DC. And I walked into Room 1003. And there 
they were: the Big Boys. And they were talking Big B, Little O, Little M, 
Silent B. And they were saying, let's teach those robots how to play 
hardball. Let's teach those little fellas a little gratitude. 
Hey! What's that big noise from the sky? Sounds like thunder—^nope. 
Sovmds like the Fourth of July—nope. Wrong again. You know? It's just 
those angels walking. They're clomping around again. Wearing those big 
clumsy shoes we got for them. 
Well, deep in the heart of darkest America, 
heart! Heart. You've already paid for this. 
(Album sleeve. Home of the Brave) 
Home of the Brave. The 
Listen to my heart—beat. 
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Throughout the narrative of "Sharkey's Night", Adriart Belew plays screechy 
guitar solos, which is the nnost prominent musical sound- At the end of the 
number, when Anderson intones her warning about the "heart of darkest 
America," she draws out specific words to give her statements even more 
impact; they sound almost like threats. Electronic screams and yips punctuate 
her last lines: 
Well deeeeeeep (i/ip) (yip) (i/ip) (yip) 
m the haaaaart (yip) (yip) (yip) (\jip) 
of darrrkest (yip) (yip) 
America (y ip)  (y ip)  (y ip)  (y ip)  
HOME of the Braaaave 
The heaaaart! (yip) (yip) (yip) (yip) 
Heaaaart! (]/ip) (yip) (yip) (}fip) 
You've already paiiid (\/ip) (yip) 
for thissss. 
(zuaming siren) 
listen to my heart 
(lucirning siren) 
BEAT. 
(Nuclear disaster warning siren pulses) 
The ending is thunderous. The sotmds fill up the stage and the theatre. The 
enormity of the sound contributes to its threatening quality. From the narrative 
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to the ambient sounds aromid the narrative, the timbre of this piece is menacing. 
All of the auditory stimuli suggest danger. 
The motion in the piece is almost as frenetic as the movement in 
"Sharke5r's Day." While Belew plays his wailing guitar, the cast dances the 
choppy "Sharkey dance." Some have oven mitts or wooden mittens on over 
their hands. The cast members with fingerless hands show up prominently in 
the "Sharkey dance"; their hands give them an even more robotic look. At one 
point, Anderson appears out in the audience, where the crowd enthusiastically 
cheers her presence. She dances through the aisles, talking to the audience. The 
sound man appears in the picture as he scrambles to get out of the cameraman's 
viewfinder. At another pomt, William S. Burroughs slowly enters from the side 
of the stage. We know it is Burroughs because he has already appeared twice on 
stage in the suit he is wearing. This time he wears a Sharkey mask. With the 
stateliness of a dignitary, he and Anderson tango and twirl across the stage in a 
comely dance that contrasts sharply with the Sharkey dance. He then leaves 
slowly, in his dignified way. Anderson returns to her previous frenzied pace. 
She finishes the piece as Sharkey instead of genteel dance partner. 
Through most of the piece, the projection screen shows the line drawing 
of the "Sharkey face," but this time it has its eyes closed and its mouth open, in a 
silent scream. At various points, the bottom of the screen glows red. As 
Anderson speaks the last lines of the piece, she draws her bow across her violin 
to activate the nuclear disaster warning siren. At the same pace as the siren, a 
zero and one flash on the proiection screen. The film ends with the same 
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simple/complicated binary code with which it began. At the end of the film, the 
spotlight is on her, maniacal look on her face, and the screen is lit only with the 
image of the number one. Then the stage goes black. 
Narrative texts and analyses Anderson's Sharkey character has a chance 
to demonstrate his realities in these two pieces. Sharkey seems to be a victim of 
his thought processes. He is caught in his own flood of words. The narrative of 
"Sharkey's Day" is all about the "strange dreams" he has, where mechanical trees 
chop themselves down and wild aiumals talk to him. In "Sharkey's Night/' 
those strange dreams magnify into paranoid nightmares. Sharkey is trapped in 
the description of what he's encountered in "Room 1003" in "big DC." In both 
cases, his character seems powerless to get away from the scenes he describes. He 
seems to have lost his social filter, or any way of deciphering what is "real" or 
"imagined". Sharkey is trapped in Foucault's "excess of interpretation," but he 
must explain himself and his amazing vision(s). His explanatioris make him 
sound like a schizophrenic who has forgotten his medication and is forced to 
listen to the voices in his head.'' Foucault claims that madness aligns itself with 
language: "Madness, in the classical sense, does not designate so much a specific 
change in the mind or in the body, as the existence, under the body's alterations, 
under the oddity of conduct and conversation, of a delirious discourse" (MC 99). 
Sharkey seems to be speaking this delirious discourse in his descriptions of his 
day and night. 
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Sharkey's/Anderson's ponderings are smaller stories within this larger 
story of "discourse delirium/' We do not know if Sharkey is a true madman or a 
carefully observcuit genius; he may be either, or both, "Sharkey's Day" is 
relatively optimistic in its exploration of the world. The verses tell of how 
things are made, how things work, how the world works together to create life. 
The narrative also speaks of Sharkey's interpersonal abilities. Sharkey can 
inspire fear and love in women as he becomes "Mr. Heartbreak." His emotional 
play with "little girls" seems playful but confused. As he is appealing to the 
"little girls" enough so they call him "Mr. Heartbreak," at the same time he and 
the women "ride off in opposite directions," even though "at the beginning of 
the movie they know they have to find each other." Sharkey's language seems 
to isolates him as well as make him popular. 
His relationship stories are less important than his "strange dreams." The 
strangest is his decision to locate himself "deep in the heart of darkest America, 
home of the brave." Here we also have the repetition of "You've already paid for 
this/Listen to my heart beat." In these lines is a plea for acceptance—we've 
already "pmd" for Sharkey's craziness, but we have yet to accept his point of 
view. His heart beats just like ours. All of us are stuck in "darkest America, 
home of the brave." Some of us are braver than others—^Sharkey is brave 
because he can articulate his theories of mechanical trees. 
"Sharkey's Night" is Sharkey's/Anderson's darker dreams. This piece 
describes a threat of (nuclear) war, a threat of a malevolent government, a threat 
of total distraction. Sharkey's imaginings are not without basis in 1985/86; the 
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Cold War still rages, and nuclear disarmament is not a reality. What Sharkey 
sees in "big DC" is a common paranoid vision of the government—a group of 
"Big Boys" sitting around, deciding the fate of the world, carefully ensconced 
"deep in the heart of darkest America." In the "home of the brave," our coimtry 
is run by cowards who shield themselves in darkness and secrecy. 
Despite Sharkey's courage in articulating his "strange dreams," he claims 
that "nobody knows me. Mobody knows my name." As forward as he is about 
his opinions, he still perceives himself as a nobody. In this respect, his narrative 
relegates him to the voices Anderson claims to represent in her work. She notes 
that her performances and projects are the "various voices" she has used to 
speak for her (NB 7); these voices represent "English as spoken by Americans: 
the voices  of  machines ,  pol i t ic ians ,  s i tcom stars ,  nuns,  and oui ja  boards"  (NB 7) .  
She argues that "I relate to . .. the No Bodies. I've written many songs and 
stories for these 'people.' They have no names, no histories. They're ousted of 
time and place and they are the ones who truly speak for me" (NB 7). Sharkey 
represents one of Anderson's No Bodies, even though he has a name and a job 
('Taging Mr. Sharkey . .. Sharkey's not at his desk right now; can I take a 
message?"). Anderson's No Bodies are the ones who repeat, over an over again, 
"Deep in the heart of darkest America/home of the brave/you've already paid 
for this/listen to my heart beat." The No Bodies, like Sharkey, want to be 
noticed. But they're too "crazy" to be acceptable to our cultxxre. 
If we view Sharkey with a dispassionate eye, he certainly seems to be ill. 
In fact. Sharkey seems quite manic. Mania is one half of manic-depressive 
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illness, or bipolar disorder. Bipolar disorder is an imbalance of 
neurotransmitters in the brain, causing sight, sound, and language systems to 
become overactive and unpredictable. Mania is "talking on and on without 
making sense" (Gorman 178). Sharkey rambles on and on, becoming more 
threatened and delusional as the film progresses. Another symptom of bipolar 
disorder is delusions, in manic or depressed states, which are characterized as "a 
false belief that no amount of reality, facts, or hard evidence will shake" 
(Gorman 403). Delusions are their own reality, usually singular realities. 
Sharkey's reality seems fairly individual to Sharkey, and his stories represent his 
unique perspective. Sharkey's reality reflects Foucault's theory that madness is 
"delirious discourse." 
Visual texts and analyses The visuals in "Sharkey's Day" and "Sharkey's 
Night" provide other textual examples of Sharkey's/Anderson's oppositional 
viewpoints. The Sharkey mask, worn by the cast in the Sharkey pieces and by 
Anderson in "Zero and One," is deceptive: Sharkey seems to have a very 
expressionless face, but his narratives belie the idea of an expressionless 
persoiiality. Sharkey's big, fingerless hands that cast members wear in "Sharkey's 
Night" are awkward; they prohibit much work, but they encourage clapping and 
hand-slapping on the floor. The physical representations of Sharkey are a study 
of the schizophrenia he seems to exhibit The "Sharkey dance" is a high-energy 
physical exploration of physical axid personal space. The dance is another 
reflection of Sharkey's potentially unstable mental state. The cast in the Sharkey 
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masks do this dance in both "Sharkey's Day" and "Sharkey's Night/' though in 
"Sharkey's Night" some cast members are hindered by their hand mitts. The 
angular, automatic movements in the Sharkey Dance indicate that Sharkey may 
be "going through the motions" or may be reduced to a robotic, mechanistic 
individual who has no control over his life. In "Sharkey's Day/' the movements 
are a bit more energetic and humorous than they are in "Sharkey's Night," 
where an element of fear seems to propel the cast's movements. 
The lighting also contributes to Sharkey's slightly paranoid visions. For 
"Sharkej^s Day," the stage is bright. All the musicians are easily seen, and 
Anderson is not spotlighted until the end of the piece, when she wistfully claims 
"on top of Old Smokey, all covered with snow, that's where I'm gonna go." 
Sharkey's Day is clearly an ensemble piece, and Sharkey's/Anderson's energy is 
radiated to the cast and reflected back from them. In "Sharkey's Night," the stage 
is shadowy. The performers seem to fade in and out of Sharkey's/Anderson's 
consciousness. When the stage is illuminated, it is lit by dim red light or by 
spotlights on Anderson. The red haze is threatening; it provides a scary energy 
for the piece, especially wheia it lights the bottom of the projection screen where 
the Sharkey face is drawn, eyes closed and mouth in a frightened O. When 
Anderson is spotlighted and the stage is almost dark, she is conveying Sharkey's 
most delusional thoughts. According to the light and dark contrasts, the 
inquisitive maniacal musmgs exhibited in "Sharkey's Day" disintegrate into 
paranoid delusions for "Sharkey's Night." 
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The projections on the screen provide another reflection of Sharkey's 
mercurial thoughts. In "Sharkey's Day," the screen is full of images: the sun 
comes up over and over again, sometimes in orange. The line drawing of the 
mountciin is continually deluged with cascades of planes, TVs, and lightning 
bolts. The images flow as freely as Sharkey's thoughts; they reflect his "strange 
dreams" with no hint of malice. Confusion or disassodation may be the order of 
the day, but the narrative and its visuals do not seem threatening. By contrast, 
the one image on the projection screen for "Sharkey's Night" is the Sharkey 
mask with its "scared face." Sharkey's changed face grabs our attention because it 
has changed so dramatically from his previously lackluster expression. Now this 
line-drawn face appears truly frightened. When we look at the Sharkey 
projection, we realize that we, too, should be a bit frightened by this visual text. 
Political culture in the eighties Sharkey's paranoia reflects the political 
happenings of the eighties in the United States. When Anderson created these 
pieces, America was learning Reagan's version of bravery. Ronald Reagan was a 
Holl)rwood actor who had many cowboy roles. Reagan was a conservative, and 
he captured the governorship of California in 1966, then the presidency of the 
United States in 1980. Reagan's social revitalization in his "supply-side" 
economic policies promised to create a more robust atmosphere in the U.S. The 
country plunged into an era of glitz, glamoiur, and excess, hoping to make up for 
the recession in place at the begii"uiii\g of Reagan's presidency. By 1983, the 
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economic picture brightened, with lower inflation rates, rising production, and a 
slowly-falling jobless rate. 
Reagan's contribution to "American bravery" came most distinctly in his 
military policies. Under Reagan the U.S. became involved in peacekeeping in 
Lebanon, Beirut (where the Marines sustained heavy casualties), and Granada, 
plus covert missions in Nicaragua. The long-awaited release of the American 
hostages in Iran began his presidency with the image of a mighty and powerful 
America, and Reagan intended to maintain that image- Reagan continued his 
military buildup through the defense mdustry, and the jobs and products from 
the defense industry created part of the imagined economic stability of the 
eighties. Reagan also supported the Strategic Defense Initiative, designed to stop 
Soviet missiles in space before they reached U.S. targets. Reagan's establishment 
of U.S. military bravery is part of what "Sharkey's Night" reflects. 
"Sharkey's Night" was created in the early eighties, as Reagan was busy 
reminding the world that the United States was a mighty military force. Sharkey 
is also concerned with worldwide military involvement. It is Reagan's 
government who is in "big D.C.," talking about how to teach "those little devils a 
little gratitude." The "big B, little O, little M, silent B" is the ever-present nuclear 
bomb, the one Reagan mock-threatened to use at the begixming of a press 
conference early in his presidency, noting that he had just made a law that 
eliminated the USSR, and bombing would begin in five minutes. Reagan was 
bent on impressing the world with the bravery of the United States of America. 
Anderson is reacting to Reagan's version of bravery as a show of force. 
I 
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Anderson's reaction to Reagan-esque culture is personified in Sharkey. 
Sharkey is brave in part because he has the strength to be crazy. Sharkey is not 
afraid to say what he ttiinks, and to see the sun as a "big bald head poking up 
over the grocery store." Sharkey's ability to express his individuality makes him 
brave. That individuality also allows Sharkey to react in the way he does against 
"the big boys" in D.C. who are considering how to use the bomb. These "big 
boys" are the arbiters of the strong-arm tactics involved in bravery. They live 
"deep in the heart of darkest America" in the "home of the brave," working in 
"room 1003" of the Pentagon or some other secret government building.. 
Sharkey: madman, artist, or concemcd citizen? Sharkey exhibits several 
signs of mental illness. If he were a real man (or woman), someone would have 
sent him to a hospital and pumped him full of antipsychotic drugs. But 
Anderson herself—^Sharkey's actucil "voice" and personality—is never 
committed, nor is she considered crazy. Instead, she is allowed to let Sharkey 
represent the schizoid views of bravery she sees in America. Anderson is freed 
by Shcirkey. She can speak bizarre narratives in the guise of Sharkey and his 
shaky reality. Anderson is allowed this liberty because artists (especially 
performance artists) can assume personas in their works. Sharkey represents 
Anderson's illustration of how slippery reality can be, and how we can have 
strong reactions to cultural forces we encounter. The logic in Sharkey's 
narratives tends toward the slippery. Sharkey's narratives and visuals are 
reactions to our culture's notions of "saxiity" and of "bravery." Being insane is its 
I 
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own version of bravery, and Sharkey's reaction to the pro-war rhetoric of 
American culture provides us with another form of bravery in our "home of the 
brave/' Insane or not, Sharkey is Aiiderson's version of a concerned citizen, 
speaking out against the potential abuse of governmental power. 
Despite his bravery in expressing his opinion, Sharkey may be intimidated 
by his delusions. In "Sharkey's Night," he hears "that big noise from the sky," 
which he thinks (or is told) "it's just those angels walking. They're clomping 
around again. Wearing those big clumsy shoes we got for them." The trees and 
animals that talk to Sharkey in "Sharkey's Day" seem much less threatening 
than the big angel noise. This delusion of "angels clomping around" may or 
may not be generated within Sharkey, thanks to the piece's investigation of 
nuclear war and the U.S. government's role in warlike activities. As I've 
mentioned, Anderson is reacting to Reagan's policies of militaristic world 
involvement with her work. Consequeiitly, the threat of nuclear war emerges in 
several places in Home of the Brave. Sirens go off several times during the film, 
including ones that sound like nuclear attack warnings. At one point, Anderson 
stands in ftront of a projection of what appears to be a large radar tracking 
antenna, one that might be used to track incoming missiles or enemy satellites. 
Dressed in white, she spins in sync with the rotation of the antenna, arms 
outstretched like a dying Christ on the cross. "Sharkey's Night" is the most overt 
attention Anderson pays to the threat of nuclear destruction. In this song, we 
begin to question the "Home of the Brave" as a safe place to live, especially if our 
government in "room 1003" in "big DC" is telling citizens that the big noises 
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from the sky are angels in heavy shoes. Anderson's Sharkey character is brave or 
crazy enough to articulate his fear of nuclear war and his distrust of the 
government, in his hope that someone will tell him what lies "deep in the heart 
of darkest America." In "Sharke/s Night," Anderson asks us to "listen to my 
heart beat/' and punctuates the sentence with another siren. The heartbeat of 
America is a signal of destruction. 
In 1986, when Home of the Brave was entering theatres, the Cold War 
was de-escalating. In the mid-Eighties, nuclear proliferation was slow and a 
gradual peace was evolving with the USSR. Anderson began her commentary 
on war before Home of the Brave, however, with her first commercial hit single, 
"O Superman," released in 1981 (NB 284). Her critique of war in Home of the 
Brave fits with her earlier commentary, which continues through her recent 
performances. In 1992, she devoted part of her tour of Stories From the Nerve 
Bible to critiquing the Gulf War (NB 273). One of the pieces from that 
performance is titled "War is the Highest Form of Modem Art/' a phrase 
borrowed from Futurist artist Tomas Marinetfci (NB 272). "Sharkey's Night" 
holds much fewer aspirations. It boasts no pretensions of considering war as an 
art form. "Sharkey's Night" tells the story of a potentially frightened and 
possibly crazy individual who isn't sure what his government is hiding. For 
Sharkey/Anderson, the "language virus" the government has is obfuscation of 
the truth about its nuclear involvement. 
Sharkey's delusioris harm no one, except maybe Sharkey. But they 
provide a great deal of information for analysis. Anderson uses the Sharkey 
persona to explore the ideas of paranoia, government conspiracy, and 
"abnormal" ideas of how life works. True to form, Anderson does not declare 
whether or not Sharkey is crazy, or whether she intended him to seem mentally 
ill. Audiences don't know whether or not Anderson herself is quite sane. The 
issue of sanity isn't important—the ideas provided by the "insanity" are. The 
concepts proposed in "Sharkey's Day" and "Sharkey's Night" are not average, 
ordinary ideas. However, they are thought-provoking and interesting concepts. 
Whether or not she or Sharkey is insane does not matter. Our heightened 
consciousness regarding the presentation of "American" bravery is what matters. 
Conclusions: the versions of bravery 
In this chapter I suggest that Home of the Brave, specifically "Zero and 
One," "Sharkey's Day," and "Sharkey's Night" serve as opportunities to 
problematize Anderson's consideration of America as a home of various kinds 
of bravery. Home of the Brave is not a "stand-alone" problematization of 
American culture. No problematization stands alone, nor does any 
performance. To problematize is to enter the cultural "play of true and false" 
around an idea by uncovering and analyzing particular formations of that idea. 
No one angle will be true or false; all angles will be part of the disoirsive 
formations around a particular idea. Problematization is basic to thinking, as 
Foucault argues in Deleuze's volume Foucauli: "To think is to experience, to 
problematize" (in PPC xxiv). Anderson is thinking, experiencing, and 
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problematizing as she explores bravery in American culture. The final argument 
I make here involves Anderson's privileged use of interpretation. Anderson is 
free to problematize in almost any way she desires because she is a "code 
speaker" of the "code" of art. She has the power to do as she chooses, because she 
is part of the discursive structure of the cultural entity called art. 
''Code speaking" and interpretation 
Anderson's privileged position as "artist" allows her to be as 
indeterminate as she chooses. She is a "code speaker" in the art world, and 
artists are allowed to explore the cultural play of ideas, including the play of a 
concept such as bravery. In her work, Anderson happily places the burden of 
meanings on us, but she also provides us with many meanings to consider. Her 
pieces are multidimensional and provide no answers. In some respects, 
Anderson gives away control of her pieces by allowing them to hold many forms 
of meaning. However, Anderson retains her position as "code speaker" by 
providing some particular guidelines for interpretation. Even though Anderson 
is trying to subvert the cultural code that holds sway, she is still a privileged 
speaker. As an influential, popular artist, she is part of determining how the 
cultural code of the U.S. is articulated. 
Anderson is a recognized part of twentieth century performance art 
history (Levin, McCorduck, Dery). As a performance artist, Anderson is not a 
painter, sculptor, printmaker, or filmmaker, nor any other "typical" artist. 
Performance artists paix\t with their bodies and stay on top of ladders for twenty-
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four hours. According to Goldberg, "the history of performance art in the 
twentieth century is the history of a permissive, open-ended mediixm with 
endless variables, executed by artists impatient with the limitations of more 
established art forms, and determined to take their art directly to the public" (9). 
Though Anderson is not extreme or confrontational, as some performance 
artists are, her work is appropriate to performcince art. Her open-ended 
performamces with "endless variables" subtly work to subvert the cultural code 
she reads in American culture. Home of the Brave is part of the history of 
twentieth-century performance art. However, her inclusion in history and the 
popularity of her work provide her with the opportunity to become a "code 
speaker." The implication of that phrase is more than just the person who 
"speaks the code." It indicates Anderson's power level within the codes at hand. 
Anderson is extremely influential as an artist, and her influence crosses cultural 
lines; she is as popular with the technology geeks as she is with postmodern 
artist critics and performance art fans (McCorduck 80). Critic Ted Grossman calls 
Anderson "the grande dame of performance art" (1). At the same time, Mark 
Dery claims "tike Pee-Wee Herman, Ronald Reagan, and Michael Jackson, she is 
always in character; her onstage and offstage personae are virtually inseparable" 
(791). Anderson is a "code speaker" because she has attained power within the 
ciiltural structure of the art world. 
Anderson uses at least tv\'o visual tactics in Home of the Brave to 
maintain her position as "code speaker." The spotlight and the idea of light/dark 
combinations are introduced in the beginning of the film, when Anderson 
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enters to perform "Zero and One." The spotlight adds visual emphasis to 
Anderson, because the spotlight marks her as "the one in charge" or "the one 
with the answers". At the very least, she is "the performer," and we listen to her 
for that reason. The appearance and disappearance of her Sharkey mask is also 
part of the visual representation of her power. For "Zero and One," she wears the 
mask, and she is singular. When she performs "Sharkey's Night," she does not 
wear a mask, and the cast does. She is marked differently, and she retains her 
position as "code speaker." 
Anderson's status as a solo performer also reifies her as a "code speaker," 
because she allows little chance for others to disrupt her code. Anderson seems 
to work alone, no matter how many guests artists she incorporates into her 
performances. Her work may look like chaos, but it is all very carefully 
orchestrated. Home of the Brave is Anderson's largest collaboration, but it looks 
like a solo performance backed by an ensemble. The collaborative portion of it is 
less thcin it could be, for such a large group of performers. Of course, everyone is 
spotlighted at one time or another—for a brief moment. Always, however, 
Anderson is the focus. 
Anderson has taken on the role of artist as social critic, and as such, she 
has incorporated Van Laar and Diepeveen's designation of artist as social critic: 
"cilienated expatriate, a kind of prophet who stands outside society. . . . These 
artists create new visual languages m order to reject pjirticular social and 
aesthetic conventions" (60-61). But the role of social critic is one we can all 
appropriate. It is different for -A.nderson because of her status as an artist. 
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Anderson's personal power and "code speaking" represent a different approach 
to what Foucault refers to as the relationship between power, truth, and the 
individual; "If I tell the truth about myself, as I am now doing, it is in part that I 
am constituted as a subject across a number of power relations which are exerted 
over me and which I exert over others" (PPC 39). Anderson's performances may 
try to make sense of the power relations that flow over us in our culture, but her 
role as "code speaker" gives her some control over these power relationships. 
She may be subject to the mercy of critics and the ticket purchases of audiences, 
but she also is part of the group who shapes the climate in which her work 
appears. Anderson has been part of the art establishment. She has won two 
grants firom the National Endowment for the Arts (Howell 150), a government 
agency. She is not one of the "NEA Four," the performance artists who were 
derued grants because their work was too controversial (Ingalls B8): she is not 
chocolate-covered Karen Finley, or lesbian activist Holly Hughes. Her cool, 
careful approach to art is a Laurie Anderson hallmark. This cool calculation is 
part of why she is a "code speaker"—she only speaks against "the code" when it 
will benefit her. 
Her position as "code speciker" undermines, to some extent, the posture 
she works to cultivate in Home of the Brave. Anderson works hard to disrupt 
the power our culture has over us, but at the same time she is unable to escape 
the fact that she controls that culture, at least in part. Her protracted career and 
her popularity have allowed her to say and do almost anything, without much 
reprisal. Despite the fact that Home of the Brave wasii't a commercial success, it 
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was a success in Anderson's particular "code world." Critic Tony Reveaux 
reviewed the film after viewing it in San Francisco, mentioning that "the film is 
imified by the astonishing charm of Anderson's hi-tech visual expressionism" 
and "Anderson's epigrammatic narratives were never so clearly conveyed as 
they are in the audio-visual imity of the film" (n.p-). Reveaux's commentary 
praises Anderson's work. If she produced pieces that weren't appreciated or 
admired in the art world, she would have little status as a "code speaker." 
However, that's not the case. Anderson's ability to engage in "code speaking" 
comes from the power she draws in the art world and in the flow of pop culture. 
Her success in the art world allows her to speak subversively, and pop culture 
loves her for turning upside down the rarefied airs of high culture. Anderson 
cannot lose. Her power is secure. 
Final thoughts on American bravery 
Anderson's status as "artistic code speaker" diminishes her credibility to 
undermine power structures involved in that code, or any other code. However, 
Anderson's performances still ask interesting questions about the nature of 
bravery as our culture conceived of it in the eighties. Her pieces suggest we 
caimot claim one meaning for bravery, despite Reagan's attempt to make 
America "brave" with his aggressive stance on world peace. No matter what we 
believe, Anderson's attempts to problematize bravery in Home of the Brave 
provides myriad ways to understand this particular national concept. Anderson 
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has followed Foucault's request for explorixig "the play of true and false." Levin 
argues 
reprocessing media information is what [Anderson's] work is about: 
languages, sign systems, body language, and the conventionalized 
languages of cliche, jargon, and slang. Meiking simple connections 
that speak of lack of connection, she sets streams of consciousness to 
work in a game of associations and non sequiturs that short-circuits 
systems of commimication. .. - (189) 
Home of the Brave takes Foucault's desire to uncover power relationships and 
casts our national ideas of bravery into the arena for consideration. Anderson's 
notions of bravery seem to be non sequiturs, such as Sharkey's delusions. But 
Sharkey's delusioiis remain consistent in his desire to speak his mind. Sharkey 
is brave to speak against the Big Boys in Big D.C. 
Various conclusions can be abstracted from the film: bravery is 
individutd, bravery is a national obsession, our goverrunent pretends to be 
brave, only those who speak their minds are brave. The conclusions do not 
matter as much as the effort to unearth them. With Home of the Brave, within 
the art world and the performance world, Anderson has stimulated us to 
problematize, as she does, our understanding of cultural concepts such as 
bravery. We may not enjoy facing the realities Anderson offers us with her 
problematizations. Looking into the dark side of America's government may 
not appeal to us. However, Anderson does not intend her work to be entirely 
appealing—Anderson is aiming for thought-provoking, instead. Critic Herbert 
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Blau claims that Anderson's performances provide us with a slightly scary view 
of life: "in the middle of the journey of life, the dark wood is entered and the 
straight way lost" (121). There is no "straight way" to American versions of 
bravery. The word offers too many contradictions, and Anderson points out 
some of those contradictions in Home of the Brave. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PERFORMANCE 
WITHIN CULTURAL ANALYSIS 
Or perhaps, if we all remiiirv attached to the old name [rhetoric], 
feeling that it gathers together a wide and exciting array of 
approaches to symbolic behavior as it has unfolded throughout 
human history (and continues to unfold), we must grant the term 
rhctoric the broadest meaning—a meaning that would encompass 
all inquiries into the use of symbols, with no suppositions as to the 
answers of our questions. Let us give up contending over the word, 
over who is in and who is out. Rather, let us see what our 
contending viewpoints together reveal about skilled human 
discourse. Then rhetoric will be ever new. (Bazerman 7, italics in 
original) 
It is the thrill of the pull between someone else's authority and our 
own, between submission and independence that we must discover 
how to define ourselves. In the uncertainty of that struggle, we 
have a chance of finding the voice of our authority. Finding it, we 
can speak convincingly ... at long last. (Sommers 31, her emphasis) 
Keeping rhetoric "ever new" asks us, as commimication scholars and English 
studies scholars, to expand our definitions of rhetoric and be willing to risk 
failure to gain greater insight. A study as intricate as mine risks much to test a 
small idea, namely combining concepts of text and context, energized by an 
audience, to form a coiicept of performaiice useful for analyzing artifacts. I offers 
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few new insights on rhetoric, but several suggestions for future research. I claim 
few discoveries, but have laid out a map for travelers. Geertz names the 
discovery/mapping challenge as "how to sound like a pilgrim and a cartographer 
at the same time" (Warks and Lives 10), or how to continue discovering new 
territory without forgetting to track yoiu- course. In this chapter I provide the 
implications of the cartography drawn by the first four chapters. I provide my 
ideas for the next pilgrimage based on these "maps"—the suggestions for 
continued research drawn from the work done here. The maps I have drawn 
with this work should take us somewhere useful. 
This chapter concludes my exploration of the performance equation I 
established in Chapter One. First I offer a specific implication for English studies 
from Chapter Four's emalysis Anderson. Next I explore some directions for 
future research based on. my project. I conclude the chapter with another 
narrative appropriate to this manuscript. 
Implications of Chapter Four 
My study of Home of the Brave offers several implications. One I consider 
here that relates to Anderson's exploration of bravery is her claim that "language 
is a virus." In English studies, we are tmable to "escape" the virus of language. 
In medical terms, a virus is a clearly defined entity. It enters your body 
and tricks other cells into reproducing the viral structure. A virus does not leave 
your system. It may lie dormant, and you stay well. It may be active, and you 
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become sick. Once you contract it, you are never free from it. We contract the 
virus of language when we speak our first words as young children. We cannot 
be free of it: language is everywhere in our culture. We caimot rid ourselves of 
language, though we may try at times. Language comes in many forms, and its 
purpose is commimication with each other. We need language(s) to 
corrunimicate. Why, then, do they make us sick? Why do we have such trouble 
with language when it "gets away" from us and grows without bounds? Why do 
we have propaganda and hate speech? "Negative" forms of language flourish in 
the same way positive language systems do. We must be willing to accept the 
hate speech in order to facilitate the speech of peace. 
In her short monologue in "Difficult Listening Hour," Anderson/Sharkey 
muses that her relationship to the Soul Doctor who has broken into the house is 
a "guest/host relationship." After examining Anderson's pieces that most 
directly confront language use, I conclude that her view of language is similar to 
the guest/host symbiosis that exists for viruses. When a virus enters our body, 
we become its host, and it is our guest. If language is our viral guest, it may 
respond to us more charitably if we treat it with respect. Respecting a virus 
means keeping ourselves healthy, and trying to prevent the conditions that 
cause an outbreak of the virus. Respecting our language systems may indicate 
the same. But how do we keep ourselves "healthy" u\ relation to language? 
Anderson's suggestion is embedded in her work: play with language, challenge 
it, and work to uncover as many nuances of a particular idea as is possible. 
Anderson does just that in her exploration of language as a virus. She 
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approaches zero and one as cultural status positions and as binary computer 
code. She allows her Sharkey character to revel in his language play and express 
his ideas, whether they are delusional or not. She overtly states that language is 
a shipwreck, a job, and a virus. Anderson never steps away from the idea of 
language as viral entity. Listead she mires herself in the possibilities that the 
idea generates. 
If we "host" language, we become responsible for its safety and security. A 
good host takes care of her guest and make sure the guest's needs are met, 
regardless of her Gack of) appreciation for the guest's visit. We can apply this 
wisdom to the idea of hosting language within our human systems. For 
language, our host duties involve taking responsibility for how we mis/use 
language. We may decide not to contribute to hate speech; we may decide to give 
more compliments. Or we may decide to become more aware of the effects of 
language. The surface of language is slippery, changeable, and the top layer of 
meaning can slide away to expose its underbelly, where the power relationships 
lurk. The underbelly of language is where Anderson hosts her guests. Her 
performances remind us that language needs to be respected, cared for, and used 
wisely. 
If, as language hosts, we are careless with language, we may make 
mistakes. We may assume that a pain cry is nothing more than a groan, and we 
may not offer help. We may assume people are ignoring us when they're really 
asking us to pay attention. A guest may leave without warning if our hospitality 
isn't sincere or adequate. We camiot get along without language. We can't 
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afford to find out whiat would happen if we lost oiu- language. But we can only 
be so careful. We cannot be responsible for the interpretations others attach to 
our language structures. We can be responsible for the way we construct our 
language use. We can offer evidence, support, and clear language to prove our 
position. We are responsible for the explidtness of our position. What happens 
after we create our position is not our responsibility. 
As postmodern humans, we evoke language "diffusion, dissemination, 
pulsion, interplay, communication, interdependence, which all derive from the 
emergence of human beings as language animals, homo pictor or homo 
significans, gnostic creatures constituating themselves, and determinedly their 
universe, by symbols of their own making" (Hassan 93, italics in original). If we 
take this charge seriously—we make and live by our symbols—^we can add to it 
Anderson's chcirge—we die by our own symbols. Our linguistic structures are 
powerful creative and destructive entities. We must respect that power, as hosts 
to our guest of language. 
Directions for future research 
I offer directions for future research here as my suggestions for becoming 
both "pilgrim and cartographer." The two those areas of study covered below 
should respond well to my particular combination of performance, text, cmd 
context. Before I discuss areas of future research, I must sum up my argument 
for the importance of performance. 
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Performance theory in communication research 
Performance is fiuidamentai to humankind. Performances are as complex 
as religious rituals, as average as business lunches, or as intricate as childhood 
games. Performance never happens in a vacuum; performance is always for 
someone, whether for an audience of one thousand or of one (ourselves). 
Performance can overlap ctUtural categories: a play about AIDS represents an 
aesthetic event when it is performed on stage by actors using scripts and sets. 
However, the play's messages represent the cultural ideology of the plaj^right, 
the actors, and the producers. Communities can be split or imified by a 
performance's political implications. Performances involve a complicated set of 
actions, individuals, and beliefs, no matter what kind of performance it is. All of 
these factors—audience, cultural purpose, message, political implications— 
provide evidence of the social nature of performance. 
Throughout this work I have suggested performance as a cultural 
phenomenon—a site of cultural inquiry and cultural construction. Performance 
provides a space to work with or against a particular set of cultural constraints. 
The interpreter of the performance articulates (within the text/context 
interaction) assent or dissent in terms of those constraints. According to 
Kapferer, performance helps us understand larger cultural mysteries (such as 
religion) through individual, particular performances (such as prayer or 
communion) (190-191). Dis/agreement with the larger system is played out in 
the smaller action—the individual's interpretntion of the larger. 
196 
If we think of performance as a site for social debate, then the notion of 
argument can be incorporated into performance. The manager acts this way 
because she is arguing, with her performance, for a particular set of managerial 
techniques. The employee acts this way because she is performing against the 
boss's idea of management. Both manager and employee may thwart their overt 
performances with covert ones. A manager may ask for a set of employee work 
guidelines to be t):ped up for each employee, but may conduct herself in ways 
that directly contradict these guidelines. Though she has made overt gestures 
toward a particular point of view, her covert performance calls that point of view 
into question. The overt and covert incorporation of texts and contexts 
determine the impact of the performance on each interpreter (manager, 
employee, or outsider). Using the performance equation into our rhetorical 
analyses provides us with a tool to analyze situations where communication 
incongruities exist. We can study texts and contexts to interpret how the 
performances agree and differ. We can use the same analysis in situations where 
performances are consistent; we can study texts and contexts to determine why 
the performance is effective. Diamond points out that "culture complexly 
enunciates itself in performance, reiterates values, reaffirms community . . ." (6). 
Fusing the performance equation with rhetorical studies provides us with a 
unique way to understand how cultiure proclaims itself within performance 
contexts. 
Problematization allows us to make choices about our text and context. 
Problematizing an issue such as nuclear war might yield the machinations it 
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takes to release a nuclear warhead, or how many nuclear protest groups exist in 
this coiantry. These pieces of information add to the problematization of nuclear 
war by adding this information into the "play of true and false" around nuclecir 
war. Then we interpret the information as we need to. If we, like Anderson, 
decide that it is still possible that a small group of men in a room somewhere has 
the ability to begin World War m as an act of revenge, we might create a 
performemce like "Sharkey's Night" ProblematizatiLon's "play of true and false" 
allows us to pick and choose our information to construct our viewpoint. 
Performance and professional communication 
In their overview of Professional Communication: The Social Perspective, 
Blyler and Thralls ask two questions of professional commuiucation scholars; 
"how can we begin to describe the different approaches within the social 
perspective ... [and] how can we make sense of existing research and assess the 
directions that socially based studies in professional writing seem to be taking?" 
(5). These two questioris allow for performance to enter the field of professional 
communication. The field is flexible enough to accommodate a new approach to 
social situations. Additionally, professional communication is large field, and 
the boundaries for what constitutes professional communication discourse have 
not been strictly drawn." This flexible approach and permeable boimdary allow 
for new approaches to scholarship, including performance analysis. 
My suggestions for research in professional communication using 
performative analysis arise from situations that seem to have a large component 
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of audience. Someone is there to listen to information presented by others, eind 
that audience thus provides the interpretation that catalyzes texts and contexts 
into performances. Examples of such situations would be corporate shareholder 
meetings, office staff meetings, customer service phone calls, and performance 
reviews. Using the performance equation to analyze the personal interaction 
within texts and contexts inside the workplace allows us to enter those "business 
performances" into the larger interplay of performance considerations. We may 
discover new connections between staff meetings and church services, or 
motivationed speeches and stage performances. 
Thinking of professional communication interactions as performances 
can help generate better documents, speeches, and manuals for business and 
technical situations. Close study of the interaction of text and context, plus an 
awareness of audience needs, can help us more closely match texts or contexts to 
appropriate audiences. Careful analysis of text and interpretation can help to 
illuminate what contextual factors feature in the performance. Consideration of 
contexts and audience interpretation can help determine what information 
needs to be included in the texts of the performance. No matter which angles of 
the performance equation are highlighted, we stand to gain a deeper 
understanding of professional communication situatioiis if we bring the 
performance equation into our interpretive strategies. 
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Performance in the classroom 
A pedagogical situation provides obvious ties to performance, whether we 
study a one-on-one mentorship or a teacher lecturing to a class. Ask any teachers-
she or he can artiailate the "teacher role" they play in various teaching 
situations. Performance equation allow for different analysis of the teacher role, 
the student role, and how both interpreters interact within the text and context of 
the classroom. Interpreter perspectives would differ—^is the teacher the audience 
for student-centered classrooms? Is the student always the audience for teacher 
knowledge?—and analysis of these various perspectives would be useful for 
understanding such topics as the creation of feminist classrooms, as told from 
both the student's and teacher's point of view. Textual necessities would differ 
from subject to subject. Contextual outlooks would vary with class size, location 
of classes, and reasons for gathering in an educational setting. Analyzing these 
combinations of text and context could provide us with better designed materials 
for teaching, or with better pedagogical techniques. 
Performance has begun to move into the classroom. Two 1996 Text and 
Performance Quarterly articles interview Camille Paglia as a "performing artist-
intellectual" (62). The second article was titled "'Improv is my pedagogical style': 
Camille Paglia on Teaching as Performance Art" (161). Paglia's pedagogical style 
arose from her admiration of great comedians and her great dislike of famous 
intellectuals who read to their audience. She argues that teaching is closer to 
improvisation: 
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People say to me, "Well, not everybody can do improv/' And I say, 
"Well, what else is teaching but improv?" I say, "What kind of 
fucking stupid teaching is this—pardon my language—^where you 
have these Shakespeare courses at Harvard, with 800 people sitting 
there and somebody comes out and reads a lecture that they've read 
every year for the past decade? Is that teaching? That's not 
teaching, that's wasting everybody's time. Teaching is improv!" 
(162, emphasis in original) 
Paglia views the classroom as organic: "the classroom is a living, breathing 
entity. The mood of the students—^like the mood of a crowd—is part of what a 
teacher must take into consideration in a presentation. That's my philosophy" 
(163). In Paglia's eyes, the teacher/performer is "on stage" each time they enter 
the classroom. If their audience "heckles" them, they must change their 
material, as performers do. Phelan takes the performance-in-dass analogy 
another direction, arguing that "The pedagogical class, like any performance 
event, is a collaboration. Each person is a part of the group and each a part from 
it. Collectively the class creates 'a piece'" (173). Phelan indicates another angle 
for performative research in the classroom—the "piece" the class creates as a 
performative unit. Hemdl adds a Foucaultian twist to the idea of performance 
in the classroom. Herndl argues: "we must recognize that discourse is 
inseparable from institutions, from organizational structures, from disciplinary 
and professional knowledge claims and interests, and from the day-to-day 
interaction of workers" (353). Herndl indicates that writing teachers have their 
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own knowledge claims and represent Foucault's "code speakers" as much as 
anyone else. Hemdl goes on to argue that "we have to face the fact that in 
teaching discourse we are unavoidably engaged in the production of professional 
and cultural power" (354). In essence, Hemdl asks for the acknowledgment of 
our power relations—teacher/student, student/student, teacher/discipline—^in 
the classroom. Using performance theory can help us unlock the power 
relationships present in the classroom. 
Not every teacher approaches their classroom with the performance 
backgrounds of Paglia or Phelan. However, most teachers and students are well 
aware of their "performances" within the classroom. A performance analysis of 
pedagogical issues such as agency (who does/does not have it), intimidation 
(who is/isn't doing it), and learning effectiveness (what indicates it). These 
issues can be seen and articulated through classroom performances. We simply 
need to access those performances through explicating a classroom's text/context 
relationships in relation to a particular interpreter. Few of us offer the 
extraordinary performances of Paglia: "she is an endlessly self-referential 
dramatist, indeed a breast-beating melodramatist, histrionically ringing down the 
curtain on staid English department textualists" (Rodden 62). Even more 
subdued teaching performances can benefit from performative analysis. 
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Final notes 
In the preface to his Classical Rhctoric and Its Christian and Secular 
Tradition from Ancient to Modem Times, Kennedy notes that the audience for 
his volume "is primarily made up of English-speaking students and 
nonspedalists in the dassics who are interested in discourse in a variety of ways . 
.. /' (xi). Kermedy mentions nothing about disdpline, or who can and caimot 
read his book. I intend my dissertation to be another small example of a text 
available for students "interested in discourse in a variety of ways." My project 
crosses many disdplinary boundaries, explores many theoretical areas, and 
makes several rhetorical leaps. I have accomplished what I set out to do with 
this dissertation, namely conceive a manuscript that uses tenets from speech 
communication, rhetoric, and professional communication, with a little art, 
anthropology, and cultural studies thrown in for good measure. If rhetoric is 
"the human effort to induce cooperation through the use of symbols," (Brock et. 
al. 14), rhetorical studies should be open to all students interested in the 
commurucative cooperation that results from the combination of these symbols. 
The study of human communication is a task for many different scholars in 
many different fields. No matter who does the examination of the artifact, or 
who takes the theory and applies it elsewhere, the task remains the same: the 
study of communication. That task crosses all boundaries. 
I indude one more story/performance to end this chapter, as I ended 
Chapter One. The performances I detail in these narratives (an Anderson 
concert and a David Byrne concert) are significant to this project for three 
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reasons. On a performance-as-aesthetic-event level, the work in them is of the 
greatest caliber—artistic, captivating, and thought-provoking. Spending a 
Saturday night with Laurie Anderson or David Byrne is a worthy investment in 
a cultural event. On an academic level, these performances are drenched with 
the interplay of texts and contexts plus the problematization of cultural 
constructs. Anderson's and Byrne's performances are perfect candidates for 
studies such as this one. On a personal level, these performances free me to do 
more artistic, creative work, both inside emd outside academe. Performance is 
ever5^here, and I participate with curiosity. 
• • • 
August 1997 
I haven't seen David Byrne since 1989. When I heard David Byrne was 
coming to Minneapolis, / immediately called joel. YJe knew we'd have to go 
together—both of our spouses would hate this show. But it's not a hardship, 
because we enjoy being together, especially in the pursuit of interesting concert 
experiences. We come to David Byrne as friends united in funky avant-garde 
aesthetic sensibilities. First Anderson, now this. Who could ask for more? 
The opening band is great, and foel and I agree we need to buy their CD, 
maybe before we buy David Byrne's. They're from New Orleans, and they layer 
the classic Dixieland jazz with funky horns and hip-hop, of all things. You 
wouldn't think it works, but it does. They play a 45-minute set, and my analytic 
mind begins to zuhir about ten minutes into the show. Who is performing here 
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(Cool Bone)? Who are thcij (eight younger black men)? What is their text 
(stories about the lives and relaticmships of black men, told in rap/hip-hop 
rhyme)? What are thc]/ problematizing (black men and black culture)? What are 
the historical and cultural roots of their music? Why did David Byrne choose 
them for his opening act? As I enjoy the music, [ think about all these questions, 
and I realize I'm not relaxing quite as much as I had planned. Stop thinking, I 
tell myself But the performance nuances [ have been working out in my 
dissertation keep weaving themselves in and out of their big brass sound. 
When they leave thc stage, I turn to Joel and say "Guess what I'm doing." 
He asks "What?" and laughs when I tell him I'm writing my conclusion in my 
head. He tells me to quit it and shakes his head in amusement. Joel is smart; he 
plans on completing a master's degree, and stopping. 
After some equipment and set changes, the lights dim again. The crowd 
begins to cheer, most of them on their feet. We're in the balcony, so we can see 
the floor wavering, a field of bodies szuai/ing in anticipation. The musicians 
come on stage, and finally David Byrne emerges in a hot pink fringe-fur suit, 
with a lime green shirt. He looks like a Muppet on crack, but it fazes no one. His 
looks are part of the craziness. We all know he's a genius. He begins with one of 
the most popular Talking Heads songs: 
And you my find yourself living in a shotgun shack. 
And you may find yourself in another part of thc world. 
And you may find yourself behind thc wheel of a large automobile. 
And you may find yourself in a beautiful house. 
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with a beautiful wife. Ami yo/i ittay ask yourself, 
"Well . . . how did / ^et here?" 
• • • 
And you may ask yourself, "What is that beautiful house?" 
And you may ask yourself, "Where docs that highway go to? 
And you may ask yourself, "Am I right? Am I wrong?" 
And you may siry to yourself "MY GOD! WHAT HAVE I DONE?" 
(What the Songs Look Like 27} 
It's the song I heard on the way to the concert. It seems appropriate: what have I 
done to myself, thinking I can finish a dissertation? Am I right? Am I wrong? 
It's one of my all-time favorite Talking Heads songs. 
He segues into "Making Flippy-Floppy," and the crowd keeps cheering, 
dancing, clapping. The energxf in this theatre is enormous, as is the sound. He 
has a female vocalist, who looks like a throwback from 1968, a bass player who 
looks like he's straight from a Jamaican beach, a keyboard and steel pedal guitar 
player who looks like a washing machine repairman, and a kind of "webmaster" 
of the stage who looks like a computer geek, zvho seems to be running the show 
with a PowerBook. For five people, they make a lot of music. Their energy 
matches the energy of all of us who are dancing. David Byrne looks like 
popcorn, bouncing all over the stage. He's 45, and he has the energy of an 
eighteen-year-old gynmast. He looks like energy—he's skinny, with no fat on 
him. He's crazed. He stops bounding around to do some of his signature "jerk 
dancing," and becomes a possessed marionette. No one shuts up, no one sits 
dozvn. It's too much fun. Joining in is imperative. 
206 
My mind begins, again, to think about what he's doing on an analytical 
level. I dance, listen to the music, and think. What are his texts (old Talking 
Heads songs, for now)? What is his context (this ornate theatre with millions of 
gilt angels, his history as an avant-garde musician, my personal ties to his work, 
that Muppet suit I'm sure his costume-designer spouse made)? What am I 
doing?!?!?!?!?!? I tell my brain to relax and be quiet—or at least try, I have to get 
out of dissertation mode, at least for a couple of hours. David Byrne's 
performance is for another project. 
But I keep thinking. 
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NOTES 
' For more on the negotiation of communication, see the work of paralogic hermeneutidsts. 
Faralogic hermeneutics argues that we negotiate communication from moment to moment, and these 
negotiations form our communication activity. Rhetorician Thomas Kent and philosopher Donald 
Davidson have done most of the work in par^ogic hermeneutics. 
- Maclean's book Narrative as Performance: The Baudelarian Experiment (1988, Routledge) is an 
excellent study of how narratives are integral in performance. She uses the work of Barthes, 
Balzac, Mcirin, LaFontaine, and Baudelaire to explore the relationships within narrative 
performances. Because this work is outside of the scope of this dissertation, I have not relied 
heavily on Maclean. 
^e "interpretive turn" allows us to examine commimication within our own biases, points of view, 
and ideologies. Geertz and other interpretive anthropologists are at the forefront of this school of 
thought. The "interpretive turn" has been adopted, with success, in composition and rhetoric. 
Stem and Henderson consider four elements as integral to a performance: text, context, performer, 
and audience. 
 ^ For a thorough discussion of performance, ritual, theatre, and the importance of performance to 
humans' lives, see Turner's germinal volume From Ritual To Theatre: The Human Seriousness of 
Play.  
 ^ For a thorough discussion of dissoi logoi, see Susan Jarratfs book Rereading the Sophists. 
'' Part of Plato's problem with the Sophists, in general, was their apparent reliance on style for 
their eloquence. The charge of "style without substance" is one of the main arguments against 
sophistic rhetoric. For a dry treatment of the topic, see George A. Kermed3r's chapter on the 
Sophists in his Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modem 
Times. 
* See Richard Leo Enos's volume Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle for a differing viewpoint on 
individual and community involvement in the sophistic tradition. Enos also addresses the 
diversity within the sophistic tradition. 
' For another discussion of narrative and dcissical rhetoric, see Douglas Hesse's cirticle "Aristotle's 
Poetics and Rhetoric: Narrative as Rhetoric's Fourth Mode." 
Narrative theory has emerged in psychology, sociology, organizational communication, 
professional communication, political science, anthropology, history, and pedagogy. For excellent 
examples of narrative scholarship, see articles and books by Nancy Blyler, Jerome Bruner, Edward 
Bruner, E)ennis Mumby, and Hayden C. White. Many of these authors have been cited here, but 
each has several works devoted to narrative. 
" These requirements for informative visuals (plus others) are detailed in Tufte's first book. The 
Visual Display of Quantitative Information (Graphics Press, 1983). 
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'* For more discussion of the aesthetic attitude, see other aesthetidans like Monroe Beardsley, 
George Dickie, or Vincent Tomas. The distant, aesthetic attitude towards art is not often employed 
in contemporary discussions of art 
See Gui Boi\siepe's article "Visual/Verbal Rhetoric," published in Ulm 14-16 (1965): 23-40, for 
further discussion of Bonsiepe's position on visual rhetoric. This article is difficult to find because 
Ulm is a German publication; the article is written in German and English. 
" For a discussion of the "preparedness" of communication interactions, see the works of Tom Kent or 
other paralogic hermeneutidsts. The tenets of paralogic hermeneutics could have a large bearing 
on the argument for or against performative rhetoric; however, induding that argument here would 
dilute the topic at hand. 
 ^For a thorough, easy to read discussion of Foucaulf s impact on communication studies, see Foss, 
Foss, and Trapp's chapter devoted to Foucault in Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, second 
edition. The authors provide a comprehensive look at Foucaulf s theories and his emergence in 
rhetorical studies. 
Foucault's volume The Archaeology of Language provides an extensive discussion of Foucault's 
theories of discourse. 
For an up-to-date analysis of the regulatory/transformatory power of Foucaulfs theories of 
sexucdity, see David Halperin's book Saint Foucault. 
Problematization provides a larger discussion of a topic, such as sexuality. Problematization 
allows us to explore cultural institutions and ideas tied to sexuality; is not a set of activities or a 
method of study. Deconstruction, for example, gives scholars a chance to carefully and thoroughly 
dissect a particular term that might come from the problematization of sexuality, such as 
heterosexuality. Deconstruction is more distinctly a method of inquiry, where problematization is 
a point of departure for inquiry rather than a particular set of terms or actions. 
" Clifford Geertz provides a discussion of art as cultural communication in his essay "Art as a 
Cultural System," induded in Local Knowledge. 
 ^A thorough history of conceptual art or performance art is not integral to this study because I am 
not situating Anderson within those traditions. Instead, I situate her within performance studies, 
which has been covered in Chapter Two. 
Though Anderson does not seem to intend Sharkey to be "crazy," her Sharkey character exhibits 
the tendendes of schizophrenia as described by physidan Jack M. Gorman. According to Gorman, 
"the hallmarks of schizophreiua are hallucinations, delusions, thought disorder, and abnormal 
affect [mood]" (202). Rather than daiming Sharkey as an escaped mental patient, Sharkey seems 
to indicate, instead, that someone who would be assigned a diagnosis of schizophrenia (or another 
mental illness) has some useful political and sodal insight. 
~ For research in the field of professional commtmication, see Blyler and Thralls' volume, OdeU 
and Goswami's Writing in Non-Academic Settings (1985), and artides from the foumal of Business 
and Technical Communication. As a field, professioneil communication is constantly evolving. The 
scholarship of individuals such as Blyler, Thralls, Odell, Goswami, Mary M. Lay, Arm Hill Duin, 
BGtty Locker, Richcurd Freed, Charles Kostelruck, Rebecca Burnett, Phillipa Benson, Ben Barton, 
Marthalee Barton, and Elizabeth Tebeaux make the field constantly new. 
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